Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in South Asia: A Case of India and Pakistan

Abstract

The nuclearization of South Asia has forged a paradoxical reality where the threat of catastrophic nuclear war coexists with efforts to achieve strategic stability. This study examines the delicate balance between deterrence and insecurity within the context of the India-Pakistan dyad and critically evaluates how nuclear weapons have shaped their conflict dynamics. Based on nuclear deterrence theory, the research analyses key episodes like the Kargil Conflict, the Pulwama- Balakot crisis, and others to assess the strength of deterrence in limiting major confrontation and promoting continued low-intensity conflicts. By critically analysing nuclear doctrines like India’s “Cold Start” and Pakistan’s “Full Spectrum Deterrence,” the study highlights their precarious equilibrium’s strategic calculus. Beyond evaluating effectiveness, this study identifies critical challenges and limitations of the South Asian nuclear environment. It demonstrates that past animosities, asymmetrical capabilities, and the presence of non-state actors increase the likelihood of miscalculation and escalation. Additionally, the lack of effective communication channels and the dependence on external actors, (like the United States and China) for crisis management highlights the vulnerability of stability in the region. Therefore, this study concludes by suggesting policy recommendations to fill such gaps. The outcomes of this research shed light on the complexities of enforcing nuclear deterrence strategies and demonstrates the need to enhance confidencebuilding measures, crisis management solutions, and sustainable dialogue in order to navigate the region’s complex security landscape.