Conditions of Depleting Offender Behavior in Volunteering Dilemma: An Agent-Based Simulation Study

Abstract

In this paper, an agent-based model of bystanders e ect on volunteering in a crime situation is presented. The model is pivoted on the results of a game- theoretic experimentation of the volunteering dilemma (1), emphasizing the role of guilt in increasing the volunteering tendency. An analytical model of by- standers e ect on volunteering (2) is extended so that it incorporates multiple interventions and changes in agents' beliefs to be used in subsequent interactions. However, the main contribution is the model extension including the guilt prop- agation, subsequently responsible for increases in volunteering tendency. We also introduce a new model of o ender behavior, that operates in conjunction with the model of volunteering. The model is simulated asking interesting \what-if" questions with particular focus on decreasing o ending tendencies. The results of the simulation reveal that, the model we have proposed, validates the theo- retical foundations of bystanders e ect on volunteering and importance of guilt in increasing the volunteering tendency.