Abstract:
This study empirically analyzes the performance of Uniswap DAO from the perspectives of market trends, governance structure, and token holding concentration. First, the treasury growth model using OLS showed that indicators such as token price, total diluted valuation, liquidity, trading volume, fees, TVL, and market capitalization significantly contributed to the increase in quarterly fund balance (all with p < 0.01). Next, in the fee structure model based on principal components analysis, it was observed that PC1, representing market size and efficiency, significantly increased fees (β = 11.90 million, p < 0.01), while PC2, reflecting governance participation, showed no impact. Furthermore, in the developer commits model, it was confirmed that both market efficiency (PC1), governance/development activity (PC2), and the change in liquidity structure (PC3) are strongly correlated with the increase in the number of developer commits (p < 0.01). Finally, in the Gini coefficient model using ARDL(4,1,3,2,2), the Gini coefficient of the current period was found to be highly dependent on the values from the previous period (Giniₜ₋₁ = 0.718, p < 0.01) and four periods ago (Giniₜ₋₄ = 0.068, p < 0.05), with the lagged Nakamoto coefficient and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of the current period also being significant predictors, while the influence of entropy and transaction volume showed no consistency. Furthermore, the Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient (0.78) revealed high asset inequality among Uniswap holders, and Nakamoto's analysis highlighted the serious risk of centralization, with the top nine addresses holding over 50% of the voting rights. These findings indicate that while DAOs are theoretically "decentralized," in practice, power tends to be concentrated in the hands of an economic and voting elite, underscoring the need for a more equitable and accessible governance design.
