Abstract:
The terminology “Indo-Pacific” has been used as a geographical notion for many decades. Since 2010, it has progressively become a recognized political and strategic concept in the foreign policy lexicon of United States. China, though, is reluctant to identify itself as part of Indo-Pacific, primarily because of its deeply rooted suspicion towards U.S. led Indo-Pacific strategy which aims to contain China’s rise. While the conflict between the two notions, the Indo-Pacific and the Asia-Pacific, may be amicably resolved in the future, US-China strategic competition has just begun. In the post-Cold War era a simmering US-China strategic rivalry was subsumed by an untenable accommodation of mutual self-interests of Washington and Beijing. However, now the escalating tensions between China and the U.S. have spurred fears that U.S is moving towards a trajectory of recreating Cold War. Although conflict is inevitable, however, aggressive strategies that unnecessarily aggravate the sources of rivalry are most likely to prove perilously counterproductive. One such outcome of this strategy is the AUKUS Pact which is analyzed as a case study in this thesis. For the first time in history two nuclear weapon states, U.S. and UK forsaking the IAEA regulations, are transferring nuclear powered submarines to a non-nuclear weapon state, Australia. At this point, paradoxically, U.S. has accepted the reality of decline in its relative power so this pact is a competitive instrument to counter China. Nevertheless, this thesis asserts that the changing parameters after AUKUS has provoked China for countermeasures thus instigating an arms race. Moreover, the grave nonproliferation implications of this arrangement has set a damaging precedent for the would-be proliferators. With an empirical focus this research examines the Beijing response to a triggered Cold War 2.0.
