FM Attack: Mitigation and Robust Control in a Smart Grid

Abstract

It is very challenging to construct an effective, environmentally friendly, and versatile smart grid cyber-physical system (CPS) while retaining high resilience and security, especially given the constantly evolving cyber threat scenario. The expansion of communication and information technology throughout the electrical grid and the hacker community's greater access to sophisticated hacking tools are both factors in the issue. The biggest security threat in smart grid CPS is increasing number of false data injection (FDI) attacks. Wide area monitoring and measurement systems for smart grids are vulnerable to a significant category of cyber attacks known as FDI attacks. They trick control centres to operate incorrectly by manipulating the measurements of various phasor measurement devices and electrical sensors. latest research has shown that if an attacker is completely aware of the transmission-line admittance values and the topology of power grid, they can successfully modify the FDI attack vector to avoid detection and pass the residue-based bad data detection method that are frequently used in state estimation of power systems. For smart grid CPSs to counter these security problems and further protect the electrical system, mitigation strategies for FDI assaults have been a prominent area of research. Conventional state estimation-based bad data detection methods, however, have been shown to be susceptible to developing FDI attacks. To fill this gap, an ideal strategy that successfully reduces bogus data injection assaults is needed. To reduce the effects of FDI attacks in a multi-area interconnected smart grid CPS, this paper suggests an H2 control technique. By including communication delays, disruptions, and uncertainties, smart grid system performance can be evaluated.