

MEDIA COVERAGE OF POPULIST LEADERS OF PAKISTAN AND INDIA: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ELITE AND POPULAR PRESS



ANBREEN WAHEED

01-285191-001

A dissertation submitted in the partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
PhD Media Studies

Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences

Bahria University Islamabad

October 2025

Approval for Examination

Scholar's Name: Anbreen Waheed

Registration No. 01-285191-001

Programme of Study: PhD Media Studies

Thesis Title: Media Coverage of Populist Leaders of Pakistan and India: A Comparative Study of Elite and Popular Press

It is to certify that the above scholar's thesis has been completed to my satisfaction and, to my belief, its standard is appropriate for submission for examination. I have also conducted plagiarism test of this thesis using HEC prescribed software and found similarity index 12% that is within the permissible limit set by the HEC for the PhD degree thesis. I have also found the thesis in a format recognized by the BU for the PhD thesis.

Principal Supervisor's Signature: _____

Date: _____

Name: Dr. Shabbir Hussian

Author's Declaration

I, Miss. ANBREEN WAHEED hereby state that my PhD thesis titled "Media Coverage of Populist Leaders of Pakistan and India: A Comparative study of Elite and Popular Press" is my own work and has not been submitted previously by me for taking any degree from Bahria University, Islamabad Campus or anywhere else in the country/world.

At any time if my statement is found to be incorrect even after my graduation, the University has the right to withdraw/cancel my PhD degree.

Name of Scholar: ANBREEN WAHEED

Date: _____

Plagiarism Undertaking

I, solemnly declare that research work presented in the thesis titled “Media Coverage of Populist Leaders of Pakistan and India: A Comparative Study of Elite and Popular Press” is solely my research work with no significant contribution from any other person. Small contribution / help wherever taken has been duly acknowledged and that complete thesis has been written by me.

I understand the zero-tolerance policy of the HEC and Bahria University towards plagiarism. Therefore, I as an Author of the above titled thesis declare that no portion of my thesis has been plagiarized and any material used as reference is properly referred / cited.

I undertake that if I am found guilty of any formal plagiarism in the above titled thesis even after award of PhD degree, the university reserves the right to withdraw / revoke my PhD degree and that HEC and the University has the right to publish my name on the HEC / University website on which names of students are placed who submitted plagiarized thesis.

Author's Sign: _____

Name of the Student: ANBREEN WAHEED

Dedication

To my beloved mother and father.

Acknowledgement

All praises to Almighty Allah, who gives calm, hope and motivation to, dejected hearts. Who gives and forgives even knowing all our faults and defiance. And pays huge tribute and countless Darood-o-Slam upon the last Prophet of Allah, Hazrat Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم. Who reformed humanity into a civilized, modern and moderate way of life. I would like to pay my special appreciations and Thanks to my reverend supervisor Prof. Dr. Shabir Hussain for his endless support, guidance and coordination while conducting this study. I owe him a great respect. Here I would also like to mention sincere guidance of Dr. Syed Abdul Siraj, Dr. Farrukh Shahzad and all other faculty of Media Studies (BU). Special thanks to all my colleagues, Friends and Class fellows for their endless support and guidance.

Librarians at Bahria University also deserve special thanks for their assistance in supplying the relevant literatures. My class fellow Dr. Tabinda Sadiq should also be recognised for their support. My sincere appreciation also extends to all my, friends and colleagues who have provided assistance at various occasions. Their views and tips are useful indeed. Unfortunately, it is not possible to list all of them in this limited space. I am grateful to all my family members.

Abstract

This study examines the coverage of populist leaders in the newspapers of India and Pakistan, focusing on how the newspapers frames the populist leaders in both pre-election and post-election phases. By analysing key framing strategies, media-genic attributes, and issue types, the research aims to highlight the distinct approaches taken by the newspapers during critical political phases. The study employs a quantitative content analysis of coverage from four selected newspapers: *Dawn* (Pakistan), *The News* (Pakistan), *The Hindu* (India), and *The Times of India* (India). Framing theory serves as the theoretical framework for examining the primary discursive strategies.

The findings reveal that among the Approach-Based Frames, the most prominent strategies were the "People-Centric" and "Anti-Elitist" frames, while "Nationalism," "Moralism," and "Personalization" were less commonly used. The "People-Centric" frame was predominantly applied during the pre-election coverage of populist leaders in both India and Pakistan. In contrast, the "Anti-Elitist" frame emerged as the most common in post-election coverage. Additionally, in the Language-Based Frames, there was a shift from the "Emotive Language" frame in the pre-election period to the "Demonizing Language" frame post-election, with the latter being frequently used to describe populist leaders in both countries.

In the pre-election period, the tone of the press was generally supportive, but it became more critical after the election. Throughout both phases, various media-genic attributes were ascribed to populist leaders, with "Human Interest" attributes being the most frequently used. However, after the election, there was a noticeable increase in the use of "Controversial Attributes."

Overall, this research contributes to the understanding of how the newspapers in these two neighbouring South Asian countries shape political narratives around populist figures, providing insights into the relationship between populism and media framing.

Table of Contents

Approval for Examination	ii
Author’s Declaration.....	iii
Plagiarism Undertaking	iv
Dedication.....	v
Acknowledgement	vi
Abstract.....	vii
List of Tables	xii
List of Figures.....	xiii
List of Appendices	xiv
CHAPTER 1	1
INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background	1
1.2 Media Contribution to Boom Populism.....	2
1.3 Populism in the Global Scenario	8
1.3.1 Rise of Populism in Pakistan	9
1.3.2 Imran Khan as a Populist Leader	11
1.3.3 Mapping Populism in India.....	13
1.3.4 Historical perspective of Populism in India	14
1.3.5 Narendra Modi as a Populist Leader	15
1.4 Media in the Context of India and Pakistan.....	17
1.4.1 Media Settings of Pakistan.....	17
1.4.2 Media Settings of India	18
1.5 Statement of the Problem	20

1.6	Significance of the Study.....	21
1.7	Objectives of the Research.....	21
1.8	Research Questions and Hypotheses.....	22
CHAPTER 2		24
LITERATURE REVIEW		24
2.1	Overview.....	24
2.2	Populism.....	24
2.3	Populism as an Ideology	28
2.3.1	People-Centric Approach.....	29
2.3.2	Anti-Elitism Approach	31
2.3.3	Individual Centric Approach	34
2.3.4	Nationalism Approach.....	36
2.3.5	Moralism Approach.....	39
2.4	Populism as a Political Style.....	41
2.4.1	Populist’s Rhetoric.....	42
2.5	Populism as a Political Strategy.....	46
2.6	Paralleling the Approaches:.....	47
2.6.1	Political Behavior and Populism	48
2.6.2	Demographical Behavior in Populism.....	51
2.7	Political System and Media Logic in the Context of India and Pakistan ...	53
2.8	Theoretical Framework.....	56
2.8.1	Framing Theory	57
2.8.2	Populism Theory	60
2.9	Research Gaps	69
CHAPTER 3		75
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY		75
3.1	Content Analysis.....	75
3.2	Research Design	77
3.3	Selection of Medium	77
3.4	Rational of the Newspapers	78

3.5	Sampling and Time Period of the Study	83
3.8	Content Categorization Scheme	86
3.8.5	Frames	89
3.8.6	Mediagenic Attributes	92
3.9	Inter-coder Reliability	94
3.10	Intra-Coder Reliability.....	96
3.11	Data Analysis	96
CHAPTER-4.....		97
DATA ANALYSIS.....		97
4.1	Description of Findings	97
4.2	Test of Research Questions and Hypothesis	100
CHAPTER 5		123
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION		123
5.1	Discussion	123
5.2	Conclusion.....	129
5.3	Implication of the Study	132
5.4	Delimitation of the Study	133
5.4	Recommendations	134
Notes.....		135
CHAPTER 6		137
REFERNCES.....		137

List of Tables

Table 1 Frequency of News Stories _____	98
Table 2 Frequency of Tone, Time period, Topic and Frames in the Coverage _____	99
Table 3 Distribution of Approach Based Frames _____	101
Table 4 Distribution of Language Based Frames _____	103
Table 5 Media Genic-Attributes in Press _____	105
Table 6 Topics Covered in Frames _____	108
Table 7 Coverage Tone in Pre-Election and Post-Election Time Period _____	110
Table 8 Framing Strategies in Pre-Election and Post-Election Scenarios _____	112
Table 9 Language-Based Frames in the Press _____	115
Table 10 Coverage of Populist Leaders in Pre-Election and Post-Election _____	115
Table 11 Topics in Pre-Election and Post-Election Period _____	117
Table 12 Media-Genic Attributes in Pre-Election and Post-Election _____	119
Table 13 Comparative Media Framing and Coverage of Populist Leaders in Pakistan and India _____	119

List of Figures

Figure 1 Comparison of Populist Characteristics in Pakistan and India	19
Figure 2 Comparative Features of Populism in Pakistan and India	63
Figure 3 Literature perspective of Comparative Framing Patterns in Media Coverage	68
Figure 4 Summary of Media Populism	180
Figure 5 Summary of Literature Concerning Populism in General	182
Figure 6 Summary of Literature Concerning People-Centric Approach	184
Figure 7 Summary of Literature Concerning Political Polarization	185
Figure 8 Summary of Literature Concerning Individual-Centric Approach	186
Figure 9 Summary of Literature Concerning Nationalism Approach	187
Figure 10 Summary of Literature Concerning Moralism Approach	189
Figure 11 Summary of Literature Concerning Populists' Rhetoric	191
Figure 12 Summary of Literature Concerning Political Behavior	193

List of Appendices

Appendix A Coding Sheet	153
Appendix A Coding Sheet	155
Appendix A Coding Sheet	158

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This chapter offers an overview of the research by introducing the topic, and outlining significance of the study. It provides background information to contextualize the research and defines the problem statement of the study. The chapter discuss in detail the origin and history of populism. And focuses on the detail introduction of both populist leaders e.g. Imran Khan (Pakistan) and Modi (India) respectively. Also, presents research objectives, research questions and hypothesis, to prominence the importance and latent contributions to both theory and practice.

1.1 Background

Populism has become a well-known phenomenon due to the widespread popularity of various Western democracies. Numerous scholarships share the growth and spread of populism, particularly in Western Europe in the area of right-wing populists (Aalberg et al., 2017; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008b; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). But some studies have looked at populist communication in the media (e.g. Akkerman, 2011; Bos et al., 2011; Rooduijn, 2014). Populism is repeatedly referred to as "notoriously vague" (Canovan 1999, p. 3). Wear (2008) said that the nature of

populism is hollow, which deficiencies values. Populism whether among rightist or leftist parties and between opposition or in power is not a novel phenomenon. In fact, from the last decade the escalation of populist and authoritarian establishments has been the most debated topic for scholars (Boyras, 2018). One of the reasons for the remarkable attention to this issue is the multiple effects of populist phenomena on political, social and economic levels (Cocco, 2022). Schenkel (2024) underscores the importance of nuanced policy responses and acknowledges the influence of political factors, particularly populism on each policy type. Only expert recommendations do not ensure an effective government response rather may align with different populist narratives and attitudes. The Likelihood to recognize populism, while exploring phenomenon and its aspects, Vreese et al. (2018) identified different sorts of populism with the reference of style and content (Aalberg et al., 2017; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) as Complete populism, Excluding populism, Anti-elitist populism and Empty populism includes. Complete populism, excluding populism and anti-elitist populism embraces references and appeals to the people and exclusion of out-groups, while, empty populism comprises only reference and appeals to the people

1.2 Media Contribution to Boom Populism

From the most well-known populist events in Europe that movements and their leaders frequently appear to rely on "media complicity." Several times, it seems that the European media helped to legitimize the issues, mottos, and communication philosophies that populist politicians like. Through the use of communication tactics that guarantee media coverage, "underdog" leaders who aim to attract public attention have consistently demonstrated their ability to take advantage of the media's inclination to cover anything that "breaks the routine" in political arenas. This "supply and demand" dynamic causes the populist message to become more visible and have a substantial impact on a larger audience. To put it another way, whether on purpose or not, the media may be operative tools for

populist cause mobilization (Mazzoleni, 2008). It is evident that no causal connections between the media and the rise of populism are implied. However, when analyzing the mechanisms of media-promoted portrayal and the symbolic establishment of positive public attitudes – as well as populist leadership, ideology, and behavior, it discovers that the media contributes considerably to the emergence of populist phenomena. Naturally, the media component is by no means the sole independent variable at play here. That is to say, it is impossible to isolate media activity from the other structural elements that are examined in this volume, including the characteristics of the social and cultural political climates and the structure of the political system (Mazzoleni, 2008).

Media populism is primarily defined as using the particular ideological and stylistic elements by the relevant media platform. These ideological and stylistic elements may involve: framing the political facts in a particular manner, constructing favoritism regarding political groups, hostility towards politicians and elites (Frank et al., 2017). In this context, the relationship between populism and media is always considered as “Mediatization of politics”. A majority of the existing literature concerning populism in media perceive populism as a force threatening and undermining the democratic sphere as the media content gives a wider exposure and visibility to politicians answering the marketability and newsworthiness (Manucci, 2016). In such a scenario, Akkerman (2011) considers media as a source of political debate that serves the commercialized purposes of media. It also gives an opportunity to politicians to adopt a populist stance as a competitive advantage as compared to prominent politicians.

Moreover, besides construction of several frames and representations, media populism also involves highlighting the characteristics and attitudes of populists to indicate the relevance and gain support from the public. Still, populism is different than merely creating the perceptions of non-elite political actors. Also, we need more ideological details to grasp the ideological facets of populism including criticism on the democratic institutions, evaluation regarding leadership characteristics, and other relevant political matters (Krämer, 2014).

During the past few years, populist parties worldwide have gained much popularity and support especially during the election. One of the assumptions behind this increased popularity is the media support and coverage given to the populist parties which is directly or indirectly giving prominence and benefits to the populism all over the world. According to Kalogeropoulos (2019) media populism seeks strategic alliance with the political parties to run the mediatized political movements. However, sometimes populists may run their politics through news media to run their own political interests. Despite media also oppose populists yet the aim is to highlight and support the populist strategies undercover.

A prominent example of media populism can be cited from the journalistic campaigns. These campaigns focus on popular sentiments and also play the role of political actor leading to increase and strengthen the political influence and also to attract the audience. While Stewart (2003) believed that, media logic is advantageous for the populism by fostering the sentiments regarding i.e., crisis, social concerns, insecurity, and the relevant media platform is more concerned about the public wellbeing and development. In contrast, the tabloid newspapers tend to familiarize people about the worldviews and political debates even if the media platform is committed to preserved and improve the links with the established government institutions. Yet media platforms do not expose their support for the populism or the populist movements but sometimes they withdraw this support if their news values decrease or their stance is opposed by the audience. Here Akkerman (2011) discussed and highlighted the difference between popular press and quality news media. As noted, that, the populist media platforms are supposed to prioritize the public wellbeing, express their anti-elite stance, and to focus on conflicts. In this respect, popular media should offer favorable rambling opportunity structure for the populist groups. To further address the potential of populist newspapers, Akkerman (2011) empirically examined the Dutch newspapers. The researcher selected three prominent newspapers i.e., *The Sun*, *Telegraf*, and the British National Party (BNP) and gathered data by using the content analysis method. Findings indicated that, there is no significant difference based on the power of both populist and quality news media. Yet, the populist press focused more on highlighting the populist movements than the quality newspapers. Also, the populist parties did not show any anti-elite

biased with the fellow populist parties. On the contrary, Esser et al., (2016) disagreed with the mediatized focus towards populists as a prevailing phenomenon as they recognize three pervasive media coverage patterns:

First, populists received less media coverage if they are comparatively more marginalized and receive less support from the public. This coverage reduces more if any rival political parties stand against the weak populists to exclude them from the power. For example, if Belgian populist parties gain strength and popularity among the public (such as populist part of Vlaams Belang), they received more coverage. If they receive less support, media coverage decreased that eventually leads to a total loss of media interest.

Second, the negative coverage is not always bad or undermines the public interests. For example, Swedish Democrats gained increased media attention as compared to those even in the dominating government. As a result, increased media coverage resulted in gaining more power for poll numbers of the democrats despite much of the media coverage was negative, it largely benefitted the democrats. Thus, the negative coverage led to positive results for the Swedish populists leading to their distinguished victory in the election.

Third, involves the critical concern of media regarding the role of populism in undermining or facilitating the established governments. For instance, the right-wing populist parties in Germany can expect critical yet strong media coverage. Even German educational institutions and courts also consider this as a political right of populist parties. This mutual agreement and shared attitude are also justified by the German history as media convey this mutual consensus, right-wing German populist parties do not have a long-lasting success.

A study conducted by Hameleers and Vliegthart (2020), further addressed populism in news media by empirically examining the newspapers in the Netherlands. The researchers conducted the content analysis and selected sample Dutch newspapers published from 1990 to 2017. Results revealed that, as compared to the older times, contemporary newspapers reporting gave a strong focus to populists in the Dutch newspapers. Yet during the past 28 years, the focus towards populist movements, anti-elitism, increased preference

to common man, and left and right exclusionism subsequently increased as one of the major focuses of Dutch news media.

Moreover, Manucci and Weber (2017) contradicted the notion regarding an increased media exposure to populism only during the election. As argued that, populist stance is not prominent only during the election instead it always remains as one of the main topics and an important part of media coverage. Despite during election, party manifesto and news media campaigns tend to focus more on populist movements. However, this increased focus towards populism took place during the last few years of the nineteenth century. Many researchers also witness the role of media in accelerating and popularizing the populist stance and discourses, they attributed this to the Mediatization of the political matters. Manucci and Weber (2017) further examined the development of populism in the European media from 1970s to the 2010. Their study addressed two basic questions **(i)** whether political parties articulated populist debates only during the course of election? And **(ii)** whether and to what extent focus towards populism has increased overtime in the Western European media content? (Germany, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland). Findings showed that, populism is not a new phenomenon for the European media content, indicating no linear expansion during the last decades. Besides, the researchers also found increased populist movements during the course of election, yet this exposure remain prominent during the normal situations as well. This study affirmed the idea regarding populism as a persistent part of mediatized public discourse. Also, it can be concluded that, mediatized populist content does not provoke any potential anthropological mutation in the Western Europe. As noted by Manucci and Weber (2017) mainstream political parties are not mainly populist. Despite we can anticipate their stance in the near future they have gained a strong media exposure due to their manifesto. Whether or not these parties will adopt an explicit populist stance, they are having a stable position in the Western European politics along-with their party manifesto as populist and focused towards anti elitism.

A study conducted by Salojarvi (2019) further examined the portrayals of politicians in the Venezuelan populists regulated newspapers photographs. The researcher compared one populist owned and one state owned newspapers to examine visual representations of

political leaders in the country. Data gathered from the visual rhetorical representations and content analysis of the newspapers revealed that, Hugo Chavez was represented as mainly occupying much space in the photographs as a strong political leader. The relevant newspapers constructed his image as a strong, authentic, experience, and patriotic leader focusing towards development of his country. On the other hand, the anti-Chavez news photographs represented him as less concerned and traditional regarding his country's wellbeing. Thus, Salojarvi (2019) concluded that media representation is a multi-dimensional process, that is based on the aim and ownership regarding its reporting preferences. Both types of representations studied in the current study witness how the political leaders are portrayed through the media based on their political stance (Political or Populism). In such a situation when media representations are based on the type and objectives of the ownership especially populist stance and ownership, media can also become a threat to a strong democratic system. As argued by Calléja (2020). The concept of "the people" in populism has changed much during the last century and today it is considered as more destructive due to the role of media in representing the political scenario in a certain manner. For example, during the Cold War populism was mainly perceived a uniting the authoritarians and uneducated people however Soviet Union was representing populism as a true support for the democratic system and the common wellbeing. In this sense, people supporting populist movements were considered true citizens that were indirectly backing the political manipulation by the populist for their own interests. Indeed, populism is also considered as a discursive strategy that populist actors beyond the ideological span can implement (Ulinskaite & Pukelis, 2021).

So, (Rooduijn et al., 2014) argues that seeing populism as a thin-centered ideology does not eliminate the likelihood that it structures a specific discursive style as well: if the goal of populist leaders is to give back power to the common people, it is not surprising that they use the language of the people. It is also reasonable to expect ideology to impact party organization under some circumstances. Yet, there are also important theoretical and methodological differences that lead us to treat these approaches as distinct. Indeed, scholars

working in these traditions echo, often in the course of criticizing one another's definitions of populism.

For instance, Kaltwasser and Mudde (2012) whose work employs the ideational approach, criticize Laclau's discursive theory of populism, arguing that it equates populism with all forms of dualistic rhetoric, thus stretching the term beyond its theoretical limits and making it too abstract to be the object of a rigorous empirical analysis. Filc (2010) also suggests views of connection between ideology, discourse and political strategy, focusing on the interplay between social inclusion and exclusion in populist politics. Gidron (2013) classified three approaches to understand populism including political identity, political parties and political strategy. This study following the two approaches e.g. Political Ideology and political style to analyze the media coverage of populist leaders of India and Pakistan in the selected newspapers (See content categorization scheme).

1.3 Populism in the Global Scenario

South Asian populists are primarily concerned with fostering religious and ethnic differences, combating drug trafficking, notably methamphetamine trafficking, and attracting to the laboring and lower-middle classes. The common people, in particular, are dissatisfied with democracy because they feel democratic leaders have failed to address inequality, combat crime, or provide adequate public services (Kurlantzick, 2018).

Populism in South Asian nations such as Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh are some ways or another distinctive from that European partner since in these nations, migration isn't a major political migraine. The issues tended to by populism in these nations are diverse: countering elites, issues related to minorities, poverty, and humiliation (Kurlantzick, 2018). Populists in developing nations are inferring bolster primarily from the rising center classes and the optimistic youth in urban zones. In India, Pakistan, Turkey, Poland and Russia, images of 'illiberal religious resurgence' have been utilized by populist pioneers to energize

the social bunches. Whereas in created nations, populism centralizing state and political teach, since it sees them as elitist, separated and a risk to nearby communities (Bardhan, 2016).

1.3.1 Rise of Populism in Pakistan

Pakistan haven't vast list of leaders, who associated with populism due to unclear definition of 'elite' and the unauthentic representation of the masses. But the uncluttered democratic society and the anti-elitist engagements that emerged under dictatorships has been caused the success of populism in Pakistan (Yilmaz & Saleem, 2021). The occurrence of populism was started from subcontinent (Pakistan movement in 1940s), where Muslims were treated as minority 'the people' and Hindus as majority 'the others' (Jalal, 2010). Although the creation of Pakistan was based on Muslim identity (religion) but, after independence the father of nation Muhammad Ali Jinnah welcomed non-Muslims, especially Hindus and Christians (Yilmaz & Saleem, 2021). Apparently, the dream of pluralistic and secular Pakistan has gradually been Islamized. After Jinnah's demise in 1948, the Objective Resolution (draft for the constitution) was issued which stated that "sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone", but also includes "the state shall exercise its power and authority through elected representatives of the people (Ahmad, 2019; Pal, 2010; Yilmaz 2016). A combat of 1965 with India over Kashmir, expedited the growth of Islamic populism in Pakistan (Kapur & Ganguly, 2012).

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto would most likely be the first populist leader in Pakistan. But considering the past of Pakistan, particularly the history of East Pakistan (Bangladesh), Pakistan's first populist leader was Abul Kasem Fazlul Haq, widely famous as A.K. Fazlul Haq or Sher-e-Bangla (Lion of Bengal). He was famous as anti-elite and struggled against Hindu and Muslim landlords (Yilmaz & Saleem, 2021). The wave of left-wing populism in Pakistan was started in the late 60s, with Moulana Bhashani and Mujibur Rahman in East Pakistan and Bhutto in West Pakistan, all waving anti-elite placards. Both populist leaders

(Mujib and Bhutto) were rejected the constitution and declared to construct a fresh realm ^[1] Mujib's populism became the forerunner of Bangladesh's independence movement, while Bhutto's populism faded away once it began to address actual socioeconomic and governance issues (Nanda, 1972).

Bhutto populism was not a new marvel in third world politics, because of popularity of the leaders such as Sukarno (Indonesia), Nkrumah (Ghana), Peron (Argentina) and Castro (Cuba). But for West Pakistan, Bhutto is a new type of leader. Before him, the politicians usually had taken an unspectacular political tactic, by avoiding popular support to progress their objectives and determinations (Dutt, 2000). But Bhutto's superiority gradually began to fade as he became more authoritarian. The religious parties had never accepted Bhutto's religious authorizations and determined to form an alliance (Pakistan National Alliance). Sooner, the opposition and Alliance (PNA) "otherized" the "corrupt," "elite" and "un-Islamic" PPP leadership while putting themselves as an actual representative of pure people. Their influence, revolting, and conservative politics enforced Bhutto to constitutionally declaring Ahmadis non-Muslims, prohibition nightclubs and alcohol for Muslims also swap Sunday with Friday as the weekly vacation (Dawn, 2014).

The Islamization was imposed by the Military Ruler General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88) and elated right-wing religious parties to introduce the Nizam-e-Mustafa (Snellinger, 2018). The rhetoric and use of religious nationalism of Zia was pretty similar to populist rhetoric but he was not a populist. After the era of Zia, the country had faced bad governance, exploitation, institutional clashes and financial crisis that endangered the existence of the delicate democracy. This situation once again incited religious populism by the political parties (PPP & PML-N) and legislators to gain the support of their voters (Aziz, 2015). The PPP was now headed by Benazir Bhutto (daughter Z. A. Bhutto), she followed her father and adopted reformist populism and used the slogan of: *roti, kapra, makan* that impressed the working class and poverty-stricken crowd (*Sekine, 1992*). On contract, her populism was contradicted by the religious populism of Nawaz Sharif (PML-N). During their both terms in Government, the party greatly depends on religious populism; PML-N supporters repeatedly "otherized"

Bhutto by issuing *Fatwas*. And questioning the legality of Benazir Bhutto's government, the religious scholars fingered a woman ruling an Islamic state was sinful (Azeem, 2020).

In 1999, a fourth military ruler General Pervez Musharraf overthrew the second Sharif regime to "balance out" the state. Unlike Zia, the Musharraf Government didn't depend on religious populism. The 9/11 terrorist attacks put the Pakistan into the "war on terror" guaranteed that the cash-strapped country could rely on incoming foreign funds to survive (Ibrahim, 2009). After years of direct or indirect state support, radical groups such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) rebelled as the noose tightened around their necks. The Musharraf era assumed one of the most violent periods in the history of modern Pakistan, with suicide bombings devastating metropolises across the state (Looney, 2008). The state's refusal of religious populism was encountered with violence and carrying the "war on terror" home. Later, in 2006 the Laal Masjid episode aggravated the native and global terrorist sets e.g. Taliban (Pakistan or TTP), al-Qaeda, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and others suicide bomber attacked on Pakistan and assassination numbers of public (Scroggins, 2012). Benazir Bhutto was also victimized of that violence and executed in pre-election march in 2007. TTP is generally blamed for Benazir's death because of her anti-Mujahideed-e-Islam [2] views and strategies (The Economic Times, 2018).

Since the late 2000s to 2018s, the gradually shifted democracy in Pakistan has brought PPP and PML-N once more into the rule. But the paralyzed economic status because of 'war on terror' [3], Asia Bibi's Case [4] (2009), Salman Taseer's assassination [5] (2011), Sentenced to death by hanging Mumtaz Qadri [6] (2016) and the movement of Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan [7] for "saving the pride and greatness of the Prophet" (2018) have extraordinarily changed the religious populism in Pakistan (Pasha, 2016; Malik, 2018; Yilmaz & Saleem, 2021).

1.3.2 Imran Khan as a Populist Leader

Many political scientists regard Imran Khan as a populist leader. Since assuming power, he has pursued divisive legislative issues by at times quieting and at other times disparaging protesters (Gillani, M. S., 2020). Imran Khan emerged as a reformist leader. His outspoken approach is expected to improve his performance at both local and international levels. Khan's popularity among the public stemmed from his status as a national hero and lack of political background, which contributed to his rise to the position of populist leader (Abbas, 2018). The earliest Khan's strategy was anti-establishment and socioeconomic populism. He identified a gap in investment projects for human and educational development, focusing on basic human requirements. Pakistanis wanted for a populist leader who addressed their concerns and demands (Butt et al., 23). Imran Khan's populist style is distinguished by his communicate closeness to the audiences and energize them to support his vision for Pakistan. He employs individual shapes to express various issues such as patriotism, pluralism, religion, and debasement. His campaign was ruled by offers to conventional devout convictions, which appeared to contradict his claim life encounter and identity as a western-educated member of the social tip top. But his determination towards Islam is strengthened, in that he discovered a way to use Sharia to legitimize women's rights, or idea of *Riysaat-e-Medina* to legitimize a plural society (Hassan, 2020).

However, this phase of populism in Pakistan exhibits ideological cluelessness and supports toward the valence populism. Imran Khan has devoted his entire political career to portraying the ruling elite as corrupt, promoting transparency, governance reforms, social justice, and moral integrity (Khalid, 2020). Similarly, Imran has exploited the ancient concept of the "corrupt elite" as a political cash cow. This is because maintaining the division of society into "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite" is critical to the survival of his political narrative. Imran used this tried-and-true political strategy to build his mass following in 2014, when his party emblem to rule through Protests meant to vilifying the ruling elite (Mazhar, 2022). In contrast, Zaidi (2022) Claimed that the formula of Imran Khan's populism is depended into three parts which fulfilled the requirement of majoritarian populist policies; the first one is 'The Big Lie', the second is about 'Blame Everyone Else' and the third 'The Loyal Supporters'.

According to Naseer (2022) the reason of Imran Khan's attractiveness is the success of his populist strategy. Specially the rhetoric that stimulating the public on Pakistan's utmost persuasive factors in politics: religion and anti-Americanism. His influences are not trapped in terms of his administration's successful strategies but, particularly the management of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ehsas program, and the launch of the National Health Card reveals his populism on the other side, Daily Times (2022) stated in an article that Imran Khan cannot be compared to other populist leaders e.g. Modi or Trump because of one factor that is agenda. Khan has no official agenda to relegate minorities. He does not support racist sentiments. Khan is lacking in leadership abilities, astute decision-making, smart handling of issues, and, most importantly an effective pragmatic plan to bring about change.

1.3.3 Mapping Populism in India

Populism in India addresses one of the most extreme articulations of populism that arose in the previous few years. It discourses an impressive shift from post-frontier strategies of incorporation, pluralism and resilience, presented after 1947 (Hajdari, 2018). Definitely, in India, populism is Hindu nationalist in nature, which practices religion to assemble messes and unite a split population. Although there are numerous racial, traditional, linguistic, and spiritual variances among Indians, but the practice of Hinduism unites diverse crowds from across India. Populism in India, manifested as right-wing Hindu nationalism, threatens not only minority groups ideologically opposed to Hinduism, but also anything that contradicts the nation's traditional "Hinduness" (Repucci et al., 2018).

1.3.4 Historical perspective of Populism in India

In the late colonial period, two types of political forces used populist appeals widely: multi-ethnic Indian nationalism and middle and lower caste movements. Gandhi's reevaluation of an abstract pre-colonial communal economy^[8] centered on independent communities was marked as populist (Gudavarthy, 2020). The idea of a popular national community leveling for social and radical decolonization also constructed a multi-religious and multi-ethnic alliance, even though one oppressed with tensions. Gandhi, on the other hand, distinguished himself by spearheading the establishment of strong party organizations. The Indian National Congress (Congress Party) established itself in much of India and provided a platform for many people with different social visions, including modernists like Jawaharlal Nehru. After independence, these modernists took control over strategy and abandoned Gandhi's policies for a fundamentally reorganized democracy with a narrow state existence and a non-industrial economy (Subramanian, 2007).

The Indian National Congress began to decline in the 1960s as a result of some troubles encountered in maintaining the idea of a secular nation. Simultaneously, populist groups arose and gained support by forming alliances with other political parties (Calléja, 2020). The Bharatiya Janata Sangh (BJS) formed an administration under the Janata Party (JP) in 1977, a coalition of several parties that adopted radical measures such as changing history books to idealize Hindu civilization and relegate the Muslim communal. As a result, tensions between Muslims and Hindus grew in the 1980s, causing the Janata Party to split into different clans and the formation of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Within the context of violence between Muslim and Hindu communities, the BJP saw an opportunity to rally voters about a prominent Hindu nationalist ideology identified as Hindutva (Ammassari, 2018).

During the 1990s, the institutional failure and the developing defilement among political elites played for the BJP's ubiquity, before long surpassing the Congress (Hajdari, 2018). In 1999, the BJP made the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a legislative alliance that was anti-Muslim, anti-secular, and supported the agenda of Hindutva (Ammassari,

2018). The United Progressive Alliance (UPA), a federation of center-left parties mostly included earlier INC participants, was elected to rule the country until 2014. Though, financial disparities were not effectively tended to and also, a few individuals were implicated for exploitation (Calléja, 2020). Narendra Modi, Gujarat's Chief Minister since 2001, acted as a business pioneer rising to state prominence under the BJP. Modi was elected Prime Minister in 2014 with a populist ideology based on Hindu majority dominance and the notion that minorities pose a threat to national identity (Hajdari, 2018). In general election May, 2019, the BJP was gained a landslide victory, capturing 353 of the 543 Lok Sabha (Lower House) seats (Times of India, 2019). Since 1984 the selection of Narendra Modi as an India's 15th Prime Minister on May 26, 2014 was marked victory, because it was the first time that a solo party secured an absolute majority in the Indian Legislature. Critiques suggested that the Modi's reputation, weak opposition, and corruption of Congress in earlier term are the reasons of this victory (Repucci et al., 2018).

1.3.5 Narendra Modi as a Populist Leader

Modi is a self-proclaimed Hindu nationalist and populist. Modi's status as a "chaiwala," also photo of him sweeping a floor, is central to his narrative and cult of personality (Al-jazeera, 2014). These both strategic signs reflect the populist narrative of the frontrunner as a "common man". While Ammassari (2018) stated that various factors favored the BJP's victory, including the party's ideological principles and the persona of the charismatic populist leader, Narendra Modi. According to World Report (2017) since taking over, the BJP government has hardly work on spiritual liberty, safeguard the privileges of women, and end maltreatments against minorities. Narendra Modi is a magnetic and influential leader who is uplifting India's status in the universal community. Modi played a vital role in Country's economic achievement, which raises his popularity among public (Jain, 2017).

Varshneys (2017) claimed that Modi practices the hybrid category of populism and rejecting Right wing populism and left-wing populism. He values electoral majorities above all else, opposes the idea of an independent press, has mistrust for the judiciary, and enjoys the support of the general public. A term "empty signifier" (Nationalism or Patriotic) used by Sinha (2017) for Modi, which exemplified in a leader who representing the public and claim supremacy. To get that stance Modi and his team avoided the use of traditional media by relying on social media. And sooner he becomes a political brand after joined all social networking sites to eliminating the media barrier between him and the Public.

Modi also depended on an anti-elite diatribe of populism for building his relationship with public and presenting them that he was one of them. He dubbed himself the protector of the public money at a public protest in 2012 and made them believed that people of India were his only family (Zain, 2019). Modi's victory is usually ascribed to his welfare measures and how public foster trust in him and increase his sincerity in the eyes of people (Aiyar, 2019, p. 86). Several people view him as a leader who discourses the durable insinuations of neoliberal strategies, socioeconomic disparity, and rampant corruption, all of which have excluded a big portion of the Hindu community (Chacko, 2018).

One populist leader must build and mold the rhetoric for a strong and effective populist political movement (Taggart, 2000). In 2014 general election Narendra Modi's campaign was mostly dominated with one single name of Modi, because of the new media technologies gave him this "individualized" feature. However, he keenly observed the strategies and cooperated with his followers over social media via responding and tweeting (Zain, 2019). In addition, Narendra Modi practices slogans like "*I am new India*" to associate himself and the party with the state. Slogans are a popular way for populist leaders to associate with the community. To achieve popularity Modi utilized mass meetings, TV, social media, and radio program (Jaffrelot, 2017).

1.4 Media in the Context of India and Pakistan

Since 1947, press freedom has been contested in both India and Pakistan. The Official Secrets Act, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and several other political and economic restrictions have all served to limit media freedom in India (Sreedharan, 2009). The press in Pakistan has likewise endured several oppressive laws like the Press and Publication Ordinance, yet despite the restrictions imposed, the media in both nations has managed to not only endure political and military administrations but also to prosper (Saddiqua, 2018).

Although national and local newspapers in Pakistan and India served a large readership, the English press considered more powerful in terms of its ability to shape public opinion. Thomas (2000) and Haque & Narag (1983) both argued in favor of the importance of a strong English press in the subcontinent. This significance can also be linked to British control, at which time English served as the dominant language. The ruling classes in Pakistan and India continued to use English for the same purposes (Rahman 2004, 2005). In both India and Pakistan's diverse settings, English has remained a language of the literate and powerful (Sonwalker, 2002)

1.4.1 Media Settings of Pakistan

Pakistan's broadcast industry has had a great rise over the past 30 years, print media in general and the newspaper industry in particular have also shown encouraging evidence of growth in terms of readership patterns and an increase in the number of publications. According to a Gallup Pakistan poll, in 1982, 52% of Pakistanis did not read any newspapers; in 2014, just 34% of Pakistanis said the same (Javed, 2016). The reduction of non-readers was attributed to a higher reading frequency over an average week. The report acknowledged literacy improvements as one of the key causes for growing readership numbers (Javed, 2016, p.4).

In Pakistan, the press has become a powerful instrument for influencing public opinion in favor of the government's policy. Cross-media ownership patterns among newspapers, radio stations, and television networks are also prevalent in Pakistan's news industry. On account of this cross-media ownership, prominent newspapers' editorial and reporting choices are seen to have a strong effect on public opinion because the sister television channels follow the same policy lines. The liberalization of Pakistan's broadcast media in 2002 attracted significant investment from the commercial corporate world (Saddiqua, 2018).

The Dawn, with a daily sale of 138,000, has the greatest English language circulation (Press Reference, 2009). It is published by Dawn Media Group, which also owns the City FM 89 radio network, The Herald current affairs magazine, and Dawn News TV station, among other media properties. The Nation, a widely read and well-liked English daily newspaper in Pakistan, is published by the Nawa-i-Waqt Group of Publications. One of Pakistan's most widely read English newspapers is The News, which is published by the same company as Jang. According to Pakistan Media and Telecoms Landscape Guide (2012) Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) is regarded as Pakistan's biggest news organization.

1.4.2 Media Settings of India

Around 910 daily and weekly newspapers, of which 2.37 copies were added during the past ten years, are estimated to dominate the Indian market. The expansion of the Indian print sector was seen to be developing in the "Indian Audit Bureau of Circulation" report from 2017 since India is one of the few states where print media advertising income has increased. Accessibility and low costs were cited as two key factors in the emergence of print media. The growth of print media in India was also credited to the speedy urbanization in the country (Audit Bureau of Circulations, 2017).

As per the report of World Press Trends (2008) India was the second-largest newspaper market in the world, selling more than 110 million copies of newspapers daily. While Press

Trust of India (PTI) is regarded as the largest Indian news agency, The Times of India, among other widely read publications in India. The Hindu and Hindustan Times both identify as national English-language newspapers. The majority of the world's nations did not exhibit the pattern of market growth based on nationalism. Currently, America only has one national newspaper, USA, while the majority of local papers account for more than 80% of print ad earnings (Kumar & Sarma, 2015). The Hindu, Hindustan Times, and The Times of India were thought to have tremendous impact on Indian ruling class (Kaushal, 1997; Viswanath & Karan, 2000).

Figure 1 Comparison of Populist Characteristics in Pakistan and India

Aspect	Pakistan	India
Religious Foundation	Islamic populism, often linked to anti-elitism	Hindu nationalism (Hindutva) as a basis for majority unity
Notable Leaders	Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Imran Khan	Narendra Modi
Mobilization Themes	Corruption, religious morality, justice	Hindu identity, nationalism, anti-minority rhetoric
Media Use	Reliance on TV, social media and rallies; emotional religious rhetoric	Strong social media branding; direct engagement with the public
Exclusionary Targets	Secular elite, liberal opposition	Religious minorities, liberal media

Note: Data synthesized from Yilmaz & Saleem (2021); Hassan (2020); Ammassari (2018); Sinha (2017).

Despite these ideological differences, both cases demonstrate common populist strategies such as simplifying complex issues, portraying the political elite as inherently corrupt, and using mass media—including social and traditional platforms—to build

charismatic political personas (Mazzoleni, 2008; Sinha, 2017). These patterns reflect the shared reliance on emotional appeal, anti-establishment narratives, and direct communication with "the people" in order to legitimize power and reshape democratic discourse.

1.5 Statement of the Problem

Populism has become a dominant force in global politics, with populist leaders often leveraging media coverage to advance their political agendas (Canovan, 1999; Mudde, 2007). However, little attention has been paid to how the media in India and Pakistan, two significant South Asian democracies, frames these leaders, particularly in critical election periods. The framing of populist leaders before and after election can influence public perception and voter behaviours, yet there is limited empirical evidence on how the media's portrayal changes across these phases (Pappas, 2012; Acemoglu et al., 2011). Populist leaders, reliant on storing favorable coverage, frequently employ anti-elite and people-centric tactics. Populist leaders, reliant on storing favorable coverage, frequently employ anti-elite and people-centric tactics. However, as populist leaders rise to positions of power and become part of the ruling elite, the consistency of their favorable media coverage becomes uncertain. This study aims to uncover how media's attitudes and portrayal of populist leaders evolve over time, also analysing the differences and similarities in the press coverage of populist leaders, by examining the framing strategies ("approach-based frames" and "language-based frames") and the role of media-genic attributes in shaping political narratives of coverage in both pre-election and post-election phases.

1.6 Significance of the Study

This research revolves around the dynamic connection between populist leaders and media coverage in pre-election and post-election settings. Populist leaders, reliant on storing favourable coverage, frequently employ anti-elite and people-centric tactics. However, as these populist figures ascend to positions of power and become part of the elite themselves, the extent to which they maintain their favoured media portrayal becomes uncertain. This study provides insights by examine and compare the extent and nature of media coverage given to populist leaders in the press of India and Pakistan. By comparing news coverage in two neighbouring South Asian countries, the research identifies similarities and differences in media practices, offering a comparative perspective on populism. The research also highlights the differences and similarities in the coverage, particularly focusing on “approach-based frames” and “language-based frames” during both pre-election and post-election phases, offering a comparative perspective on populism. Also, by scrutinizing the tone of coverage in both pre-election and post-election phases, this research uncovers how press attitudes toward populist leaders may shift over time.

1.7 Objectives of the Research

Following are the objectives of the study:

- To analyze the framing strategies of the populist leaders of India and Pakistan in selected newspapers.
- To examine the variations in the framing strategies of newspapers in the pre-election and post-election phases.

- To evaluate the media genic attributes of the populist leaders of India and Pakistan in the selected newspapers.

Newspapers of Pakistan and India are selected to examine how the newspapers of two different countries framed the populist leaders in two different scenarios having divergent ideologies and strategies

1.8 Research Questions and Hypotheses

Following are the Research Questions and Hypothesis:

- RQ1.** What are the key framing strategies applied by the selected press for the populist leaders of Pakistan and India?
- RQ2.** In which proportion do the selected press distribute Human-Interest and Controversial Attributes?
- RQ3.** How far the key topics covered in the news stories related with Language-based frames and Approach-based frames?
- RQ4.** To what extent does the coverage to populist leaders vary in terms of supportive and critical coverage in the pre-election and post-election phases?

To be more focused, the current study has tried to test the following Hypotheses:

- RH1:** *The framing strategies significantly different in the pre-election and post-election phases.*
- RH2:** *Populist Leaders receive more supportive coverage in the pre-election phase as compared to post-election.*
- RH3:** *There is a significant difference in the key topics covered in the pre-election and post-election phases.*
- RH4:** *Populist leaders receive more Human-Interest Attributes in the pre-election phase as compared to post-election.*

So, populism in South Asia exhibits both convergence and divergence in its expression, particularly in the cases of Pakistan and India. In Pakistan, populist discourse has often drawn upon Islamic symbolism and anti-elitist rhetoric, with leaders such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Imran Khan mobilizing the masses by invoking moral, religious, and anti-status quo narratives (Yilmaz & Saleem, 2021; Hassan, 2020). In contrast, Indian populism, especially under the leadership of Narendra Modi, has been rooted in Hindu nationalist ideology, where religious identity is used to foster unity among the majority while excluding minority voices (Ammassari, 2018; Hajdari, 2018).

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Overview

This chapter provides an inclusive review of the existing literature on the media coverage of populist leaders, with a specific focus on India and Pakistan. It examines significant theoretical frameworks surrounding populism, media dynamics, and political communication. The chapter explores how media outlets have portrayed populist figures, analysing the role of the media in shaping public perception and political discourse. Additionally, it highlights relevant studies that discuss the intersection of populism and media in South Asia, identifying gaps in the literature that justify the need for this research. This review not only contextualizes the current study but also informs its research direction and methodological approach.

2.2 Populism

According to Dalio et al., (2017) populism is one of the least understood phenomenon during the past few decades as it kept on emerging in developed countries as merely a concept

and virtually absent in the developing regions. It is a major phenomenon that emerges in almost every country once a lifetime especially during the emergency situations such as pandemics, geographical tensions, wars or natural disasters. In this context, populists consider common people as naïve and politicians as mainly “corrupt”. As Mansbridge and Macedo, (2019, p. 62) stated that, “moral arousal is not the dynamic mechanism behind perceiving an elite as corrupt” because a moral arousal takes place when the elites are oppressors, disdainful, rude, haughty and too rich to be obligated by the legal authorities. However, in the practical terms, populists believe that some elites are corrupt as compared to the common people, and all utilize ethical language to stand against the dominance.

Populists vow to “attain back control” or “to attain back the country” from the power holding elites and to do away through politics that further empowers and strengthens them. Although the meaning of populism can be ambiguous for many of us, journalists generally agree that populism involves supporting politicians who engage in confrontational, anti-establishment actions aimed at challenging the dominant elites and undermining the political power structures that sustain them, particularly in liberal constitutional democracies (Mueller, 2019). For example, today every election worldwide is accompanied by a most prevalent question “Has the populism won or defeated?”, until the Dutch election in 2017 when the Nigel Farage coined the term “tsunami” to indicate an irresistible and strong wave of populism dominated the public debates. Populism became rapidly prevalent during the relevant election especially after the victory of Emmanuel Macron in both the French legislative and presidential election (Müller, 2016).

Many believe that sooner or later, populists fail to meet their goals or they will only work as moderators. Notably, when the populists’ parties stand against elites it does not mean that populism in the government becomes “self-contradictory”. However, all these failures are mainly attributed to elites whether they are at home or outside the country. Several populists also prefer to behave like victims or mistreated minorities. For example, Hugo Rafael Chavez Frias a populist in Venezuelan politician would always discuss about the darker sides of opposition parties. According to Frias, opposition parties and United States government both are trying to sabotage his contemporary socialism (Gagnon et al., 2018).

Similarly, Tayyip Erdogan as a famous Turkish politician and current president of the

Turkey always represent himself as a survivor having a strong stance against Kasımpaşa as a tough neighborhood and also facing old establishment attributed to Kemal Attaturk as today, Erdogan dominates and handles all the cultural, political, economic powers in his hands. After the 2016 Atatürk Airport attack, Erdogan represented himself as struggling against the evil forces such as Gulen network and military as he refused to leave his office and residence despite the ongoing threats by the opposing parties. According to Müller (2016), these examples create several concerns as populists have large majorities in the parliaments that further help and support them to create their own regimes. Although, such regimes look like democracies but internally, they are subjected to perpetuate and sustain the populist dominance in the political system.

In a majority of the populists' movements elites are having a prominent identity regarding their political, economic, cultural or military status. For example, in the original United States populists' movements, although the targeted individuals were economic elites, they were also having a strong influence over political elites who were dominating decision regarding banking system, economic monopolies, cultural patterns, railroads and others. Despite populists opposed cultural elitism in the United States, it was marginal and not considered as targeted against any specific cultural elites. On the other hand, the contemporary populist movements have confronted to many military elites commonly as standing against common wellbeing (Mansbridge & Macedo, 2019).

As a result, when protests and strikes take place, populists start pressurizing the dominant elites against a forceful political regain. Several cases also involved political elites pressurizing mass media platforms that further led to the fall of dictatorships from threatening the social institutions and law and order institutions (Dalio et al., 2017). However, many cases also resulted into civil wars and conversion of democracies into dictatorship. All these arguments represent populism as a movement to preserve the rights of the common man against government. Populism as rebellion and conflicts occur in varying situations with varying degrees. Sometimes the system breaks and sometimes it bends with it. Whether the system breaks or bends due to populism relies on the extent to which system is flexible and ready to obligate the populists' demands. Also, it depends on the respectfulness and flexibility of populists as if the aim is to break the government, they would not comprise on

reconciliation. On the other hand, if the populists want the government to serve their demands, they tend to look for the other flexible options. As noted by Bonikowski (2016), populism stays in conflicting situation with the democratic practices as it potentially contributes to political polarization, undermines the institutional trust, and also leads to legislative deadlock in the country. All the anti-democratic activities of populism mainly depend on the extent to which the populists trust the democratic and legislative system.

According to Repucci et al., (2018), despite populism is considered as a voice of common man, populism is not a validate version of democracy nor it necessarily voices the public stance. Populism exposes crevices within a society based on such as economic class, race, ethnicity, cultural clash and others. Populism also highlights the lack of public wellbeing which should be the main focus of every democratic government. Most of the times, many populist leaders merely restrained and banned the institutions after breaking the government.

To advance their populist agenda, the primary focus is on four key institutions within a democratic government: **(i)** political rights of the marginalized communities, **(ii)** press freedom, **(iii)** autonomous judiciary, and **(iv)** gender equality (Repucci et al., 2018). This extensive contribution in political polarization and undermining the government institutions, populism gives a voice to the grievances of judicial deadlock as populism stands with those who silently stand in tension with the democratic system. Consequently, populism is considered as a barometer for deeply existing social concerns and a catalyst to bring the constructive social changes. It is also worthwhile to note that, populism needs to be carefully handled to bring the required positive changes. Those who recognize and acknowledge its underlying causes, address it appropriately as it is a reason of constructive change for the social wellbeing, else the outcomes can be detrimental for the common man.

To understand the populism scholars have been studied various theoretical disciplines, methods and approaches (Aalberg et al., 2017; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Kaltwasser et al., 2017; Laclau, 2005; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012) and define populism “as an ideology, as a discursive style, and a form of political mobilization” (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, p. 5). Most of the descriptions argued on the ideology and style that underline the correlation between the “people” and elites (Hovden, 2019). But in existing

political phenomena the concept of populism is confronted particular confusion, the first approach is a strategy to consuming a distinctive style of political rhetoric for political mobilization. While the other is a particular style of communication, which deals with politics of personality (Abts & Rummens, 2007). So, populism is characterized by its endorsement and veneration of 'the people,' especially when their ideals markedly contrast with those upheld by the elites (Majidifard, Fouladiyan & Yousofi, 2025, p. 1).

2.3 Populism as an Ideology

Cas Mudde (2004) was the first and foremost, who stated populism as a thin-centered ideology that separated society into two homogenous and opposed groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite'. The Thin-centered ideologies don't offer responses to the entire key socio-political queries, but could be viable with other, and established political awareness including, socialism or liberalism. In this perspective populism can be found outside the ideological dissection, revolved around either left- or right-wing appeals (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2011).

Similarly, Canovan (2002) claimed populism as a thin-centered ideology, which does not offer an inclusive vision of society. But provide a specific connotation and primacy to significant perceptions of political discourse, thus producing an ideological depiction of political sphere. For now, populism is mostly stress on concepts for examples 'the people', 'democracy' or 'sovereignty'. Whereas (Wirth et al., 2016) described populism as a thin ideology that deals with the people, the elite and the populist actor.

In contrast, Pankowski (2010) studies ideologies as 'mental frameworks' that aid populist construe political reality and monitor political action. By approving Mudde's description of populism, so far focuses on significance of cultural resources for example mutual inventories and structural patterns, and above all the customs that validate specific features of political activities. According to Gidron and Bonikowski (2013) populism is an ideology related to the patterns and themes of studies. Generally, investigation centers on

literature either on party or political actor (as populist or not)

2.3.1 People-Centric Approach

Mostly populist leaders prefer to use a simple, commonly understood language in their speech and general discourse. For example, several scholars consider speeches from Donald Trump as simple as understandable for a sixth-grade student. Juan Peron's speech on the other hand, is considered as comprehensively understandable for both educated and uneducated individuals. Member from the French National Front is more likely to use plain language. Silvio Berlusconi's discourse style is described a popular and easily understandable for everyone. While some of this evidence are indicating the nature of populists' discourse, it is imperative to analyze these speeches in an international context as well (Decadri & Boussalis, 2020). According to Decadri and Boussalis (2020), the non-institutionalized, unambiguous, and spontaneous langue spoken by populists directly reflects party rhetoric and ideology. For example, the success of famous Italian populist "Lega Nord" is mainly attributed to the nature of his speech and more public-centered approaches aimed at common wellbeing and development. Another example can be cited from the rhetoric of another Italian populist Bepe Grillo "Five-star Movement" communicates with the public and supporters in a most simplistic yet comprehensive manner. As a result, Grillo successfully articulated complex matters in a simple and widely understandable manner.

In this context, Heckman et al., (2021) described populist discourse as "Public-centered" as they are mainly aimed at highlighting the public issues. Through their discourse, these populists focus on leaving an impression of public wellbeing and awareness. The populist discourse is mostly based on a naïve notion of public focused efforts again political elites yet many raise criticisms on populist discourse in terms of its meaning and practical interpretations. Populist individuals normally talk in piratical approaches they are more authoritarian and tribalism. In other words, the message and discourse of populists mainly

give an expression of “we can do it on your behalf, you cannot do this”. As noted by, populism is not different than a rhetoric that focuses on legalizing the aristo’s critical politics when democracy is a sociopolitical norm. But the real issue is tribalism in which politics is represented as a war and tribalism represents the populist stance as an only solution to the existing political problems. This ideology demands for a strong loyalty towards one tribe and questioning the credibility, goals, and motives of the other tribes (Krekó, 2020). As noted by Rueda (2021), due to separate and distinct ideological background, populism is one of the main comprehensive subject in political arenas regarding the selection of social and political agendas. All the contemporary approaches applied to analyze the populism in the global context also describe public focus as the core approach that further drives the rhetoric and actions of the populist movements and leaders.

To further affirm the technique, approach, and meaning of populist discourse, Krekó & Juhász, (2019) conducted a case study regarding Hungarian and Polish politics. It is notable that, both Polish and Hungarian populist widely resort to historical factors as responsible for contaminating the contemporary politics and elites. As a result, these populists commonly have a stance against anyone deliberately or not following the historical political conduct. Also, both Hungarian and Polish populists criticize their position in the European Union as they commonly perceive themselves as treated as Second Class Citizen those further increases distrust and cynicism on European Union. Notably, Hungarian and Polish populists do not focus on national level elites instead the main focus is to criticize the international political elites in the European Union. Thus, the findings of case study by Krekó and Juhász (2019), indicated that, people-centered agenda in populist discourse and anti-elite stance was equally visible in the both Polish and Hungarian pieces of discourse. Populists in both countries were also found supporting the political pluralism as a primary component of democracy, yet Hungarians were more pluralist than the Polish.

According to Hameleers (2020), the role of mass media in representing the populists discourse is of greater importance. Media platforms represent the relevant speech and discussion in manner that indicate their focus and expected outcomes. In this context, research on media and populism highlights two aspects: **First**, media help providing a

platform to the populist as a source to communicate with the public, share their stance, and attain necessary support. **Second**, media portray and represent the populist stance in a particular manner, mostly as opposing or supporting the rhetoric in terms of public wellbeing and development. As political cynicism, economic declination, unemployment, and deprivation from other basic rights provide strong dynamic grounds to populist movements. Since institutional trust is a basic foundation of public support in a democratic system, in case of failure in fulfilling the public trust and lead to political cynicism. In such a situation, populists attain a ground that further help them to utilize different communication source to directly communicate with the public (Danaj et al., 2018). Thus, despite the charismatic nature of populists, their focus is primarily to attract the common man. From physical appearance to the selection of rhetoric, populists are more likely to create and maintain unmediated links with the people. As noted by Kenny (2021), the populist movements are mainly driven by several strategic approaches. These approaches are public-centered, and emphasize on the realignment of the political system. These populists resort to a unique political rhetoric which is non-institutionalized and non-routinized that is mainly separate from patrimonial and bureaucratized form of political communication.

2.3.2 Anti-Elitism Approach

According to Edingerh (2021), populism is specter, haunting the politics all over the world. It has different dynamic, different goals, different origins, yet the goal is similar for all. Yet, populists worldwide also share some common characteristics that collectively make them populists having the similar stance. For example, one of the popular characteristics of populism is an extreme hostility towards elites that further guides their movements. In order to run the populist movements, individuals necessarily need adherents and audience. These populists follow a strategic construction of elites as the sole enemies of the public and their wellbeing that further cause a greater persuasion, support, and mutual consensus regarding

the populist stance from the public. However, under certain circumstances political leaders can challenge the populist stance and the personal interest-based policies. Also, there are many examples that witness changing patterns of populist rhetoric based on anti-elite approaches used by populists. As noted by Polk et al., (2017), anti-elitist stance is a primary component of populist ideology as the anti-corruption salience is a core concept of populist movements. For example, during the European election in Austria, Poland, Denmark, Sweden (2014, 2015, and 2016) public exhibited a great support to the populist parties. After the relevant election, many researchers attempted to search for the reason behind an increased support for the populists in these countries and mainly found anti-elitism approach as the basic motivating factor to have a positive attitude towards populist movements.

To further affirm the anti-elitist stance as a primary dynamic of populist support, Schulz et al., (2017), noted that anti-elitist stance is a primary component of populist ideology as the anti-corruption conducted case study in Sweden. The researcher employed cross-sectional designed and used survey method to gather data during the election campaigns in 2014 and 2015. Results by using the deductive approach revealed that, populist attitudes that were based on anti-elite and anti-corruption were the major factor behind an increased public support.

As noted by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011) populism is based on a thin ideology that tends to differentiate the existing society with the ideal society based on demolishing the political powers and elites. Here populism divides its ideological propositions into “elite-centric”, “preservation of national and “public-centric” approaches and further identify them as having a people-centric approaches against the democratic system. Populist always supports anti-elitism as they consider political elites as standing as a barrier against public wellbeing and development. These elites are represented as evil, corrupt, and an obstacle to focus on public centrism. In such situation, media and journalists work as providing a voice and spotlight to populist anti-elite and anti-corruption approaches. Today, both populists greatly rely on journalists for passing their stance to the public and also represent the elites as contradictory power against public. As noted by Ernst et al., (2017) populists have much affinity in the political spectrum due to their greater association with the mass media

resources. These populists are considered as having closest links with the journalists due to elements like news values. To further validate the relevant arguments, Ernst et al., (2017) examined the relation between Swiss populists and mass media platforms especially during the Swiss election. Content analysis of newspapers and social media posts revealed that, media platforms widely highlighted and acknowledged populists' stance on both types of platforms. Social democrats also resort to support public-centric rhetoric of populists and attributed it mainly to public development and anti-corruption agenda. Most importantly, the online public discourse on populists' stance was found more focused on accelerating the anti-elitist sentiments that was further accompanied by sharing and re-sharing behavior.

A study conducted by Geurkink et al., (2020) examined the role of three elements: political efficacy, political trust, anti-elitism stance, and attitudes in attaining support for populist stance in the Netherlands. The researchers employed case study method and gathered data from the National Referendum on derzoek 2018 database where the voters' attitudes and their opinion regarding the election is recorded before and after the election. Findings revealed that, anti-elitism and political efficacy remained as the most motivating factors behind the relevant voting decisions. However, the varying support for all the populists revealed that, there were many other factors that resulted in altering support for all. As noted by Bonikowski and Zhang (2020) research on populist stance and approaches mostly focus on its impacts on the democratic government. The existing studies also witness anti-elite technique as a strategic approach to meet the populists' goals in general and also during the election. Particularly, attitudes of populists towards public issues serve as the main area of appeal for the public. For example, Bonikowski and Zhang (2020) examined the public behavior regarding populists speeches based on anti-elitism, refugee support, and national sovereignty of the United States of America. Results showed that, public expressed a strong support for the populists aiming to back the refugee rights. Also, they acknowledged the anti-elitist stance of the populists as the primary determinant of voting for the populist parties. According to Majidifard, Fouladiyan & Yousofi (2025) two approaches that directly oppose populism are elitism and pluralism. The negative definition of populism contrasts it with

these two concepts, the idea of “the people” in anti-populist thought can take two forms: (i) as plural and role-playing individuals, or (ii) as politically immature people.

2.3.3 Individual Centric Approach

In populists’ political communication, term “the people” is of greater importance due to its potential meaning that are directly linked with its aims. “People” can be referred to the whole population, a fraction of even an individual whose interest are aimed to serve by the populists of the nationality, culture, religion or other significant relevance. According to Petersen (2020), focusing on the interests of any particular group, that are accompanied by individual centric approach, is mostly common in the right-wing populism which is also known as “ neo-populism”. For example, the populists “Lega Nord” differentiate the people from North Italy and Southern Italy on the basis of their geographical location. Here cultural differentiation is another matter that is a primary factor behind this differentiation is also based on the cultural connotations. However, Petersen (2020), considers such differentiation as racism that is not the main goal or purpose of populists movements. Another example can be cited from the individual centric approach based on Middle Eastern and Asian populism where populism focuses on the religious identity of the individuals. Every individual having the same identity becomes the priority for the populists that further leads to support the same religion, people and their interests.

As noted by Gottenhuber (2020) strong focus on public and their agendas, is the core strategic practice of populists all over the world. Populists are critical about the performance of democratic government and eager to bring a positive change, supporting the public interests. However, a majority of populists tend to serve the interests of people from a particular group, class, or region, that further narrow down the scope, practices, and goals of populism. As populist support their support and consider public equally important,

advocating a particular group or region questions the importance of populism in the modern democratic systems. As a result, despite populism is providing a pathway to sustainable development, Haustein and Tomalin (2021) argued that, many researchers consider populism as a threat to democracy and civil society. As noted, that the “people” are the true citizens that are dominated and controlled by the political elites. Despite populism and people’s right to vote and select are interlinked, yet the populism causes serious threats to democracy. For example, liberal democracy believes in people’s participation and willingness in the voting process, transparency, and political pluralism of the establishment and political institutions. On the other hand, the populists’ ideology on people’s right to vote, involvement in the political decision making, political polarization, and distribution of power deviates the primary principles of liberal democracy. Populists always criticize the political structures by attributing them to dominance and authoritarianism. Delsol (2013) claimed that the creation of populism is based on individualistic approach, and the elites perceive the sphere via frame of logos. While the modern populism mainly focuses on party leader, loaded with power and charisma, so as the refusal of contemporary populists indirectly support the logos.

In such a situation, the rise of populism especially during the post-cold war time and its delicate relationship with the liberal democracies are major obstacles to consolidate the democratic rules and practices human rights on the realistic grounds. For example, populism in India is explicitly one of the most radical and individual-centered due to the particular conversations of the Indian populists in the country. Where on the one hand, the government ensure secular religious rights for all, the populists movements focus on the particular religious’ groups and their wellbeing. According to Haustein and Tomalin (2021), the ideology of BJP is based on “Hindutva” or Hindu nationalism, holding the idea that Hindus are the dominating factor of India society in every aspect. This partial populist notion guides the current government to adopt anti-secularism and oppose the idea of homogenous Indian nation. As a result, BJP formed a political coalition named “National Democratic Alliance” (NDA) which was supporting Hindu agenda, anti-secularism, and anti-Muslim as well. Following several historical events, Narendra Modi became prime minister in 2014 with a notion that minorities pose threats to sovereignty of India. Later again in 2019, NDA won

the election with his individual-centered populists' proposition about Hindutva and charismatic populists leadership aimed at well-being of Hindus in the country.

Once again, when populist favor the sustainable development on the national level, their plans are not for the whole community. Instead, they are only aimed at individuals that are marginalized, deprived and suffering according to the populist ideology. According to Kroll and Zipperer (2020), populism in every country is a collaborative factor of (i) the demand of populism, (ii) the supply of populism, and (iii) the approaches focused on individual and collective goals. For this purpose, the existing literature widely witnesses populism movements driven due to issues such as economic declination, immigration concerns, social deprivation, and political instability. To further determine the individual centric approach by populists is cited by Kyle (2018) an important example. As noted, that, populists mainly dramatics the social events to highlight the relevant issues in their rhetoric. First, they identify the crisis, then highlight the failure, attribute failure to the insufficient governmental credibility cope with. Eventually, they attribute failed policies to government partiality towards any particular group. Populists link incredibility to other areas that further lead them to make people think the current government as posing threat to national security as well. However, once again, the leniency towards any particular group remains prominent in populist stance. In many cases, populists criticize the government's incompatibility to address the immigrant crisis, emphasize the issue of national security, economic declination and others that require an urgent and effective solution. Thus, the argumentation about emotions and individual-centrism in populism ideologies pose a direct link between populist stances on people's wellbeing. Here these populists are primarily focused on a single group of people that are considered more deprived and suffering, that further help the populists to gain the public support (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2021).

2.3.4 Nationalism Approach

We have seen several populist movements over the past few decades across prominent electoral democracies all of whom promised to bring constructive transformation in the countries. However, researchers anticipate strong effects of populist rhetoric in terms of national and their approaches to support their stance. For example, using ethno-nationalist stance in foreign policy is considered as a building block regarding the bilateral relations and preserve the national sovereignty (Jenne, 2021). Yet the role of populism in prioritizing nationalism, and using ethno-nationalist master frame needs many debates as it leads to national revisionism and Omni-revisionism. Many studies also propose nationalism as a destructive factor when merged with the populism due to the adverse consequences.

Today, a majority of countries, populist parties are governed and dominated by nation- This increased trend of “national-populist party” has given rise to a trend in which the term national-populist is applied in a very loose manner. However, Martinelli (2018) argued that the contemporary interpretation of the term “nationalism” and its relationship with the populism is ambiguous, polysemic changes with time, and needs even more argumentation. Nationalism is a basic component of modernity and culture which changes overtime yet, creates a sensed of solidarity ad and national identity in a modern society. In this regard, nationalism and populism work hand in hand through different aspects. Martinelli (2018) further cited an example of nationalism as a core approach in European populism. As argued that, the collaboration between populism and nationalism especially in Turkey is well-witnessed phenomenon. The convergence of populism into nationalism and then the rise of even strongly aggressive populism rhetoric supporting nationalism have become a serious threat to democracy in European countries especially in Italy. The concern is regarding the weak democracies that can be harmed by populist’s right at the time when Italy required legitimate and credible government, able to confront and handle the intertwined crisis.

The global status of democracy has increased over the past few years as in 2019, major democracy institutes worldwide formulated different reports having bleak titles such as “Increasing Polarization and Repression, Democracy Facing Global Challenges, and Democracy in Retreat”. These titles indicate a rather unique trend in demolishing and arming the democratic regimes (Lührmann & Hellmeier, 2020). These changing trends in political

arenas and increased challenges to democratic establishments are mainly caused by political entities that are having aggressive rhetoric to gain support from their supports and demolish the democratic establishment. Prominent example of the relevant populist leaders can be cited from the Donald Trump in the United States, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, Jair Bolansaro in Brazil, and Narendra Modi in India. According to Lührmann and Hellmeier (2020), common characteristic of all these populist leaders is supporting Xenophobic, ethnocentrism, nationalism, radicalism, and anti-elitism through their rhetoric. Many examples can be taken from the populists also adapting violence against women rights, LGBT, ethnic minorities, and other marginalized groups. At the same time, they cause serious threats to social institutions such as judiciary, law-enforcement institutions by attributing them to supporting the elite agenda. These populists' resort to mainstream media, civil society, and even student council of criticize and accuse the establishments

Bonikowski et al., (2019) stated that, the proliferating use of the term "Populism" criticized its usage on almost every political platform. For example, in 2016 President Obama visited Canada and challenged media narratives of Donald Trump as populist. The media narratives of Donald Trump lied on the fact that he is taking stance of national interest through his presence as a populist. However, President Obama contradicted media's narratives and explained an explicit differentiation between opportunism and nationalism regarding Donald Trump. The primary goal of this debate was to delegitimize Trump's position as a populist. President Obama attributed Donald Trump to supporting Xenophobia and nativism. According to Singh, (2021), the current examples of populists in different countries proposes two basic postulations **(i)** Populism is equal to nationalism, or **(ii)** Populism is complete opposite to nationalism as indeed the collaboration of populism and nationalism in most of the examples remained destructive. Thus, the historical debates about nationalism and populism are symmetrical regarding their interdependency. Yet, using nationalism as a core approach is one of the basic component of populist movements worldwide., Regardless of the consequences, we cannot deny nationalism as a primary component of populist stance (Brubaker, 2020).

2.3.5 Moralism Approach

Political researchers and think-tanks believe that populism is primarily an ideological difference between right and wrong that can be adopted and fought by both left and right-wing parties. However, the contemporary perceptions regarding populism perceive populism as a war between right and wrong, or between the individuals supporting public welfare and self-centered elites who fail to serve the public interests and are required to be replaced by the favorable people (Williams, 1993). As a result, recent research studies are even more deeply examining the strategies of populism and their impacts on democratic establishment all over the world. To examine the ideological grounds of populism, researchers are empirically examining populist discourse and factors that are influencing this populist rhetoric through such as through Global Populism Database. Using Global Populism Database to identify the strategies used by populists worldwide highlighted many approaches particularly moralism. In this context, political researchers define populists in several ways, yet the core proposition is regarding how people perceive political elites, restoring the thinking where “the people” are righteous and deserved to be served by the political elites. The ideological moralism in populism also assumes that, people should attain their rights and restore the balance of power in a democratic political system. However, due to an overly judgmental, unforgiving, and self-righteous approach, moralism is often criticized regarding populist rhetoric and stance (Vittori, 2017).

According to Jensen (2017), moralism in populist stance can harm the democratic establishment in at least two ways: **First**, it opposes pluralism as the populists believe having any other political stance is illegitimate. This anti-pluralism is against democracy where every individual has a right to think and act differently based on their personal judgments. On the other hand, populists represent an issue at stake as if it is strongly moral, requires an immediate action. Their stance is accompanied by character assassination, accusations regarding corruption, crooked way of thinking, an explicit negligence regarding public issues and an increased attention to personal interest and gains. **Second**, increasing an uncertainty

among the people to disprove for support the populist stance or having a neutral opinion regarding their political decision-making.

Here McKibben (2020) have added a clear difference between moralism and moral criticism that is always neglected, causing confusion between these two. As noted, that, although populism includes moralism in its stance, yet the exclusion of moralism is another major aspect of populist ideology. However, moralism is an under-theorized and underrepresented phenomenon, mostly considered as a threat to a society. If populists juxtapose moralism with a moral criticism, aimed solely at highlighting the wrong doings and emphasizing the significance of public welfare in populism, the meaning of moralism will be mutilated. Talking particularly about moralism in populism, moral criticism is a different approach that stands as a criticism against wrongdoings of those in power. On the contrary, Rueda (2021) considers moral criticism as important part of populism as noted that moral criticism is a part of populist morality. We need moral criticism populism to counteract against the abhorrent behavior, to preserve our rights, and the rights of those who are deprived, susceptible and more prone to political oppression. If we stop blaming or looking for the responsible factors, it might leave a message that deprivation, oppression, and imbalanced power distribution, all are acceptable. Hence, in this sense criticism can deter the anti-elite heedlessness towards public issues and wellbeing that further increases the significance of moral critic in the populist stance.

Similarly, Kim (2021) argued that, in terms of populism, identifying the wrongdoings and accusing the political elite group or a person, is also an act of recognition of their moral agency. Hence, moral criticism in the populism is not merely an act of expressing our own moral agency also, accelerating one's moral instinct and expecting an active moral action from that agency. As in populism instance, when an accusation is excessive and inappropriate, exhibits a distinct punitive behavior from the political elites, populism criticizing the act of negligence and self-centered behavior becomes a fundamental requirement of populist stance. In this context, Stavrakakis' hermeneutics argument suggests that, people who conceptualize populism as moralistic are those who characterize themselves as moralizing normativity. As further argued that, a comprehensive perception regarding

populism as a moralistic gives a birth to moral economy in a post-democratic era, that further determines what should be moral, legitimate, and according to people's interest (Alschuler, 2020).

Thus, this evolving discourse on moralism and moral criticism in populism reveals a complex ideological tension—while moralism is often seen as exclusionary and polarizing, moral criticism emerges as a vital democratic tool to hold elites accountable and restore public trust. Therefore, understanding populism requires a nuanced exploration of how these moral dimensions function not only to challenge power structures but also to redefine the ethical boundaries of political engagement in democratic societies.

2.4 Populism as a Political Style

Another approach of populism described by de la Torre (2000) as a discursive style rather than an ideology, considered populism as a “rhetoric that constructs politics as the moral and ethical struggle between el pueblo [the people] and the oligarchy” (p. 4). Later, Hawkins (2009, 2010) hypothesizes populism as a philosophy that allocates a binary ethical aspect to political engagements. Also, Populism as a ‘political style’ propose a novel perception on populism, that services to resolve a many problems regarding literature on populism (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014). Knight (1998, p. 223) perceives populism as a unstable style usually containing a declared bond with “the people”, a “them-and-us” approach, and frequently as retro of crisis and mobilization. Similarly, (Taguieff, 1995; Canovan, 1999; De La Torre, 2010; and Filc, 2011) have also measured populism as a style, mostly concentrated on its linguistic structures. And discourse populism's propensity not simply to connect in a modest and straight style, however to suggest direct solutions. Indeed, Jagers and Walgrave (2007, p. 322) suggested populism as “a political communication style of political actors that refer to the people”. While Moffitt and Tormey (2014) perceives

populism an unique political styles, which are the collection of performance used to produce political associations. Kazin (1995), conducted analysis on American populism, describes populism as a communication style typically utilized by the people who raise voice for the majority of Americans.

2.4.1 Populist's Rhetoric

The style and substantive of populism are the combination of populists's rhetoric including "highly emotional, slogan-based, tabloid-style language (Mazzoleni et al., 2003, p. 8), Oral extremism and representational politics (Betz & Immerfall, 1998). While according to McDonnell & Ondelli (2020) populists practice simpler linguistic for ordinary people as compare to their competitors to separate themselves from elites.

The communication style of populists is the progression of political mediatization, to persuading the hearts and minds of the people acts and styles of rhetoric e.g. basic, direct, argumentative are used (Block & Negrine, 2017). In order to examine both roots and consequences, researchers widely discuss this phenomenon in terms of political behavior particularly the political behavior of the populist in individuals. For example, many studies witnessed the critical elements in the populists' rhetoric especially during the election. An example can be cited in the context of the study conducted by Haas, (2020) as she mentioned the populists' behavior mainly during the election in United States of America, Latin America, and Europe. As noted, that the populists of Latin America (Left Leaning) are more likely to define their motives in inclusionary terms such as "how the people". On the other hand, European populism (Right Leaning) is strong exclusionary and differs from the populism in Latin America.

Similarly, the populism in the United States of America especially during the Trump's government is observed exclusionary as anti-minorities actions and racism remain the

primary drivers of the support. Whereas it is also observed that perceived cases of corruptions also determine the nature of populists' movements and their stance. However, Haas (2020) argues that, populism in the United States has gained much more attention during the past few years due to populists rhetoric of both rightwing and leftwing political leaders. The analysis of speeches given by both Sanders and Trump exhibit that both leaders widely adopted populist rhetoric that further led them to gain support from other populist leaders during the 2016 Presidential election. Notably, populists' support for the Saunders was primarily moderated by his part identification whereas, populists supported Donald Trump regardless of his part identification (Marx, 2020).

According to Bakker et al., (2010), despite populism is based on "people wellbeing" agenda, we can observe political radicalism and extremism in populists rhetoric. For example, the populist rhetoric by American Tea Party, Die Linke Germany, Danish People's Party, and the French Front National all are illuminating examples of anti-establishment stance through radicalized political rhetoric. In this context, several studies provide strong evidence of psychological strategies that are used in populist rhetoric to gain the public support.

As noted by Vlad (2019), populist rhetoric has gained a greater attention from the very beginning. However today, with the proliferation of communication platforms, this populist rhetoric is considered as an integral part of political and cultural discourse. For example, during the upheaval of Brexit, the British populists largely resorted to antagonist terms like "honest", "ordinary", and "patriotic" for the people who voted in support or against the Brexit. It is also notable that, using these terms represented the spec as more focused towards appealing the emotions rather than the rationality as literacy language and politic rhetoric mainly aim to address the audience attention at every possible level.

A study conducted by Bos and Brants (2014), further examined the populists rhetoric and its representations in the Dutch Media. The researchers used longitudinal study design and selected the television-based news media platforms and their content such as talk shows, news bulletins, election campaigns, political broadcasts, and interviews. Findings from first

examining the relevant content in the early 2010 and later in 2014 revealed that, the media representations of populist's debates were less populists and more focused towards only public wellbeing in general context. Despite the populists' discourse especially belong to Pim Fortuyn was based on the criticism regarding the existing government polices and their incapability to solve the public problems, his discourse was not anti-establishment rather demanding to bring positive reforms in the existing democratic systems. Another study to analyze the populist rhetoric is conducted by Kustov and Dai (2020) but the researchers preferred to highlight the populist discourse utilized by the political leaders. The researcher conducted the discourse analysis of presidential speeches from 1952 to 2016 to estimate the populist stances adopted in the relevant speeches. Results revealed that, a majority of speeches contained populist rhetoric as a core strategy of political campaigns. The ideational approach to the populism in the current study further indicated that the relevant speeches widely divided the society into two groups: "antagonistic" and "homogenous" or in other words, the corrupt and pure people with the slogan that, the political parties and their motives should reflect the public will and stance over political interest.

Many times, supporting the populist stance is also seen as irrational which involves a blunt voting decision against the establishment with no realistic purposes regarding public wellbeing and development. But it is also not opposing the voting decision of people against establishment as common man always makes vote for the common wellbeing. In this context, the populist rhetoric is considered as supporting the stance highlighting the establishment's heedlessness towards public issues and their suitable solution (Bakker et al., 2010). As noted by IDEA, (2020), populism is not an anti-democracy agenda or focused only towards accelerating the anti-establishment sentiments. Rather, populism is about pointing out and highlighting the flaws and failures and also to find the most appropriate solutions. From the Bengin's perspective, populism does not challenge any democratic system or anti-establishment sentiments. When a government fails to serve the public rights and wellbeing through the democratic means such as election, voters prefer to turn towards populists' beliefs as they hope their stance will be preferred and taken forward by the populists.

IDEA, (2020) further examined the presence, role and impact of populists and their rhetoric in the global context. As noted, that, presence of populists' stance and their leaders have posed gigantic challenges for both old and contemporary democracies worldwide. Populists attribute themselves as committed to public wellbeing and opposing the elites for their interest-driven establishments. As a result, populists mobilize around their key messages and use strategic methods to attain public support and consensus. To further support these assumptions, the findings of a research report by IDEA (2020) revealed that the number of populist parties and leaders is higher today than ever before. A majority of these populists are living in European region, while the rest are in Asia and America.

Similarly, the recent increase of populists in democratic establishments has led to the rise of many interacting trends such as: cultural and economic globalization, weakening state policy, politically polarized public sphere due to even improved (digital media based) information resources, and an explicit decline in the support of previously strong political parties. Also, the rise of many populists' parties can be seen as a strong reaction against underperformance of establishments leading to a crisis among conventionally strong political groups worldwide. Once again, the Benign's view of populist movements, as identifying the inadequacies and failures of democratic government, public awareness, taking stance of public welfare, and proposing useful suggestions regarding necessary reforms (Ab-Hassan, 2015).

Meyer, (2021) cited an example of populism in the United States as a primary reason behind the failure of Donald Trump's government during the recent election. As noted, that the speeches of Donald Trump during his government were mostly based on racist and discriminatory discourses that further led to a rise of populist rhetoric against him. More importantly, Trump's refusal to concede his defeat in the presidential election and his supporters invading and occupying the US Capitol building on January 2021 also created gigantic vandalism and five casualties during the whole course of violence. This unpredicted development of graphically shows that how populists gathered against Trump government and become an underlying factor behind its loss and later anti-Trump stance among the public. Despite the populists never agree to permanently damage the liberal democracies, yet

the example of United States is better able to exemplify the populists in the United States damaging the Trump's reputation through his anti-minority agendas. As Sahin, (2021) noted that, populist rhetoric contain components that are powerful against backsliding the democratic systems. Especially when despite government's extreme focus and efforts regarding public wellbeing, populists' movements still rode the establishments by resorting to their Manichean view regarding check and balance, judicial system by using different strategies to secure the election the way they aim to. Besides, these populists securitize the election results by triggering the public's ontological insecurities to promote the perception that election are the most important opportunity to choose the best suitable leader to serve their rights and wellbeing. Populists argue that, only they can deliver public welfare as the other political parties are weak, traitors, corrupts, indecisive, and corrupts. This strategy is helpful for the populist to gain the support as using ontological insecurities help people to realize their problems.

2.5 Populism as a Political Strategy

Gidron and Bonikowski (2013) stated that many researchers define populism as a type of political strategy. Focusing primarily on Latin American populism, they identified three key features of this strategy: policy choices, political organization, and mobilization. While, Madrid (2008) claims that populism take form of certain economic policies and mass mobilization, containing appeals of economic redeployment and anti-establishment relatively. Furthermore Acemoglu et al. (2011) emphasis on policy and sees populism as the application of policies getting support from a major section of the people, but eventually distract the economic welfares of this majority. Weyland (2001, p.14) censured this approach and describe populism as a political strategy 'through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, institutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers.'

On contrast, Levitsky and Roberts (2011) separate populism from particular policy initiatives and state populism as a political conscription of publics by ‘personalistic leaders’ who encounter traditional partisan or economic elites in the interest of an imprecise pueblo (Public). According to Kenny (2021) there are several ways to understand the concept of populism but the political strategy approach is most appropriate. Populist leaders with charismatic personality attempt to create unmediated relations with mass population to gain and hold control. In this context, populism is not about ‘what people supposedly believe’ rather than ‘what they and their leader do’ (Kenny, 2021). Ware (2002) explains populism as a political strategy organized through a extensive variety of politicians, whereas Betz (2002) sees it as mainly a political strategy, whose political style is loaded to concealed grievances and appeal to sentiments motivated by them

2.6 Paralleling the Approaches:

Above mentioned three approaches of populism have dissimilarity, also there are arguments on overlap linking meanings. The likenesses among the ideational and discursive styles are obvious, both focuses on the structure of politics and discrepancy between ‘us’ and them’ as a central module of populist rhetoric. In fact, many researchers have preserved these descriptions as the only approach of explanation (Pappas, 2012; Hawkins, 2009, 2010). The variance in the theoretical and methodological approaches of Populism often leads to scholars to criticized and distinct the definitions of populism. For example, Kaltwasser and Mudde (2012) approved the ideational approach and criticized Laclau’s discursive theory of populism, quarrelling that this approach associate populism entirely with dualistic rhetoric, which creation it excessively abstract. Whereas in contrast, it suggests a notion of populism that turn out to be ambiguous and malleable so, loses significantly its analytic effectiveness (Kaltwasser and Mudde 2012).

Equally, Panizza (2005) mainly focuses on party ideology, debate that populism as a broad practice that is accessible to every politician not just for the categorized populist. Since this

perception, populism should be assumed as a malleable approach of persuading to reanalyze the publics and their opponents (Panizza 2005). Above criticisms determine that both traditions have diverse ontological status to populism and, thus, recommend various methodical tactics for operationalizing and evaluating (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013).

The theoretical association between the ideological and discursive approaches often treats populism as a political strategy. According to Barr (2009) whether populist thoughts is about the people, then populist activities are to be expected to entail solid leadership, which capable to signify the benefits of the people and evade the establishments that might distort those benefits. Similarly, Filc (2010) concentrated on excluding and including of crowds also mentioned three different stages e.g. material, symbolic and political. Material inclusion and exclusion are related to particular strategies, and symbolic inclusion and exclusion deals with partisan rhetoric and correcting the shared restrictions. Lastly, political inclusion and exclusion are about restructuring the party, for instance, association and representation in political parties.

In conclusion, Gidron & Bonikowski (2013) approved that it is essential to underline the theoretical variances among the mentioned traditions (Political Ideology, Political Style and Political Strategy), it is not only identifying the areas for further research also provide significant allegations to explain and study populism empirically.

2.6.1 Political Behavior and Populism

The expansion of behavioral research during the nineteenth century has tremendously expanded and also led to further improvements in the political behavior assessment patterns. As a result, political behavior has shift in substantial ways especially in the developed industrial democratic states. Socio-political; modernization is now introducing new trends in the developing world as third wave of political democratization has greatly reformed the political systems worldwide particularly in Asia, Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America,

Asia, and Africa. These new trends provided us with an opportunity to test and check the validation of old political theories (Dalton & Klingemann, 2011).

Political behavior stands for the way people act, think and feel regarding the politics. The main concepts of political behavior involve public opinion, political ideology, campaigns, participation, polarization, media and partisanship. Many studies made strong comparison regarding political behavior in the cross-cultural context, researchers mainly attribute political behavioral to the national election. Settle, (2014) cited an example of political behavior during the American presidential election. As noted, that despite knowing the fact that their vote will not influence the results of election, millions of Americans dominate the rational calculation to “free ride” by actively participating in the voting process in every four years. A majority of Americans show their support for one or two national political parties, year most of the people are unable to name and identify their congressional spokesperson or know what political group holds the majority in Congress.

However, Dalton & Klingemann, (2011) argued that democratic process varies from country to country based on the political system, and people’s attitude towards political proceedings especially during the election. For example, in a newly established democratic system, engaging people in the election for voting process is a gigantic challenge especially where the previous governments followed ritualized patterns. On the other hand, the old democracies involve indulging people to unconventional politics and in new democratic systems people are often told to break the autocratic regime by considering revolutionary upheavals under consideration by increasing their political participation especially during the election. However, accelerating the citizens’ participation is comparatively stronger in the non-democratic systems. Previous research has further witnessed some deeper insights regarding into active participation process in such non-democratic nations. Countries where citizen participation in the political process especially election is not encouraged and tolerated can greatly alter the political indulgence patterns through institutionalized means. To further affirm this the study conducted by Moehler et al., (2005) found a large number of political activities among different African nations. Consequently, we can expect that the public will likely to engage in the election even if there is a transnational political

establishment. Notably, a desire to engage in life-affecting decision is common among all, but the political institutions mold the way people desire to involve in the political process, with what they want and what should be required the outcomes (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

Yet in many democracies, despite the populists and political parties motivate for an active participation, political behavior is still under question due to an increased uncertainty upon the local establishment an institution. For example, the rate of political participation among the Indonesian public is comparatively low. Despite Indonesian public considers election as a strong pathway to build a liberal; democracy and serve their basic rights and wellbeing, their lower participation indicates their less interest in bringing up the revolutionary political changes (V Political Process, 2024). According to Nur et al., (2020), some studies suggest the reason of low political participation during the election is that the Indonesian government do not much acknowledge the political participation of public and also, prefer to keep people uninformed about the political issues in the country.

On the other hand, some democracies also force people to improve their political participation as they acknowledge political behavior as one of the most fundamental components of creating the demarcating system. In this context, Ley, (2014) examined using the fear of violence as forcing people to increase their political engagement during the election in Tierra Caliente, Mexico. As noted, that understanding the decision regarding using violence is not understandable phenomenon, yet focusing on people's political behavior was an important decision by the local government as our current understanding of political behavior is mostly in the peaceful democratic contexts. Further findings of the relevant studies revealed that, the Mexican government used the fear of violence as an important strategic technique to improve the political behavior of public during the election. Participants indicated that, they fear of crime and want the next government to take considerable steps to eradicate criminal activities. For this purpose, they practically engaged in voting process as they well-recognized the risks and benefits linked with their potential political behavior.

2.6.2 Demographical Behavior in Populism

During the last two decades, world has been gigantic changes in information systems and factors that influence our perceptions and attitude towards different phenomenon. Along-with conventional media platforms, new trends have transformed our understanding of social, economic, political, cultural and other relevant phenomenon. However, yet there are some basic mechanisms that impact our perceptions and attitudes in a certain manner. For example, despite European region has adopted a new way of living and thinking due to urbanization, still they are inspired by their traditions and cultural backgrounds. Especially, people from the Czech Republic have a developed yet a particular lifestyle that is inspired by their socio-cultural background, demographical characteristics, and cultural norms (Karvánková et al., 2017).

In this context, Giebler & Regel, (2018) cited a simple example of voters' decision during the German election in the year 2014. Majority of the voters casted their votes to those candidates having a similar cultural and geographical background. To empirically investigate the personal factors and geographical resemblance, (Giebler & Regel, 2018) examined the role of demographical factors in voting for the famous populist political party name Alternative for Germany (AFD). Results indicated that, the role of demographical factors was strongly significant in determining the voters' choices. Besides, the relevant populist party largely resorted to rhetoric patterns that were supporting their stance concerning the reformation and wellbeing of their own people in the $n= 402$ German districts.

As noted by Kovalcsik & Nzimande, (2019), the influence of demographical factors largely contributes to highlight the stance of both leaders and the public. Especially, populist leaders' speeches and symbols are the determinants of attaining public support regarding their public-centered stance. To further affirm the role of demographical factors Yilmaz & Morieson (2021) examined their role in populists speech and stance worldwide. The researchers used systematic review method and differentiated the role of demographical factors on the basis of identitarian populism and religious populism. Results indicated that,

religion is the most prominent factor that is visible in the political rhetoric of the European populists. While Abadi et al., (2024) demonstrates that negative emotions, e.g. anxiety and anger, are strong predictors of both populist attitudes, including people-centrism and anti-elitism, and nativism. Particularly, anxiety precedes anger, which subsequently influences both populist attitudes and nativism. we reveal that people-centrism is primarily shaped by anger and social identity, while nativism is influenced by anger, anxiety, social identity, and education. Besides, the love for the homeland, anger, previous experiences, and populists mostly reflect religious beliefs in their speeches. Yilmaz & Morieson, (2021) further argued that this religious rhetoric in their speech is used a major factor to gain public support and attention as religion helps to sacralize the public and also by perpetuating “us VS them” mentality.

According to Nai & Martínez i Coma, (2019), it is not deniable that populists have a transgresses political style, and their speeches are based on aggression, agitation, calculated provocation, exaggeration of facts, and an intended infringement of social and cultural taboos. Populists prefer to adopt even more aggressive rhetoric on their stance so that the public may consider them as rebel, transparent, and the torchbearer of political change. For example, Geert Wilders, a famous populist from the Netherlands is always observed as aggressive and refusing to agree on bilateral reconciliation practices with Russia. To exhibit a strong disagreement, Geert Wilders attributed Vladimir Zhirinovsky to clown of Russian political system, Russian Donald Trump, and one of the political individuals performing “nut-job”. This rhetoric against Vladimir Zhirinovsky indicates the extent to which national identity of Geert Wilders affects his stance and opinion regarding the Russian political leader.

A case study conducted by Olivas Osuna & Rama (2021) also investigated the role of demographical factors in influencing the populists rhetoric in Spain during the Covid-19 pandemic. The researchers collected data from the televised speeches of the Spanish populist part named “VOX” and gathered the data by using both the quantitative and qualitative content analysis method. Results showed that, VOX being a right-hand radical populist party is having a strong connection with Catalonia. Due to this link, all the public speech and slogans of the VOX were based on criticizing the healthcare system and reforms made by the

Spanish government. Moreover, VOX also indicated that their narratives were based on anti-Islam and anti-multiculturalism especially during their parliamentary debates. According to Olivás Osuna and Rama (2021), VOX seized the Covid-19 as a source of representing their own religious beliefs, expressing their intolerance towards religious and cultural diversity, and also criticized the government at every communication platform. Abascal as the right-hand radical Spanish populist consistently intensified his populist stance during the consecutive six parliamentarian debates (from May to June 2020). On the basis of the religious affiliation, Abascal represented his stance as advocating the Spanish national integrity, raising concerns regarding the national security, criticizing the national healthcare system, and the potential role of other ethnicities and races in threatening the Spanish sovereignty.

According to Block & Negrine (2017), the communication style patterns of populists are based on their demographical affiliation as “an appeal to the people”. However, with the integration of media platforms, this populist rhetoric is even more influential, intensified, with a special focus on resonating with the people’s experiences, needs, and demographical characteristics. For example, media in the United States supported Donald Trump whose rhetoric was supporting only rights of the white Americans. Despite the ethnic, cultural and racial diversity in the America, Trump’s support and stance was only for the white people, having the similar race, and ethnicity as the Trump had. Thus, there was a time when populist stance and rhetoric was a simple process that was largely accompanied by a focus on national wellbeing rather than the just relying on the personal perceptions and demographical affiliations. Today, the political trends are transformed and primary accompanied by one’s own beliefs, associations, interest, and thus, socio-cultural considerations (Bos & Brants, 2014).

2.7 Political System and Media Logic in the Context of India and Pakistan

The existing populism mode shifts the attention from outdated discussion to the subject of how populists deal with and achieve power (Taggart & Kaltwasser, 2015). Researchers usually define populist features as resilient and charismatic leaders, but in actuality, populism is articulated through systematized administrative organizations as well as operational social activities (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2014). Similarly, the philosophy of democracy (Political system) is loaded with populist patterns, which emphasizing ‘sovereignty against accommodation, majority against minorities, and transparency against intricate procedures’ (Canovan, 2002, p. 43).

Aalberg and de Vreese (2017) assumed that populism is manifestation of political communication, which involved three significant components: political parties, the media, and citizens. While Mudde (2002) believed that the true definition of populism is the unhindered and unmediated representation of the people in a democracy. This typically directed at “the people” in order to support their candidate to rule (Canovan, 1999; Kaltwasser, 2014; Meny & Surel, 2002, p. 13; Mudde, 2007, pp. 150–155). According to Paxton (2019), "the people" can be alienated into three groups: political (the people as sovereign), cultural (the people as native), and economic (the people as a class). There is a connection between populism and democracy, especially with regard to democracy's freeing features (Wear, 2008). In the case of India and Pakistan, both countries have experienced quick and profound political upheaval since 1947. India has not experienced a system-threatening disaster, and its politics. Pakistan, in contrast, has experienced more instability, with system changes in 1988, 1999, and 2008 (Oldenburg, 2010). Comparing political system of India and Pakistan (Batoool, 2021) mentioned (Freedom House Index: India and Pakistan 2013-2021) ^[9] that both right-wing populist leaders certainly play a part in their countries' democratic decline: they preach religious nationalism, portray opposing movements as anti-national, and oppose federalization and rule devolution. Under these authorities, there has been a significant increase in the restriction on media and academics, as well as incidences of extra-judicial executions motivated by religious extremism.

Javed (2021) claimed that the growth of populism and regressive politics has truly affected Pakistan's domestic situation. He identified that the emergence of Modi and the entrenchment

of Hindutva in India, have changed Pakistan's domestic political dynamics in a number of ways, with this being the most visible spillover. Alike, Shehzad (2022) observed that populism is doing immense damage to Pakistan's democracy, economy and society as is the case with each country where this sort of politics has become a major influence. Populist leaders rely on stories that offer straightforward solutions to difficult issues, but in the case of Imran Khan, he reduced all issues to corruption-related issues and offered himself as the answer. Although corruption is a significant issue, it is not the biggest or the only one. While in the case of India, Vyas (2022) presumed that to examine the reality of Narendra Modi and his politics, populism has hardly ever been taken into account or used as a substitute to ideology. The people have been taught by Narendra Modi that he is the only one who can protect India from Pakistan. Narendra Modi has unquestionably evolved into the populace's common sense, especially in light of the parent organization's conviction that India should become a Hindu Rashtra.

The concept of the mediatization of politics has been used primarily as a prism to examine the relationship between populism and the media. Since the media system is designed to give visibility and worth reporting to political artists (newsworthiness), studies adopting this idea typically view the media as an erosive force threatening and transforming the political realm (Manucci, 2017). In this concern, Imran Khan, the leader of Pakistan Tehreek Insaf, presented the notion of "accountability of all corrupt politicians" to eliminate traditional politicians and political dynasties. He also used justifications drawn from Sharia Law to defend the rights of minorities and women, while advocating for the preservation of good relations with other Muslim nations (Hassan, 2019). Whereas, According to Reporters Sans Frontières (2021) Imran Khan rigorously curtailed the expansion of the media sector after taking rule in 2018. However, during his regime, religious conservatism and populist ideology grew. On the other hand, Baru (2021) claimed that the media has been forced to become either more restrained or more political due to the increased manifestation of state power during Modi's regime. A few Delhi-based journalists who had a deep social tie to the Nehru-Gandhi family particularly irritated Modi. Modi and the BJP may have wanted to reduce the impact these journalists had on their viewers during the 2014 election campaign. Even as they attempted to reduce their

impact, Modi and his media strategists inflated the strength and importance of Delhi's English-language media.

In existing media logic of political affairs, political groups and frontrunners have relying on the mass media in reference to construct good will, to propagate notions and to gain the support of the electors. To get public attention media often affiliated disrupting and incorrect statements of populist leaders as newsworthiness (Araújo et al., 2020). Similarly, the populist rhetoric contains same characteristics of media logic, like personalization, staging of global events, emotionalism, linguistic transformation and an anti-establishment approach that enhanced the exposure of populist leaders (Mazzoleni et al., 2003). In the same way, Khan skillfully used personal forms to support his populist discursive strategy. In order to increase his personal credibility, he positions himself by employing first and second person verb forms, pronouns, and possessives (I', 'you', 'your', 'we', 'my', 'our) to emphasize his connection with the masses, the importance of responsibility, and the necessity of punishing the corrupt elite (Hassan, 2019). While on the other side, rejecting traditional politics, Modi has reached out to a lot of people using traditional media. His election policy has not been limited to outdated approaches of campaigning. According to sources, he has gained a lot of knowledge by studying political techniques. Modi was one of the first Indian chief ministers to comprehend the influence and reach of social and new media (Singh, 2014).

2.8 Theoretical Framework

Framing is extensively used in the current disciplinary zone of social sciences e.g. culture, social and political sociology. Also popular for institutions in the arenas linguistics, communication, media studies, and policy studies (Mendes, 2011). The notion of framing is highly attentive for scholars to studying social activities via frame analysis to uncover the fundamental ideological structures of press (Benford & Snow, 2000). This theoretical

framework helps to evaluate and highlight the important names connected with framing theory, also theorizing the concept and role of populism and mediatized populism.

2.8.1 Framing Theory

The notion of framing can be traced back to Goffman (1974) later, Gamson and colleagues (1985-2002) analyzed framing to understand how people build connotations and make logic of surroundings (Ferree et al., 2002). Framing is a technique that helps individuals to categorize and understand the information that comes across in their routine (Goffman, 1974). However, Gamson and Modigliani (1987) considered frames as an essential indication that delivers sense to an 'unfolding strip of events' also recommended the 'essence of the issue'. According to Tewksbury and Scheufele (2009) primary frames in communication research have a dual significance, they are socially constructed categorization systems used to process information between journalists and citizens alike, in addition to they are used by the media to influence the targeted audience's interpretations. In other words, framing moulds and then modifies the audience's interpretations and preferences.

In brief, the Framing hypothesis suggested that media gives priorities to a few concerns and places them according to significances, which creates people's choices (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015). Framing supposition not only deals with what to think also measured how to think around. According to Scheufele (2007) the existing performs of jurisdictional issues, political parties and their innovators are dependent on the media to build their open picture, to extent opinions, to the commendation of voters and their reorganization, and characterization. The Framing theory proposed that media can influence assumption and behavior while imposing interpretive schemes on political circumstances and their public personalities. Choudary (2013) Framing is the symbolic approach of source, consumed to influence and form the spectator's opinions about news.

2.8.1.1 Approaches of Framing

Andrade (2013) proposed that news framing is the scheme that sort story either positively or negatively, particularly in media these framing approaches are broadly used to influence individuals' assumption about a particular issue. Vreese (2005) categorized the news frames into two major types e.g. episodic news frames deal with precise events or cases, whereas thematic news frames for collective and political concerns. Similarly, Cacciatore et al. (2016) focused on rationally equivalent information where the collection of single set of facts can be supposed a frame. Consequently, additional flexibility is contracted to the framing classification that often influencing what an audience receives instead of how equivalent information is obtained. The approach of framing which frequently highlighting one set of deliberations over another has been categorized as “emphasis framing. For example, the development of emphasis framing studies in communication concentrating on thematic framing, which holds retaining an issue in a broad framework, and treats episodic framing without the framework of its thematic-based equivalent (Iyengar, 2005).

To understand the approaches of framing Saleem & Siraj (2019) acknowledged two different thoughts of framing theorists, first approach is of the post-positivist theorists, and the second is about critical cultural researchers. The primary goal and emphasis of post-positivist theorists is finding various sorts of frames and measuring the particular impact such frames would have on the audience or readers. The 'generic frames' are discovered as a result of their examination. In news reports, 'generic' frames are frequently employed. The researchers contended that these 'generic' frameworks might influence how news viewers perceive events or occurring. Conflict or contest frames, strategic frames, moral frames, financial frames, and horse-race frames are some examples. Another notable example is Iyenger's thematic and episodic frames (Baran & Davis, 2015).

According to Baran and Davis (2015), the focus of critical cultural academics was mostly on elite control over framing. Critical cultural theorists have also investigated how

progressive groups have employed various frames to achieve their objectives, as well as how these media frames impact people's view of the social reality. Despite significant differences in methodology, studies by post-positivist and critical cultural researchers found consistent results (de Vreese, 2012).

2.8.1.2 Frame Overlapping

The sociological-rooted description of framing is manifestly different from theoretical concepts. Minsky (1975) defines frame as a rational pattern that systematizes information in the mind. Nonetheless, this explanation aligns with what other researchers have identified as "schemas" or "scripts" (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Markus & Zajonc, 1985; Rumelhart, 1984; Schank & Abelson, 1977) concepts that help to explain how people manage the overwhelming amount of information they encounter on a daily basis (Wicks, 1992). In particular circumstances, framing has been assumed or overlap with theories like priming and agenda setting (e.g., McCombs, 2004; McCombs & Ghanem, 2001). The concerning of overlapping is related with subjects of applicability and accessibility, precisely, whether framing is constructed on an applicability or accessibility model. Entman (1993) assumed framing as notions of selection and salience, which usually used falsely under various media effects models and tag as frame.

Cacciatore et al., (2016) recommended the finest method to recognize framing is to explain the mechanisms of the phenomenon including priming and agenda setting. Furthermore, the supreme productive approach is to pay focus on historic and theoretic details of above concepts. Also, Organization, assortment of content or thematic construction considered the key elements of framing effects, which totally relayed on appropriate activation and assessments. On contrast, according to Downs (1972) it is challenging to segregate framing effects from agenda setting and priming effects, since issues have a tendency to be framed in a reliable way as they surface on the public agenda.

The framing theory suggests that frame directs attention to the particular aspects of a problem, making them more manageable, observable, or relevant to audience. The theory is applicable to the current research and helping to perceive a vibrant connection between the activities of populist leaders and the way selected press frame them in news coverage. The framing theory has influenced the method taken in this study to analyze the coverage of populist leaders of Indo-Pak particularly, in Pre-election and post-election scenario. And allow the zone which is essential to scrutinize the selected frames operating in this study.

2.8.2 Populism Theory

The origin of populism is tracked back to populist movements, which is typically attributed to the United States and Russia in the 19th century (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 32). Since then, researchers have focused on social issues (for example, Allcock, 1971), national and regional contexts (Germani, 1978), or compared populism's uses. Dornbusch and Edwards (1991) propose definition of populism as implementation of populist policies, the application of policies that get widespread support but ultimately harm the economic interests of the majority. Populist policies are those that are to the left of the median voter's political bliss point yet nonetheless receive support from the median voter. The following section will broadly present how populism has definitive borders.

2.8.2.1 Theorizing Populism

Populism is defined as a political ideology that encourages ordinary people to stand against groups considered to be elites. It constructs politics through a binary framework, dividing society into two sides, the people and the elites (Hussain, Abbas, & Shah, 2025).

According to Urbinati (2019) the theories of populism follow two core directions: a minimalist theory and maximal theory. The minimalist theory integrates all views of populism that evaluate its ideological tropes, political style in connection to rhetorical apparatus and national culture, and leadership approaches to attain power. Mudde (2004; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013a) has made significant contributions to defining the ideological framework within this non-normative minimalism. On the other hand, the maximalist theory offers not just a conceptual framework but also a practical blueprint for the development of populist movements and regimes. This theory advocates a discursive, constructivist view of individuals. In terms of the rhetorical moment it emphasizes, it is similar to the ideological notion, but nevertheless considers politics itself in Carl Schmitt's friend/enemy dichotomy capable of hegemonic consensus, and it rejects the idea that populism is a Manichean moral dualism between the masses and the elite. The creator of this theory, Laclau (2005) and Laclau & Mouffe (2001), calls populism the essence of democracy and politics because it is a process by which a group of citizens freely and publicly constructs itself as a collective subject (the people) that opposes an existent hegemony in order to seize power and resists another collective (not the elite or the popular). Populism is the essence of democracy, since it involves the direct mobilization and permission of the people to form their own will. It is also politics at its best, because it relies only on rhetoric and the art of persuasion.

So, populism has been demarcated as a "thin-centered" ideology (Mudde, 2004), a political strategy (Weyland, 2001), a political style (Canovan, 1999; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014), and while for Hawkins et al., (2018) as a discursive frame. The term populism is still used hyperbolically than analytically, either to brand political organizations and leaders (D'Eramo, 2013), or to identify the liberal-democratic model as the only viable form of democracy (Müller, 2016). Because "populism is not an ideology or a political regime, and cannot be assigned to a specific programmatic content" (Mouffe, 2016, p. 112), it is a type of collective action aimed at gaining power. Despite the fact that populism is "a way of doing politics that can take various forms depending on the periods and places," it cannot concur with nondemocratic forms of politics because it is an attempt to create a collective subject through consent and to question a social order in the name of the large majority's interests

(Urbinati, 2019, p. 112). Populism can understand in three different ways e.g. definite style of doing politics, an internal organizational movement, and a thin ideology (Pabriks, 2017).

Similarly, Mazzoleni (2014) mediatized the concept of political and media populism to understand and shape the public opinion also media give a boost to populist leaders in their communication style. Moreover, media organizations not only rise populist messaging. Rather highlights political conflict and emotional cues, which generates favorable conditions for populist content (Mulla, 2017).

2.8.2.2 Media Populism

Populism is much depended on communication channels and media demonstrations, which pursuing the concept of media populism (Mazzoleni, 2014). Media populism can be identifying into two dimensions, the first concept (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999) consuming media as an infotainment approach to politics. While the second concept of media populism examined how political populism relates to media actions that similar to ideologically sensitive components (Mazzoleni, 2014). On the other side (Hameleers et al., 2017) considerate the media populism into two types, first type of media populism stresses the supremacy of the public's will. In this demarcation, the opinions and emotions of nations are the central topic of media coverage. And second type of media populism deals how media involve in populism themselves by means of underlining the blameless people to dishonest elites (Krämer, 2014).

This specific type of populist media content thus entails the disdain of elites, such as politicians or experts, who are perceived as a less credible and reliable source than the common people. For anti-elite media populism, the top-down analyses of elite experts, such as scientists, policy-makers, or politicians, are consequentially perceived as less meaningful and less reliable than the down-to-earth experiences of ordinary citizens.

Mazzoleni (2008) perceives that the media not only spreading media-specific populism rather consolidating populist messages. Simply, the media may act as effective mobilization tools for populist objectives, whether purposefully or unintentionally. Hence, out of journalist's intension media logic produces a favorable structure that is vulnerable to populist messages and their continuous integration into editorial considerations and news content (Mazzoleni, 2008, p. 50).

The growth of communication technology and advancement of culture industry has caused a new phenomenon Known as "mediatization" (Mazzoleni, 2014), which includes several manners for example, encompassing social communication outside their ordinary borders, exchanging social activities and establishments, most important supporting social actors and establishments to put up themselves according to media logic (Schulz, 2004). According to Esser and Strömbäck (2014) mediatization is "a long-term process through which the importance of news media as an institution, and their spill-over effects on political processes and political institutions, has increased" (p. 22), and influencing the perspective and setting of political action and manifestation typically in a populist direction (Chakravarty & Roy, 2017).

Media plays a crucial role in influencing the public perception of political parties and their party leaders (Sheafer, 2001) also serve as key communication facilitators between the political elite and the general public. As a result, the media behave as an actor rather than merely an information channel (Stanyer et al., 2019). In this context, the two different theories on how the media contributed to the emergence of populism throughout the world have been put forth. First, it is presumable that the media will serve as a platform for populist actors and their beliefs (e.g. Vossen, 2012). Populist actors are believed to receive unfair media attention because their ideologies appeal to media logic. Media material may be populist on its own (e.g. De Lange, 2011; Krämer, 2014; Mazzoleni, 2008).

Media causes populism to spread, however, the symbolic building of favorable opinion climates, as well as populist leadership, credo, and action; the media play a central role in supporting the emergence of populist phenomena (Mazzoleni, 2008). Both factors' media

coverage and public support influence one another or be influenced by another one. However, prior research (e.g., Hopmann et al., 2010, Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2009; Walgrave and De Swert, 2004) shows that media coverage may enhance support for populist right-wing parties; this is mainly relevant in electoral reform systems. The implication is that simply being visible in the media might boost support for the party, following the same reasoning that media attention to a topic raises its importance (Katsourides & Pachita, 2021).

While the right-wing populist parties receive media attention that openly praises them, the media may influence public opinion in ways that subtly advance their objective, e.g. politicizing immigration or establishing far-right ideologies as legitimate in public debate (Goodwin, Ramalingam, and Briggs 2012). Certain frames appear to support far-right discourses and making them effective, indirectly increase their prospects of winning election. In times of crisis, as noted by Mudde (2019) the public is more open to the assertions made by the tabloid media and opportunistic mainstream politicians. Thus, mainstream media may foster an environment that far-right parties can take advantage of, giving them legitimacy and making them proficient.

To distinguish the role of media in the process of populist movement, Stewart et al. (2003) and Mazzoleni (2008) identified the four phases: “Ground-laying phase” the most critical phase in which mass media leading the public mood through dwell on subtle issues, political dishonors and social ills. In ‘Insurgent Phase” populists turn out to be outsiders and challenges the current political stability in election or government. And media likely to demonstrate segregated response to the “political game”, Popular media tend to support while the mainstream media cannot assist stimulating the lied at the misbehaviors of the ruling classes and likely to be extra cautions in discriminate their constant censure from that of the populist. In the “Established phase” populists controlling the governing duties, may also face the extreme criticism of political groups and media, so drop the attention and free profile-raising. In “Decline Phase” Populists can be prompted by internal conflicts, the death of their founder, or by scandals involving the upper strata of the party.

To theorize populism in discourse, it situates within framing theory. The primary claim of framing theory is related to the engagement and transmission of messages to the people (Nabi, 2003). Scholars have delivered significant indication that the premeditated use of frames influences persons' attitudes, partialities, and actions in the context of campaigns (Druckman et al., 2017; Klar et al., 2013). Some researchers have also verified the effects of specific populist frames to define in what way various frames yield diverse consequences.

To understand this media association among populist leaders Stewart, Mazzoleni, & Horsfield (2003) divided the media association into two prime categories of news media: e.g. "elite" and "tabloid." The elite media is often measured more aligned with mainstream viewpoints, supporting the established political status quo of traditional parties. In contrast, the tabloid media focused on sensationalism, scandals, and triggers social and moral concerns to captivate larger audiences (Mazzoleni, 2003).

Using this theoretical approach, following research assumes that media played crucial role in populist movement and contour the populist's agenda through media coverage. This work analyzes the news framing of populist leaders of in pre-election and post-election routine. Also describe the political magnitudes of the mediatization and its relation to populist manifestations in Pre-election and post-election phases.

Overall, the literature shows that populism is not a single, uniform phenomenon but a complex and multi-dimensional concept. It can be understood as an ideology that divides society into "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite," as a political style using emotional and moralistic language, or as a strategy relying on direct, personalistic leadership and mass mobilization. Scholars also highlight variations such as people-centric, anti-elitist, individual-centric, nationalist, and moralistic approaches, each shaped by local histories, cultural contexts, and political systems. While populism often claims to champion the rights of ordinary people against entrenched elites, it can also create challenges for democratic institutions by encouraging polarization, undermining trust, and limiting pluralism. Recognizing these diverse forms and consequences is essential for understanding how populism emerges, adapts, and influences political behaviour in different regions and periods.

While the preceding literature explores the conceptual and operational dimensions of populism such as anti-elitism, people-centrism, nationalism, and moralism—it is also important to contextualize these theoretical concepts within the specific socio-political landscapes of Pakistan and India. Scholars have noted that populism, while globally widespread, takes on different forms depending on the political culture, religious context, and media environment of each country (Mudde, 2004; Moffitt, 2016). In South Asia, these differences are particularly significant, as populist discourse in both Pakistan and India is deeply intertwined with religion and identity politics, yet it is articulated through divergent ideological lenses.

In Pakistan, populist leaders such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Imran Khan have invoked Islamic values, moral renewal, and anti-corruption narratives to mobilize public sentiment against traditional elites (Yilmaz & Saleem, 2021). Conversely, Indian populism, especially under Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is rooted in Hindu nationalist ideology (Hindutva), which fuses majoritarian cultural identity with strong leadership and exclusionary rhetoric toward minorities (Ammassari, 2018; Sinha, 2017). Both cases exhibit the populist logic of dividing society between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite,” but their ideological and communicative strategies differ substantially. To synthesize these distinctions, the following tables offer a comparative overview of how populism and media framing are conceptualized and practiced in Pakistan and India. Figure 2 outlines the ideological, religious, and strategic features of populism in both countries:

Figure 2 Comparative Features of Populism in Pakistan and India

Dimension	Pakistan	India
Ideological Framing	Anti-elitist, moralistic, thin-centered ideology with Islamic symbolism.	Anti-elitist, nationalist, Hindutva ideology rooted in Hindu majoritarianism.

Religious Appeals	Islam as unifying moral force; promises moral renewal against elites.	Hindu nationalism (Hindutva) as basis for cultural unification, exclusion of minorities.
Leadership Style	Charismatic, moralistic, personalistic (e.g. Imran Khan).	Charismatic, individual-centered, strong-man image (e.g. Narendra Modi).
Mobilization Strategy	Moralism, anti-corruption rhetoric, appeals to religious values.	Nationalism, Hindu identity politics, anti-minority rhetoric.
Key Populist Themes	Anti-elitism, people-centrism, religious legitimacy.	Anti-elitism, nationalism, majoritarian identity politics.
Democratic Impact (Literature)	Risks institutional erosion, increased polarization, moral delegitimization of opposition.	Risks institutional weakening, democratic backsliding, increased social polarization.

Note: Adapted from literature on populism's ideological, moralistic, nationalist, and people-centric dimensions (e.g., Mudde, 2004; Moffitt, 2016; Yilmaz & Saleem, 2021; Sinha, 2017)

Similarly, in the context of media framing, research indicates that different framing strategies—such as anti-elitist, moralistic, people-centric, and personalization frames—are used by the press to construct the image of populist leaders. These strategies are not only shaped by media logic but also influenced by the national discourse and audience expectations (Entman, 1993; Mazzoleni, 2008). While Pakistani media often draws on moralistic and religious appeals, Indian media tends to amplify charismatic leadership and Hindu identity through both traditional and digital platforms. Figure 3 highlights key framing patterns, language use, and media approaches as reflected in the academic literature. These

summaries serve to reinforce the comparative nature of the current study and provide a foundation for the empirical analysis that follows:

Figure 3 Literature Perspective of Comparative Framing Patterns in Media Coverage

Framing Dimension	Pakistan	India
Approach-Based Frames	Anti-elitist, moralism, people-centric frames dominate.	People-centric, personalization, nationalism frames dominate.
Language-Based Frames	Emotive and demonizing language used to target liberal elites and rivals.	Emotive language amplifying Hindu nationalist appeals; demonizing minorities.
Media Strategy (Literature)	Reliance on traditional media, rallies, charismatic image-building.	Heavy social media branding, direct digital outreach, leader-centred campaigns.
Electoral Phase Patterns	Strongly supportive tone pre-election, moral legitimacy framing; more balanced/critical post-election.	Supportive, emotive, and personalistic pre-election; sharper anti-elitist and critical framing post-election.
Polarization Effect	Reinforces moral binaries (good people vs. corrupt elites); religious polarization.	Reinforces cultural majoritarianism; communal polarization, anti-minority sentiments.
Scholarly Concerns	Simplifies complex issues, delegitimizes opposition, risks authoritarian drift.	Encourages social divisions, democratic backsliding, personalized rule.

Note. Based on theoretical framing approaches (Entman, 1993; Reese, 2001; Moffitt, 2016) and empirical studies on South Asian media (Yilmaz & Saleem, 2021; Ammassari, 2018; Sinha, 2017)

These comparative summaries illustrate how both contexts share core populist features—such as anti-elitist discourse and moralistic appeals—yet differ in religious framing, nationalist ideology, and media strategies. Recognizing these differences is essential for understanding the distinct ways populism manifests and is mediated in Pakistan and India.

The existing literature indicates that while populism in both Pakistan and India relies on anti-elitist rhetoric and moral claims of representing “the people,” their underlying ideological frameworks and targets differ significantly. In Pakistan, populist leaders such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Imran Khan have drawn on Islamic symbolism, framing their movements as moral crusades against corrupt elites and promising a return to justice grounded in Islamic values. This aligns with populism’s moralistic and people-centric dimensions, emphasizing anti-elitism while using religious language to unify supporters. In contrast, India’s populist trajectory under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Narendra Modi demonstrates an individual-centric and nationalist approach rooted in Hindutva ideology. Here, populism mobilizes majoritarian Hindu identity, targeting religious minorities and secular pluralism while reinforcing anti-elite and anti-establishment sentiments through exclusionary, emotional, and moralistic discourse. Despite their differences, both cases illustrate how populist leaders strategically use religion, moralism, and anti-elitist appeals to cultivate mass support, polarize society, and challenge liberal democratic norms.

2.9 Research Gaps

The research gap identified in this research lies in the limited exploration of coverage of populist leaders beyond the pre-election period, despite extensive literature on mediatized

populism. Previous studies have mainly focused on populist leaders during pre-election periods, examining their communication strategies and media portrayal leading up to election. However, there is a notable absence of research that comprehensively analyzes the dynamics of press coverage of populist leaders after election. By extending the analysis to include post-election phases, this study aims to address this gap and provide a more holistic understanding of how the media interacts with populist figures over time. Furthermore, by examining press behavior towards populists across different phases of their leadership, this research intends to shed light on potential shifts in media attitudes and coverage strategies. Therefore, this study seeks to contribute to the existing literature by offering insights into the evolving relationship between the media and populist leaders, thereby enriching our understanding of the broader dynamics of populism in contemporary political landscapes. Additionally, the inclusion of language-based frames alongside approach-based framing strategies in this study aims to provide a holistic perspective on media content relating to populist coverage.

Following is the scholarly support to formulate Research Questions (RQ) and Research Hypothesis (RH):

Framing, as a hypothetical notion, is difficult to understanding how media forms public perception. Entman (1993) describes framing as the choice and salience of certain characteristics of an apparent truth to encourage a definite problem description, underlying explanation, moral assessment, and treatment approval. This impression has been broadly applied to examine media coverage of political figures, mainly populist leaders.

The linguistic used by populist politicians often sets the "people" against the "elite," a notion that is reflected in their media representation. Researchers contend that the employment of conflict-oriented narratives, dramatization, and personalizing are media framing tactics employed by populist politicians (Moffitt, 2016; Esser et al., 2017). In particular, personalization highlights the leader's charisma and media-genic qualities, such their capacity to interact directly with the people via contemporary media platforms (Block & Negrine, 2017). So,

RQ1. What are the key framing strategies applied by the selected press for the populist leaders of Pakistan and India?

The concept of "media-genic attributes" raises to qualities that make leaders attractive and newsworthy in the media (Aalberg et al., 2017). Populist leaders frequently employ these attributes—such as solid rhetoric, simplified messaging, and thru appeals to the civic—to rule news cycles. Scholarships specify that such leaders obtain enlarged coverage in pre-election phases, as their media-savvy approaches align with the media's preference for conflict and spectacle (Bos & Brants, 2014). So,

RQ2. In which proportion do the selected press distribute Human-Interest and Controversial Attributes?

Framing tactics are also formed by linguistic and methodological approaches. Language-based framing scrutinises how press dissertation supports narratives favourable or unfavourable to populist leaders. For example, reporting may highlight leaders' use of "common man" rhetoric, which shows them as significant figures (Wodak, 2015). Approach-based framing, alternatively, contains thematic versus episodic framing. Thematic framing locates the leader within wider sociopolitical settings, whereas episodic framing emphasises on remote events or controversies (Iyengar, 1991). So,

RQ3. How far the key topics covered in the news stories related with Language-based frames and Approach-based frames?

Press coverage knowingly moves between pre-election and post-election phases. Scholarships propose that during pre-election periods, coverage inclines to be more supportive, highlighting leaders' campaign aptitudes and public engagements (Strömbäck & Kaid, 2008). Post-election coverage, however, usually develops more critical, examining leaders' capability to deliver on their promises (Hopmann et al., 2010). These shifts reflect the press double role as both an agent of political narratives and a watchdog. So,

RQ4. To what extent does the coverage to populist leaders vary in terms of supportive and critical coverage in the pre-election and post-election phases?

Research reveals that framing strategies and reporting tones frequently vary based on political contexts. For example:

Hameleers et al., (2017) divide media populism into two types, first type of media populism stresses the supremacy of the public's will. In this context, the opinions and emotions of nations are the central topic of media coverage. And second type of media populism deals how media involve in populism themselves by means of underlining the blameless people to dishonest elites (Krämer, 2014). literature approves that pre-election framing approaches highlight leaders' charisma and campaign promises, whereas post-election framing repeatedly moves to governance and policy assessment (Esser et al., 2017; Aalberg et al., 2017). Thus,

RH1: The framing strategies significantly different in the pre-election and post-election phases.

Media behave as an actor rather than merely an information channel (Stanyer et al., 2019). In this context, the two different theories on how the media contributed to the emergence of populism throughout the world have been put forth. First, it is presumable that the media will serve as a platform for populist actors and their beliefs (e.g. Vossen, 2012). Populist actors are believed to receive unfair media attention because their ideologies appeal to media logic. Media material may be populist on its own (e.g. De Lange, 2011; Krämer, 2014; Mazzoleni, 2008). Populist leaders habitually obtain positive pre-election coverage, as their anti-Elit rhetoric aligns with public dissatisfaction (Moffitt, 2016). But post-election phases perceive amplified analysis as expectations of governance replace campaign rhetoric (Bos & Brants, 2014). So,

RH2: Populist Leaders receive more supportive coverage in the pre-election phase as compared to post-election.

Prior research shows that media coverage may enhance support for populist right-wing parties; this is mainly relevant in electoral reform systems. The implication is that simply being visible in the media might boost support for the party, following the same reasoning that media attention to a topic raises its importance (Katsourides & Pachita, 2021).

Press coverage during pre- and post-election phases highlights diverse key subjects, reflecting changes in public and media significances. Study directs that pre-election issues often rotate around promises, whereas post-election issues emphasis on performance (Strömbäck & Kaid, 2008; Hopmann et al., 2010). So,

RH3: There is a significant difference in the key topics covered in the pre-election and post-election phases.

The right-wing populist parties receive media attention that openly praises them, the media may influence public opinion in ways that slightly advance their objective, e.g. establishing far-right ideologies as legitimate in public debate (Goodwin, Ramalingam, and Briggs 2012). Certain frames appear to support discourses and making them effective, indirectly increase their prospects of winning election. In times of crisis, the mainstream media may foster an environment that far-right parties can take advantage of, giving them legitimacy and making them proficient (Mudde, 2019). The elite media is often supporting the established political status quo of traditional parties. In contrast, the tabloid media focused on sensationalism, scandals, and triggers social and moral concerns to captivate larger audiences (Mazzoleni, 2003). Media-genic attributes such as charisma and communication style are more conspicuously highlighted in pre-election coverage, while post-election coverage underlines leadership presentation and accountability (Aalberg et al., 2017; Wodak, 2015). So,

RH4: Populist leaders receive more Human-Interest Attributes in the pre-election phase as compared to post-election.

By integrating conclusions from various studies and comparative analyses, this review situates the study within a inclusive context while keeping a meditation on the exclusive political and media settings of India and Pakistan. The association between media's agenda-setting role and the strategic communication of populist leaders makes a critical viewpoint for testing the proposed hypotheses. Moreover, the literature highlights the significance of reviewing how language-based and approach-based framing strategies form public opinion, adding wisdom to the study's examination of key topics and coverage patterns. So, this

analysis not only verifies the research questions and hypotheses but also highlights their significance in the wider discourse on media and populism.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter outlines the research methodology used to analysis the media coverage of populist leaders of India and Pakistan, which required a statistical comparison of media framing on pre-election and post-election phases. Primarily, it describes an epistemological method of the study concerning its objectives. And highlight the selection of medium, research design and approach in detail. Finally, the chapter summaries the sampling and data analysis techniques used for a better perception of related studies.

To understand the research process Saunders et al., (2009) suggested the ‘research onion’, which rifts the research structure into five layers including: philosophy, approach, strategy, time limit and data collection methods. This study examines how populist leaders of India and Pakistan are framed in the news, by using the philosophy of interpretivism that discovers the framing strategies of newspapers in pre- and post-election scenario. Also explore that how these events influence the coverage of news.

3.1 Content Analysis

Berger (2011, p. 205) defines content analysis as the systematic explanation and classification of communication material in line with particular frequently predetermined categories" as a research approach. He realized that the same approach could be used in both quantitative and qualitative investigations. Content analysis is the organized method of assessing the content, in various fields content analysis is considered as an effective tool to attain the objectives of the research. Neuendorf (2002) described content analysis as the "primary message centered methodology", and has been considered the fastest developing technique especially in mass communication research. Yousaf et al., (2018) proposed the linkage between events and environment to differentiated Content analysis into inferential and descriptive manner. The nature of descriptive content analysis is investigative, while the inferential deal with the generalization of the outcomes over the entire population.

Wimmer and Dominick (2013) stated that content analysis is the practice of examining the media in the context of editorial, advertorial and news propagation. While according to Mayring (2000) content analysis formfitting the media content under the limitation of media models, knowledge, opinion, emotional state, socio and cultural position. Zaidman-Zait (2014) defined content analysis as a disciplined procedure for compacting words of text into a reduced amount of content, by following the planed rules of code. In contract, Berelson (1952) have been discussed content analysis as "the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication. Later, Shoemaker and Reese (1996) explained that the purpose of content analysis is to organize the media content in such a way to grasp the connotation. That process of unifying the content comprise the strategic features that consider vital and to which we interested to attend. And for this academic used various theoretical and methodological approaches. According to Mayring (2000) Content analysis describes the persistence of investigation by using the replicable and legal approaches for constructing inferences from text. Primarily purpose of content analysis is to freely remove substance from the cultural products associated to media manufacture (Leavy, 2000). Following study scrutinizes the content of nominated newspapers of India and Pakistan. The content of every news story is explored under the following Frames: People-Centric, Anti-elite, Moralism, Nationalism and Personalization.

3.2 Research Design

This research involved both exploratory and descriptive research designs. To recognize and scrutinize the statistical data, descriptive research is considered the best instrument (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). In content analysis, descriptive approach had been used to get valid explanations by deducing and coding the content (Wimmer & Dominick, 2013). Exploratory research has been observed more rigorous, decisive and inventive in nature (Manerikar & Manerikar, 2014).

The nature of the study is quantitative, which discovered the underlying meanings and to reflect the views regarding social world. This method focused on exclusive themes that demonstrated a collection of the meanings on the phenomenon, instead of the statistical importance of the specific manuscripts or conceptions (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009).

To examine the news stories regarding populist leaders in selected newspapers deductive approach of content analysis was used. The reason of applied this approach was deeply scrutinized the story containing headings, subheadings and detail stories. The deductive approach of content analysis was considered more suitable for this study because the frames were designed with strict characteristics. Also, this study quantitatively examined the media coverage of populist leaders of India and Pakistan to identifying the framing strategies in both pre-election and post-election scenario. Moreover, have been explored the tone, types of issues and personal attributes of populist leaders in selected newspapers of both countries.

3.3 Selection of Medium

The study is restricted to English newspapers of India and Pakistan. The reason of selection the Print medium for research is constant reporting and availability of data. In subcontinent, the political leaders have been habitually utilized the press to modify and stimulus the public opinions. In both states, the English press and periodicals have been measured a powerful force to influence the readers as English language has always been assumed as a language of literate and elite (Siddiqua, 2021). Despite the fact that news networks might offer more rapid and current coverage of the conflict and changing political priorities (Sonwalker, 2005, p. 514) the press has remained a potent medium because of its devoted and continuous readership. Therefore, the study's focus is consequently limited to English-language publications. In order to conduct an analysis, the study chose two English newspapers from Pakistan and two English newspapers from India. Thus, this research will conduct a systematic content analysis of four newspapers from Pakistan and India

3.4 Rational of the Newspapers

I. Profile of Dawn and The News International

Dawn and *The News International* are the two state dailies of Pakistan. Both newspapers are perceived to be scrutinized by the educationists and study by the academia of mass communication and environmental studies. Mezzera and Sial (2010) indicated that it is often read by international officials as well as decision-makers in the public and private sectors. (p.16). *Dawn* has depended on the external news agencies (Hussain, 2019).

Dawn is known for being politically apolitical, offering a fair assessment of the news, and providing a variety of viewpoints a chance to be heard. The publication is renowned for its investigative reporting and coverage of topics that are frequently shunned by mainstream media. Dawn's editor, Zaffar Abbas, described the newspaper's approach to Al Jazeera in a 2018 interview, saying that it aims to "tell the truth as it is" and to offer "balanced and

objective" coverage of news and events.

Dawn was regularly complimented for consistently upholding Pakistan's founding father's original objective. The main distinguishing feature of *Dawn* was its attempt to being tolerant and secular in its coverage of some of Pakistan's "most pressing issues." The publication also enjoyed a solid reputation as a trustworthy, impartial, and independent actor. This trait is most likely due to the newspaper's super parts approach (Mezzera & Sial, 2010). In other words, it adopts a neutral viewpoint.

While, *The News International* is the most frequently cited English newspaper of Pakistan. In English dailies, *The News International* is appreciated because of the compact, productive views, and, outstanding news reporting. *The News International* is not only the choice of the opinion leaders but also the young future leaders of Pakistan (Amrishi, 2011). On the other side, *Dawn* is frequently acknowledged for more consistently adhering to Pakistan's founder's initial intention. *Dawn's* major hallmark is connected with its aim to being secular and fair in its coverage of certain of Pakistan's "most pressing issues." Furthermore, the journal has a reputation for being reputable, as well as an independent and neutral actor (Mezzera & Sial, 2010). In short, the English dailies have enough circulation and have divorced writing rules.

The News International's editorial strategy is to "promote a specific political and ideological agenda," according to media expert Muhammad Amir Rana, who also stated that the newspaper's reporting is frequently "biased and unbalanced." *The News International* is renowned for its dedication to bringing attention to matters that are significant to Pakistan and its citizens, including socioeconomic growth, national identity, and security (Diplomatic, 2019).

Hayat & Juliana (2016) assert that *The News International* is impartial, neutral and usually tries to present both sides of an issue. However, they note that *The News International* occasionally seems to stick to the "no policy" principle and varies between being moderate or pro-leftist. In general, it is seen as pro-government and makes an effort to present a balanced position, particularly when dealing with delicate problems.

Both the newspapers are persisted unbiased and contributed news in their complete background. Mostly their attitude was clashing purpose instead conflict positioning Both newspapers have remained objective and contributed news entirety (Nadeem et al., 2019).

II. Profile of the Times of India and The Hindu

The Hindu Group, owned by Kasturi & Sons Limited was founded in 1878 as a weekly but changed to a daily in 1889, has been gradually expanding ever since. Over the years, *The Hindu* has gained the respect and significant interest of influential individuals in India and abroad mainly to its independent editorial position and it's trustworthy and impartial presentation of the news (The Hindu, 2019).

The Hindu is the leading circulated newspaper, while The Times of India is the fourth-largest distributed newspaper of India. *The Hindu* has its origins in fundamental communal reform and famous for its 'leftist leanings'. *The Hindu's* website states that its goal is to give readers "accurate, balanced, and credible" news and information while putting an emphasis on "ethical journalism, excellence in reporting, and a commitment to public interest."

The Hindu has a reputation for being politically apolitical, offering a fair assessment of the day's events, and providing voice to a variety of viewpoints. *The Hindu's* previous editor-in-chief, Mukund Padmanabhan, indicated that the newspaper's strategy is to "tell it like it is" and to deliver news in a "calm, dispassionate, and analytical" manner in an interview with the Columbia Journalism Review in 2018.

According to the newspaper's editorial policy, *The Hindu* is dedicated to accuracy, fairness, and impartiality, and it places a high priority on ethical journalism. It "upholds the values of democratic systems, secularism, social justice, and the rule of law," and it is devoted to guaranteeing that its journalism is fair, objective, and unbiased (The Hindu, 2020).

The Times Group owns and manages *The Times of India*, a daily newspaper published in India that is published in English. It has the fourth-largest circulation in India and is the best-selling English-language daily worldwide. With it's first-ever periodical published in 1838, it is the second-oldest Indian daily still in print and the oldest English-language newspaper

in India (Naqvi, 2007).

The *Times of India* was regarded as India's most dependable English-language newspaper in the Brand Trust Report India 2019 survey. In a study, Reuters identified *Times of India* as India's most dependable media news brand. The *Times of India* has been admired but in recent times perceived as popular press, which is not chiefly devoted to public concerns (de Souza, 2010). According to website of the newspaper, the *Times of India* focuses on "inform, educate, entertain, and empower" to its audience.

With a focus on spectacular headlines and appealing graphics, The *Times of India* has a reputation for being populist and entertainment focused. Media critic Sevanti Ninan highlighted that The *Times of India*'s strategy is to "give readers what they want," with a focus on "populist, reader-friendly" news and features, in an article published in The Wire in 2019. However, The *Times of India* is renowned for its editorial independence and readiness to take a stand on matters that are important to the general population (The News Minute, 2018).

Both newspapers are nationwide daily papers of India. They communicate to the cream of Indian press and are operative enough to influence the activities of the administration. Also delivers comprehensive and balanced news reporting for its readers and focused on mortality for India and its general publics (Narayana & Kapur, 2011).

3.4.1 Elite press vs. Popular Press: Conceptual Structure

“Elite press” and “popular press” seem to be incontrovertible terms, but the terms terminologically and theoretically differ and changes over the time, specifically the in the context of customs, morals, cultures, and media market settings. Magin (2022) suggested the criteria of distinguishing and conceptualizing the elite and popular press are including; (i) target audience, and social encouragement, (ii) Format, (iii) content, layout, and journalistic style, (iv) status and morals, (v) network of circulation and financing, and (vi) democratic function.

Mostly, domestic or large-circulation newspapers are considered as elite press. To recognize the elite press Merrill (1968) stated the criteria that the elite press must be beyond the political or ideological influence of the government. Elite press expected quality paper for the audience, for general rule it aimed at an educated and central to higher class audience, including opinion leaders (Goren, 1993). In contrast, the popular press has less accomplished and poorer socio-economic rank (Johansson, 2007). Finally, concerning to journalistic morals, the supposition is that the elite press significantly follow the ethical practices rather the popular press (Goren, 1993).

3.4.1.1 Operational Definition of Elite and Popular Press

Following is the operational definition of Elite and Popular press:

Concept	Conceptual Definition	Operational Definition
Elite Press	Registered Newspapers of the selected country with large circulation and readership. Highly authentic and followed journalistic values in Reporting	Dawn and The Hindu
Popular Press	Registered Newspapers of the selected country. Aimed at for lower social class. Mainly focused on the stories of public interest.	The News International and The Times of India

This study, while primarily focused on the comparative coverage of populist leaders in four selected newspapers, indirectly reflects the conceptual divide between elite and popular press traditions. *Dawn* (Pakistan) and *The Hindu* (India) are widely recognized as elite press outlets because of their large circulation, emphasis on journalistic ethics, and appeal to educated readerships (Merrill, 1968; Goren, 1993). Conversely, *The News International* (Pakistan) and *The Times of India* (India) may be situated closer to the popular press tradition, given their broader audience orientation, focus on public-interest storytelling, and comparatively more sensational or accessible presentation styles (Johansson, 2007; Magin, 2022).

Although this study did not set out to classify the selected newspapers into elite vs. popular categories, the distinction remains useful as a theoretical lens to interpret the results. For example, if *Dawn* and *The Hindu* gave more critical coverage, this can interpret it as consistent with elite press traditions of accountability. Similarly, if *The News* and *Times of India* had more human-interest or personality-focused coverage, interpret it as reflecting popular press tendencies.

3.5 Sampling and Time Period of the Study

The news stories of populist leaders of India and Pakistan published in selected press e.g. *Dawn* and *The News International*, *Time of India* and *The Hindu* were selected as the sample of the study.

For this investigation, a systematic sampling strategy was found appropriate as news stories selected by using a skip interval of one to generate a sample that is 50% of the population. Interval (systematic) sampling involves selecting every *n*th unit from an ordered list to achieve even distribution and reduce bias (Krippendorff, 2018; Neuendorf, 2017). This method is widely recommended for media content analysis, ensuring representativeness over time and across sources (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2019). For this study, an interval sampling strategy was applied by selecting every *n*th news story from the full list of retrieved articles,

following established procedures for systematic sampling in content analysis (Krippendorff, 2018; Neuendorf, 2017; Riffe et al., 2019).

Using Lexis-Nexis, all news articles for Pakistan's two newspapers, *Dawn* and *The News International*, were arranged in chronological order. This was carried out as a result of the newspapers' extensive coverage of the General Election-2018. According to Krippendorff (1980), systematic sampling favors data from frequently updated publications. Similar to this, news stories were gathered from India's newspapers '*The Hindu*' and '*The Times of India*' newspapers using a systematic sampling technique with one skip.

In Pakistan, general election-2018 was held on Wednesday, 25 July 2018, to elect the members of National Assembly and the four provincial assemblies. Imran Khan took charge as prime minister on 18th August 2018. While in Indian general election-2019 was held in seven phases from 11 April to 19 May 2019. The votes were counted, and the result declared on 23 May. In order to investigate the framing of populist leaders of India and Pakistan the time period of this study was approximately (one year) six months before and six months after the election e.g. 25th January 2018- July 24th, 2018, is assumed for pre-election phase of Pakistan and July 25th, 2018- January 25th, 2019, is for post-election phase. While for India October 11th, 2018- April 10th, 2019, is observed for pre-election period and from May 20th, 2019- November 19th, 2019, as post-election phase.

Moreover, to examine the press coverage of populist leaders in opposite country's newspapers the study scrutinized the cross data. The news stories reported about populist leaders of opposite country at the time of their election period were also analyzed

3.6 Data Collection

News stories published under the national and international sections of *Dawn*, *The News International*, *Times of India* and *The Hindu* concerning the nominated events was selected for the study. The data was obtained from Lexis-Nexis as newspapers were archived

on the database. The Data were retrieved using the key words of “General Election Pakistan 2018”; “General Election India 2019”; “Populist leader”; “PTI”; “Imran Khan”; “Narendra Modi”; “Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),”; “New Pakistan”; “Corrupted Government

3.7 Coding Unit

According to Wimmer & Dominick (2013) the unit of analysis is the selected central unit to be scrutinizing. Coding unit is the content, which categorized by the selected certain clusters. In research, coding unit helped to depict the units into expressive way and classified into relevant sets. Coding unit can be recognized i.e. smallest unit, context unit and recording unit (Schreier, 2012). In this study the news stories were categorized according to approaches and languages of the populist leaders. The coding scheme and indicators of frames were developed and operationalized by followed Mudde’s (2017) ideational approaches of populism including latest literature on populism and media framing (Ernst et al., 2017; Decadri & Boussalis, 2020; Krekó, 2020; Hameleers, 2020; Schulz et al., 2017; Kroll & Zipperer, 2020; Gottenhuber, 2020; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2021; McKibben, 2020; Kim, 2021; Rueda, 2021). The mentioned literature is reviewed in the second chapter of the study.

In this research, the whole story was measured as the contextual unit while each paragraph was considered as coding unit. Every single story on populism was coded under the frame of anti-elitist, people centric, Nationalism, moralism and Personalization frames (Appendix B). A news story containing anti-elitist indicators was coded as an anti-elitist frame. Similarly, the news story that specified the indicators of the people-centric frame was coded as a story of people- centric frame. Consequently, if majority of the paragraphs of a news story were directed items of Anti- elitist, that one was coded as Anti-elitist frame and vice versa. Suppose the indicators of Anti-elitist and People-centric frames were equally identified in the news story, then the story was coded as neutral. Similarly, to estimate the tone of the story entire story would be read and dominant impression rewarded as sportive tone. Supportive tone stories contain material that shows constancy, prosperity, credibility,

and efficiency. Critical stories demonstrated incompetence, flaw, instability and undependability. If the news story failed to clearly distinguish supportive or Critical aspects was coded as neutral. Moreover, newspaper ID, tone, and personal attributes were also coded for each story (Appendix B).

3.8 Content Categorization Scheme

3.8.1 Topics

The importance of the topic in press coverage is undeniable. As Siraj (2006), "Topic is defined as the showcase of a story" (p.29). Mostly, the topic covers the main subject of the news story. The topic in this study also states the episodic characteristic of an incident, as the agenda-setting theory supposed "what to think about" (first level agenda, e.g., Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Cohen,1963; McCombs, Shaw & Weaver,1997). Therefore, the topics of the coverage of the Populist leaders of India and Pakistan were identified prudently by a thorough reading of the numerous news stories published in the selected newspapers, which were: The Dawn and The News (Pakistan), The Times of India and Hindu (India). After thoroughly reading the news stories, the following topics were selected

i. Corruption

News about Unscrupulous or false conduct, including bribery, black money, inefficiency, lack of transparency and nepotism etc. Intentionally spreading negative information about elites. Hitting an opponent's identity, record, or supposition accounted as Corruption.

ii. Economic Inequality

Coverage regarding trade tariffs, unemployment, economic disparities, pay rates, open investing, obligation, emergency, charges, business enterprise, contracts and self-employment are considered as Economic Inequality.

iii. Election

News stories and announcements about election, changes in electoral law and policies, ending and interference of the establishment, populist campaign strategies etc. are assumed as Election.

iv. Defence and Foreign Affairs

Stories about international relations, foreign policies, pacts, army, military expenditure, and national security are categorized as Defense and foreign affairs.

v. Government Performance

News stories on laws planned to progress government performance, responsibilities including setting objectives, evaluating consequences, reporting development, focus on the rise of populist leaders, are measured as govt. performance.

vi. Other

Information on any aspect of populist leaders/ election that did not fall in any of the aforementioned categories however did cover some aspect of the issue. News stories about judicial professes, modification in legislation, convictions, pensions, health, education, welfare state, social justice, religious ideology, technology, climate changes, ethics and moral values is counted as other

3.8.2 Type of the Story

A newspaper publishes diverse types of stories, containing hard news and soft news. In this category, all types of news stories were included, covering news about populist leaders of India and Pakistan are considered as data.

3.8.3 Time Frame

- I. Pre-Election
- II. Post-Election

Stories related to Imran Khan and Narendra Modi which were published before the election are considered as Pre-Election stories. Similarly, news stories published after the election are assumed as post-Election stories. 25th January 2018- July 24th, 2018, is assumed for the pre-election phase in Pakistan and August 25th, 2018- September 25th, 2019, for the post-election phase. While for India, October 11th, 2018- April 10th, 2019, is observed for the pre-election period and from May 20th, 2019- November 19th, 2019, as the post-election phase.

3.8.4 Tone

1. Supportive

If a story mirrored that the political leader had performed in a socially responsible way and had not involved in any offense. News stories that emphasize political struggle and enthusiastic gestures. Stories that make favorable conditions for populism are considered supportive tone.

1. Critical

If the story tended to not be encouraging or admiring and capturing the political leader as corrupt. Picturing conflicting, negative or harmful views is supposed to be Critical Tone.

2. Neutral

While if a story had an equal figure of paragraphs with a positive and negative tone e.g. If three paragraphs had a positive tone toward the populist leaders and another three had a negative tone, in such a situation the story was coded as neutral. In other words, if the story does not clearly have the supportive or critical aspects of the category selected as Neutral

3.8.5 Frames

3.8.5.1 Approach Based Frames

Politicians constantly pay special attention to the issues that the general public faces. Politicians may perform well without interacting with common citizens. The supreme rule in politics in our nation should be the will of the people. The coding rule for each frame is as under:

1. People-Centric Frame

Emphasizing “the people” as the core focus. It highlights ordinary citizens’ voices, needs, struggles, and perspectives rather than those of elites, institutions, or authorities. Following are the criteria of this frame:

- a) Stressing merits of the people
- b) Flattering accomplishment of the people
- c) Indicating closeness of the people
- d) Treating the people as a discrete entity with common feelings, desires and will

2. Anti-Elitist Frame

A small number of powerful interests who mostly care about themselves effectively dominate the government. Politicians using their authority in various decisions. Many of the individuals in charge of the government are corrupt. News stories which covered those elite neglects the people's interests and deprives them of their right to rule is considered the part of Anti-elite frame. Following are the criteria of this frame:

- a) Blame Game & Stereotyping
- b) Elite as untrustworthy
- c) Eliminating the elite from the people
- d) Perceived Elite as an enemy

3. Nationalism Frame

On difficult political matters, using the card of loyalty. Trust the opinions of the people as a whole, even when it comes to complicated political matters. News stories covered the expression of ultra-national positions. Emphasizes loyalty, unity, and pride in the nation. It highlights national identity, sovereignty, cultural heritage, and the protection of national interests, focused on people of proposed community and generated the feelings of motherland. Or news highlighted the stories regarding anti national interest activities of populist leader. Following are the criteria of this frame:

- a) Sense of Patriotism
- b) Ideal nation
- c) Preferring national interest

4. Moralism Frame

Presenting that leader has a decent, honest character. The values and interests of the average person are similar. News stories in which populist leaders put themselves in a position of ethical judgment and recommended ideal social life. Or doing activities which considered as abhorrent action.

- a) Morally pure and fully unified
- b) liable for real or imaginary complaints
- c) Appealing action

5. Personalization Frame

News stories about personal views, lifestyle and routine of an individual are considered personalized frame. This is usually related to stories of human interest. Following as:

- a) Over-exposure of populist leader.
- b) Imaginary / superficial personality.
- c) Others

3.8.5.2 Language Based Frames

Language-based frames are framing strategies that rely on specific word choices, metaphors, slogans, and narratives to shape how audiences perceive political issues, leaders, or events. They work by emphasizing certain values, emotions, or perspectives while downplaying others. In populist discourse, language becomes a powerful tool to construct identities (“the people” vs. “the elite”) and to mobilize public sentiment. News stories highly covered demonizing language of populist leaders including name calling and blaming. Following are the rules and details of each frame:

1. Demonizing Language

Persuading the people of the wrongdoings of past governments, resulting in the bankruptcy of several organizations is considered Demonizing language. Criteria of the frame is as:

- a) Name Calling
- b) Using Slangs

- c) Sarcasm
- d) Hyperbole

2. Emotive Language

News stories appealing emotions and motivating the people. Allow listeners to respond more sympathetically to the speaker and to share his/her sentiments is considered as Emotive language.

- a) I vs. We
- b) Emotional phrase
- c) Determine quotes

3.8.6 Mediagenic Attributes

Mediagenic Attributes refers to labels and tags use by the media, that make a one, mostly compatible for media coverage and attention. These attributes are frequently allied with the aptitude to capture the interest of the media and the public.

I. Human-Interest Attributes

Labels and appreciating permissive terms proposed to show overpowering hardship, attaining success, or performing acts of compassion. If a story contained mentioned names or tags was considered as Human-interest attributes. E.g. Charismatic, Common man, Honest man, Influential, Fortunate, Captain, Leader/ leader for All, Double Engine.

II. Controversial attributes

Tags and depreciating possessive terms proposed to show controversies or conflict to keep the audience engaged. If there mentioned names or tags were existing in a story, it

was considered as Controversial Attributes, including People Enemy, Authoritarian, Anger man, Ribbon cutter, Liberal Elite, Selected Leader, U-Turn man, Liar/Puppet.

The notion of Mediagenic Attributes in this research refers to features of news coverage that enhance the appeal, emotional resonance, and communicability of populist leaders to mass audiences—such as human-interest storytelling and controversial framing. This operationalization builds on, and can be further theorized through, existing literature that discusses how media logic, sensationalism, personalization, and emotional framing shape the public visibility and popularity of populist actors.

Scholars of mediatized politics argue that media logic profoundly influences political communication by prioritizing dramatic, personalized, and emotionally engaging content (Altheide & Snow, 1979; Esser & Strömbäck, 2014). This "media logic" shapes political actors' behavior and news production processes, encouraging politicians to adopt styles that are highly mediagenic (Hjarvard, 2013). Populist leaders, in particular, are adept at exploiting media logic by presenting themselves as charismatic, relatable, and morally righteous figures while using emotive, sensational, or controversial language to capture public attention (Mazzoleni, 2008; Moffitt, 2016). These communicative strategies align with what this thesis describes as Mediagenic Attributes.

The concept of personalization in media coverage is central to understanding mediagenic populism. As Van Aelst et al. (2017) note, personalization shifts the focus from parties and policies to individual politicians, often highlighting their personal traits, emotions, or conflicts. This personal focus generates human-interest angles that make news stories more engaging and emotionally resonant—characteristics that this study operationalizes under Human-Interest Attributes.

At the same time, sensationalism and conflict framing in news coverage (Entman, 1993; Iyengar, 1991) amplify controversy and divisiveness, which are conducive to populist rhetoric that demonizes opponents and stokes outrage. This dimension corresponds to Controversial Attributes in the operationalization used here. Such attributes help create a simplified moral dichotomy between “the people” and “the corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2004;

Hawkins, 2010), a defining feature of populist discourse.

Scholars have described this media-driven amplification of populist communication as Mediatized Populism (Esser et al., 2017; Moffitt, 2016). Moffitt (2016) argues that populist style relies heavily on media performance—deliberately courting controversy, emotional appeal, and spectacle to dominate news agendas. Similarly, Mazzoleni (2008) emphasizes that populist leaders adopt communicative practices that are “media-friendly” or “mediagenic” by design, in order to maximize coverage and appeal.

This thesis therefore conceptualizes Mediagenic Attributes as the operational indicators of how media framing practices, influenced by approach-based and language-based strategies, contribute to the mediatization of populist politics. By systematically categorizing these attributes, the study lays the groundwork for a broader conceptual framework of Mediatized Populism that explains how framing strategies and news values interact to construct the public image of populist leaders.

3.9 Inter-coder Reliability

In this study, Inter-coder reliability was tested by using Holsti's coefficient, which is measured as $R = \frac{2M}{N1 + N2}$. In which, M refers the "number of coding decisions on which the coders agree," and N1 and N2 are the "number of coding decisions by the first and second coder, respectively" (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). The sample size utilized for verifying reliability in content analysis is subject to variation. Some researchers advocate evaluating 10% to 20% of the data (Wimmer and Dominick, 1997), but others propose testing 5% to 7% of the whole content (Kaid & Wadsworth, 1989). Two coders were taught during the study through training sessions in which they received a full explanation of the study's objectives, the nature of the textual material, and the many variables and their categories that made up the coding scheme.

Descriptive information in training sessions was followed by independent coding practice, which reduced ambiguity and significantly improved the operationalization of several indicators. For instance, in the operationalization of people centric Frame and Nationalism Frame the inclusion of exact items like, flattering accomplishment, merits of the people, provoked closeness feelings and common will of the people helped the coders in feat parallel coding decisions. Likewise, the categories of Mediagenic Attributes were operationalized in a more definite method through allocating the attributes into two terms Human-Interest and Controversial. The aspects of Human-Interest attributes were Charismatic, Common man, Honest, Influential, Fortunate, Captain, Leader for all and Double engine. While Controversial attributes were described as People Enemy, Authoritarian, Anger man, Ribbon cutter, Liberal Elite, Selected Leader, U-Turn man and Liar/Puppet. Therefore, better inter-coder reliability tests were acquired as an outcome of both thorough training provided to the coders and the inclusion of particular features in the operationalization. The guidelines for the coders are available in Appendix B.

For the inter-coder reliability of the content analysis, 52 news pieces (almost 10% of the sample) relevant to the populist leaders were randomly picked from two English newspapers of Pakistan, Dawn and The News International, and two English newspapers of India, Times of India and The Hindu. The study's major descriptive objectives were scrutinizing framing differences in coverage of populist leaders of Indian and Pakistan in press of both countries, as well as examining the supremacy of supportive, critical and natural tone in pre-election and post-election phases. The two coders that participated in the coding process were volunteer MPhil Scholars of Media and Communication studies from NUML University in Islamabad, Pakistan.

Inter-coder reliability was verified through Holsti's coefficient which generated 100 percent agreement on the newspaper identification (.92), Topic (.87), Time Period (.90), Tone (.75), Approach-based frames (.85) and language-based frames (.80).

3.10 Intra-Coder Reliability

Intra-coder reliability is the 'consistent manner by which the researcher codes' (Will, 2008). which is absorbed by the researcher after a period of time. In this study, intra-coder reliability was also measured, which generated overall reliability of .91. The intra-coder reliability for six variables is: Identification of the newspapers (.90), Topic (.85), Time Period (.91), Tone (.80), Approach-based frames (.92) and language-based frames (.87).

3.11 Data Analysis

For statistical analysis of the data collected by content analysis, the "Statistical Package for the Social Sciences" (SPSS) version 21 was used. On the data, statistical procedures such as the Chi-square test were used, with the threshold of significance (p) set at 0.05. The Chi-Square test was applied since the study was meant to compare categorical values rather than continuous values or categorical plus continuous values (Wimmer & Dominick, 2013). The comparatively high sample size ($N=527$) was another rationale for using the Chi-Square test. Also, the research intended to cross tabulate the Approach and Language based frame, for this Chi-Square is the most regularly used statistical test for analyzing the cross tabulations (Siraj, 2008; Zaheer, 2017).

CHAPTER-4

DATA ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the analysis of the data collected to explore the news coverage of populist leaders Imran Khan and Narendra Modi in the selected newspapers of India and Pakistan. It outlines the detailed examination of the data findings. The analysis focuses on identifying frames, tone, and topic in the media portrayal of these leaders, exploring how selected newspapers of India and Pakistan represent populist rhetoric and strategies. The chapter also compares the news coverage between the two countries, highlighting any similarities and differences in narrative framing. Through this analysis, key insights are drawn that address the research questions and research hypothesis contribute to the understanding of the media's role in shaping the image of populist leaders

4.1 Description of Findings

The sample of the study was 527 stories. Table-4.1 describes that a total number of stories retrieved from Dawn were 146 which consist of 27.7% of the total data. Total stories repossessed from The News were 120 which encompassed of almost 22.8% of the total data. Stories retrieved from The Hindu were 110 which comprised of 20.9% of the complete data.

The entire number of stories taken from Times of India was 151 which covered 28.7% of the overall data. Statistics disclose that Times of India and Dawn provided the most coverage to the populist leaders in pre- and post-election which was followed by The News and The Hindu respectively.

Frequency of the news stories are mentioned in the following table:

Table 1 Frequency of News Stories

Newspaper	Frequency	Percentage
Dawn	146	27.7 %
The News	120	22.8 %
The Hindu	110	20.9 %
Times of India	151	28.7 %
Total	527	100.0 %

Table 1 provides a detailed overview of the tone of news stories regarding populist leaders. Out of a total of 527 stories, 51.8% (273) were supportive of populist leaders from both countries, 31.9% (168) were critical, and 16.3% (86) were neutral in their coverage of populist leaders from India and Pakistan. The supportive tone was more prevalent than both the critical and neutral tones.

In terms of coverage periods, 136 (25.8%) news stories were reported during Pakistan's pre-election period, while 150 (28.5%) were published in the post-election period. During India's pre-election phase, 130 (24.7%) news stories were published, and 111 (21.1%) were covered in the post-election period across the selected Indian and Pakistani press.

The statistics identified six key topics in the press coverage of populist leaders.

Coverage of *corruption* featured in 99 (18.8%) stories. *Economic inequality* was the focus of 70 (13.3%) stories. Coverage of *election* was the most frequent, appearing in 150 (28.5%) stories. *Defense and foreign affairs* accounted for 55 (10.4%) stories, while *government performance* featured in 132 (25.5%). Total stories on other topics were 21 (4%).

Table 2 Frequency of Tone, Time period, Topic and Frames in the Coverage

	Frequency	Percentage
Tone of the News Stories		
Supportive	273	51.8 %
Critical	168	31.9 %
Neutral	86	16.3 %
Total	527	100 %
Time Period of Coverage		
Pre-Election Pakistan	136	25.8 %
Post-Election Pakistan	150	28.5 %
Pre-Election India	130	24.7 %
Post-Election India	111	21.1 %
Total	527	100 %
Approach Based Frames in the Coverage		
People Centric Frame	145	27.5 %
Anti-elitist Frame	182	34.5 %
Nationalism Frame	86	16.3 %
Moralism Frame	51	9.7 %
Personalization Frame	63	12 %
Total	527	100%

Language Based Frames in the Coverage		
Demonizing Language Frame	241	45.7 %
Emotive Language Frame	286	54.3 %
Total	527	100. %

To understand how the news framed populist leaders, the frames were divided into two categories: Approach-Based Frames and Language-Based Frames. Approach-Based Frames included *People-Centric Frame*, *Anti-Elitist Frame*, *Nationalism Frame*, *Moralism Frame*, and *Personalization Frame*. Language-Based Frames consisted of the *Demonizing Language Frame* and *Emotive Language Frame*.

Table 2 shows that the *People-Centric Frame* was used in 145 (27.5%) stories, while the *Anti-Elitist Frame* appeared in 182 (34.5%). The *Nationalism Frame* was used in 86 (16.3%) stories, the *Moralism Frame* in 51 (9.7%) stories, and the *Personalization Frame* in 63 (12%). Additionally, the *Demonizing Language Frame* was present in 241 (45.7%) stories, while 286 (54.3%) stories used the *Emotive Language Frame*.

4.2 Test of Research Questions and Hypothesis

RQ1. What are the key framing strategies applied by the selected newspapers for the populist leaders of Pakistan and India?

In the four selected newspapers from India and Pakistan, a total of 527 news stories were analysed. *Dawn* published 146 stories, and *The News* published 120 stories covering populist leaders from Pakistan. Meanwhile, *The Hindu* published 110 stories, and *The Times of India* published 151 stories, focusing on populist leaders from India.

Table- 3 revealed that the Approach Based Frames in the coverage by selected newspapers that “Dawn” used 38 (26.0%) *People Centric Frame*, 65 (44.5%) *Anti-elitist Frame*, 20 (13.7%) *Nationalism Frame*, 11 (7.5%) *Moralism Frame* and 12 (8.2%) *Personalization Frame* in news stories of populist leaders respectively. Similarly, “The News” reported populist leaders by using 36 (30.0%) *People Centric Frame*, 34 (28.3%) *Anti-elitist Frame*, 19 (15.8%) *Nationalism Frame*, 17 (14.2%) *Moralism Frame* and 14 (11.7%) *Personalization Frame* in news stories. While “The Hindu” published news stories of populist leaders with 22 (20.0%) *People Centric Frame*, 44 (40.0%) *Anti-elitist Frame*, 23 (20.9%) *Nationalism Frame*, 12 (10.9%) *Moralism Frame* and 9 (8.2%) *Personalization Frame* correspondingly. Also “The Times of India” Used 49 (32.5%) *People Centric Frame*, 39 (25.8%) *Anti-elitist Frame*, 24 (15.9%) *Nationalism Frame*, 11 (7.3%) *Moralism Frame* and 28 (18.5%) *Personalization Frame* in news stories.

Table 3 Distribution of Approach Based Frames

Newspaper	People Centric Frame	Anti-elitist Frame	Nationalism Frame	Moralism Frame	Personalization Frame	Total	Chi-Square/P-value
Dawn	38 (26.0%)	65 (44.5%)	20 (13.7%)	11 (7.5%)	12 (8.2%)	146 (100.0%)	16.010 P= .003
The News	36 (30.0%)	34 (28.3%)	19 (15.8%)	17 (14.2%)	14 (11.7%)	120 (100.0%)	5.500 P= .240
The Hindu	22 (20.0%)	44 (40.0%)	23 (20.9%)	12 (10.9%)	9 (8.2%)	110 (100.0%)	18.470 P= .001
Times of India	49 (32.5%)	39 (25.8%)	24 (15.9%)	11 (7.3%)	28 (18.5%)	151 (100.0%)	12.670 P= .013

Table-3 presents the counts and percentages of each Approach Based Frame in selected newspapers as following; "*People Centric Frame*" 145 (27.5%), "*Anti-elitist Frame*" 182 (34.5%), "*Nationalism Frame*" 86 (16.3%), "*Moralism Frame*" 51 (9.7%) and "*Personalization Frame*" 63 (12.0%) was used in the news stories of populist leaders in the newspapers of India and Pakistan. So, within "Dawn," the most prominent frame was the "*Anti-elitist Frame*" at 44.5%, followed by the "*People Centric Frame*" at 26.0%. Similarly, within "The News" the "*People Centric Frame*" was the most prominent at 30.0%, followed by the "*Anti-elitist Frame*" at 28.3%. And within "The Hindu" the most used frame was "*Anti-elitist Frame*" at 40.0%, followed by the "*People Centric Frame*" at 20.0%. Likewise, within "Times of India" the "*People Centric Frame*" was the most noticeable at 32.5%, followed by the "*Anti-elitist Frame*" at 25.8%.

In summary, *People Centric Frame* was the highest proportion in Times of India (32.5%) and lowest proportion in The Hindu (20.0%). *Anti-elitist Frame* was dominant in Dawn (44.5%) and The Hindu (40.0%) and least frequent in Times of India (25.8%). The *Nationalism Frame* was assumed Highest in The Hindu (20.9%) and in lowest in Dawn (13.7%). *Moralism Frame* was mostly used by The News (14.2%) slightest frequent in Times of India (7.3%). While *Personalization Frame* was Record frequent in Times of India (18.5%) and minimum frequent in The Hindu (8.2%). The p-values indicate the significance of the differences in frame distributions within each newspaper, Dawn (p-value: 0.003) significant differences in the distribution of frames. The News (p-value: 0.240) No significant differences, indicating a relatively uniform distribution of frames. The Hindu (p-value: 0.001) significant differences in the distribution of frames. And Times of India (p-value: 0.013) significant differences in the distribution of frames. So, Dawn, The Hindu, and Times of India show significant differences in how they distribute the frames, suggesting that these newspapers emphasize certain frames more than other. While, The News does not show a significant difference in frame distribution, indicating a more balanced use of the different frames.

As far as the Language Based Frames were concerned, amongst the four selected newspapers, the *Demonizing Language Frame*, was used the most (88 times) 60.3% by the

“Dawn” followed by “The News” which used it (42times) 35.0% and “The Hindu” which used it (49 times) 44.5% also “Times of India” used it (62 time) 41.1% in the news stories of populist leaders of India and Pakistan (Table-4)

Table 4 Distribution of Language Based Frames

Newspaper	Demonizing Language Frame	Emotive Language Frame	Total	Chi-Square/ p-value
Dawn	88 (60.3%)	58 (39.7%)	146 (100.0%)	10.830 P= .001
The News	42 (35.0%)	78 (65.0%)	120 (100.0%)	10.830 P= .001
The Hindu	49 (44.5%)	61 (55.5%)	110 (100.0%)	7.550 P= .006
Times of India	62 (41.1%)	89 (58.9%)	151 (100.0%)	10.830 P= .001

Table-4 displays that *Emotive Language Frame* was used 58 times (39.7%) in the “Dawn” followed by “The News” which published 78 (65.0%) stories and “The Hindu” published (61 times) 55.5% news also “The Times of India” used it (89 time) 58.9% in the news stories of populist leaders of India and Pakistan. Thus, *Demonizing Language Frame* was used 241 (45.7%) in the news stories. While *Emotive Language Frame* was mostly used 286 (54.3%) times by the selected newspapers of India and Pakistan. In summary, the highest proportion of *Demonizing Language Frame* was in Dawn (60.3%) and lowest proportion in The News (35.0%). While *Emotive Language Frame* was highly used in The News (65.0%) Least in Dawn (39.7%). The p-values indicate the significance of the differences in language frame distributions within each newspaper, for example Dawn (p-value: 0.001) shows

significant difference in the distribution of language frames, with a preference for the Demonizing Language Frame. The News (p-value: 0.001) presents significant difference in the distribution of language frames, with a preference for the Emotive Language Frame. The Hindu (p-value: 0.006) displays significant difference in the distribution of language frames, with a relatively balanced but still significant preference for the Emotive Language Frame. Times of India (p-value: 0.001) with significant difference in the distribution of language frames, with a preference for the Emotive Language Frame. Dawn Shows a significant preference for the Demonizing Language Frame, indicating a tendency to use more negative language in its news. The News Shows a significant preference for the Emotive Language Frame, suggesting a focus on more emotionally charged language. While, The Hindu showing significant differences, it has a more balanced distribution but still leans towards using Emotive Language. And Times of India prefers the Emotive Language Frame significantly.

Overall, the data suggests that each newspaper has a diverse preference for the type of language used in the news stories. Dawn tends to use more demonizing language, while The News, The Hindu, and Times of India prefer emotive language, with The News showing the strongest preference for emotive language. The chi-square values indicate that these preferences are statistically significant.

Before examining the specific distribution of media-genic attributes across newspapers, it is important to note that the concept of “media-genic” here captures how news coverage enhances appeal through either human-interest storytelling or controversial framing. The comparative analysis below shows notable cross-national differences: while Pakistani newspapers generally display a more balanced use of these attributes, Indian newspapers particularly *Times of India* demonstrate a pronounced preference for human-interest framing. The statistical tests highlight where these differences are significant within each outlet, providing evidence for variation in how populist leaders are made “mediagenic” in national media contexts.

RQ2. In which proportion do the selected newspapers distribute Human-Interest and

Controversial Attributes?

This research question provides data on the media-genic attributes of four newspapers (Dawn, The News, The Hindu, and Times of India) in terms of their coverage involving human interest and controversial attributes. The data is presented as the number of news stories along with their respective percentages of the total coverage. The table below highlights how the balance between human-interest and controversial attributes varies across Pakistani and Indian newspapers. Notably, Indian outlets, especially *Times of India*, show a strong and significant preference for human-interest framing, whereas Pakistani newspapers are more evenly split, suggesting different strategies in constructing populist appeal.

Table 5 Media Genic-Attributes in Press

Newspapers	Media Genic Attributes		Total	Chi-Square/ P-value
	Human Interest Attributes	Controversial Attributes		
Dawn	74 (50.7%)	72 (49.3%)	146 (100.0%)	0.950, P= .330
The News	65 (54.1%)	55 (45.9%)	120 (100.0%)	8.820, P= .004
The Hindu	58 (52.8%)	52 (47.2%)	110 (100.0%)	1.030, P= .310
Times of India	108 (71.6%)	43 (28.4%)	151 (100.0%)	10.830, P= .001

Table-5 shows that Dawn published 74 (50.7%) news stories of Human-Interest Attributes, and 72 (49.3%) news stories were reported Controversial-Attributes. Dawn published total 146 news stories. Dawn's coverage is almost evenly split between human interest and controversial attributes, with a slight emphasis on human interest. This balance indicates an attempt to engage readers with both personal stories and contentious issues.

The News published total 120 news stories, in which 65 (54.1%) news were used

Human Interest Attributes. And Controversial Attributes were involved in 55 (45.9%) news stories. The News also shows a preference for human interest stories over controversial ones, though the gap is larger compared to Dawn. This suggests a more significant focus on human-centric stories to attract readers.

The Hindu published total 110 news stories. In which, Human Interest Attributes were used in 58 (52.8%) news stories and Controversial Attributes were in 52 (47.2%) news stories. The Hindu's coverage is quite balanced, but there is still a slight preference for human interest stories. This reflects an effort to maintain a varied approach to news reporting.

Times of India published 151 news stories. Followed by 108 (71.6%) news stories of Human-Interest Attributes and 43 (28.4%) news stories of Controversial Attributes. Times of India has the highest number of human-Interest stories, significantly outweighing its coverage of controversial attributes. This suggests a strong emphasis on engaging readers with personal and emotional stories.

In summary, the highest proportion of Human-Interest Attributes was in Times of India (71.52%) and lowest proportion in Dawn (50.68%). Controversial Attributes were highly used in Dawn (49.32%) and lowermost in Times of India (28.47%). The p-values indicate the significance of the differences in attribute distributions within each newspaper: Dawn (p-value: 0.330) with No significant difference in the distribution of Human Interest and Controversial Attributes. The News (p-value: 0.004) significant difference in the distribution of attributes, with a preference for Human Interest Attributes. The Hindu (p-value: 0.310) No significant difference in the distribution of Human Interest and Controversial Attributes. And Times of India (p-value: 0.001) Significant difference in the distribution of attributes, with a strong preference for Human Interest Attributes. Dawn shows a balanced distribution of Human Interest and Controversial Attributes with no significant preference. The News shows a significant preference for Human Interest Attributes, indicating a focus on stories that appeal to emotions and personal experiences. The Hindu similar to Dawn, it shows a balanced distribution with no significant preference for either attribute. And Times of India displays a strong and significant preference for

Human Interest Attributes, suggesting a focus on more engaging and relatable stories over controversial ones.

Overall, the data suggests varying strategies among the newspapers regarding media genic attributes. While Dawn and The Hindu maintain a balanced approach between human interest and controversial attributes, The News and Times of India show a significant inclination towards human interest attributes.

RQ3. How far the key topics covered in the news stories related with Language-based frames and Approach-based frames?

To know the key topics covered in the news stories related with Language-based frames and Approach-based frames. The topics include Corruption, Economic Inequality, Election, Defence & Foreign Affairs, Government Performance, and Other. Each topic's total number of articles and their distribution percentages are provided:

Table-6 reveals that 73 news stories (73.7%) about *Corruption* were framed using "Approach Based Frames," while 26 (26.3%) news stories were framed using "Language Based Frames." Total 99 (100.0%) news stories about corruption were framed using in the press on India and Pakistan. This shows that the two forms of press frame *Corruption* in quite different ways.

While 49 (70.0%) news stories about the *Economic inequality* were framed using "Approach Based Frames," and 21 (30.0%) were framed using "Language Based Frames." Total 70 (100.0%) news stories were published on the topic of *Economic inequality*. Moreover, in the selected press 97 (64.7%) news stories on *Election* were framed using "Approach Based Frames" and 53 (35.3%) stories were framed using "Language Based Frames." Total 150 (100.0%) news stories were covered the topic of Election during the selected time of Election in India and Pakistan.

Table 6 Topics Covered in Frames

Topic	Frames		Total
	Approach Based Frames	Language Based Frames	
Corruption	73 (73.7%)	26 (26.3%)	99 (100.0%)
Economic Inequality	49 (70.0%)	21 (30.0%)	70 (100.0%)
Election	97 (64.7%)	53 (35.3%)	150 (100.0%)
Defense & Foreign Affairs	36 (65.5%)	19 (34.5%)	55 (100.0%)
Government Performance	87 (65.9%)	45 (34.1%)	132 (100.0%)
Other	16 (76.2%)	5 (23.8%)	21 (100.0%)

Likewise, 36 news stories (65.5%) on *Defense and Foreign Affairs* were framed using "Approach Based Frames," and 19 (34.5%) news stories on the topic of *Defense and Foreign Affairs* were framed using "Language Based Frames". Total 55 (100.0%) news stories were published on the topic of Defense and Foreign Affairs in the selected newspapers of India and Pakistan.

In the four selected newspapers, 87 (65.9%) news stories on the topic of *Government Performance* were framed using "Approach Based Frames" and 45 (34.1%) stories were framed using "Language Based Frames". Total 132 (100.0%) news stories were published in the pre-election and post-election phases of India and Pakistan.

Also, 16 (76.2%) news stories on *other* topics were framed using "Approach Based Frames" and only 5 (23.8%) news stories were framed using "Language Based Frames" on the other topics. Total 21 (100.0%) news were Published on other topics in the selected press of India and Pakistan (Table-6).

The analysis discloses that the highest proportion of Approach Based Frames in the "Other" category (76.2%) and lowest proportion in Election (64.7%). While Language Based Frames highly share in Election (35.3%) and least in the "Other" category (23.8%).

Corruption predominantly using Approach Based Frames (73.7%), indicating a focus on specific approaches, strategies, or methodologies related to corruption. Similar trend with *Economic Inequality* a high use of Approach Based Frames (70.0%), suggesting detailed discussion on methods and policies addressing economic inequality. *Election* show a substantial use of Approach Based Frames (64.7%) but also the highest proportion of Language Based Frames (35.3%), indicating a balanced approach with considerable attention to emotive and demonizing language. *Defence & Foreign Affairs* majority use of Approach Based Frames (65.5%), reflecting strategic or policy-oriented discussions. Also, *Government Performance* using Approach Based Frames (65.9%), focusing on systematic evaluations and methodologies. While, in *other* topics highest proportion of Approach Based Frames (76.2%), indicating a strong focus on specific approaches even in miscellaneous topics. The findings propose that the framing of news stories differs based on the topic and press, emphasizing the importance of considering both factors when analyzing press coverage.

RQ4. To what extent does the coverage to populist leaders vary in terms of supportive and critical coverage in the pre-election and post-election phases?

To aid comparison between India and Pakistan, the analysis below examines how the tone of coverage (Supportive, Critical, Neutral) toward populist leaders shifts between pre-election and post-election periods in both countries. This comparative approach allows us to identify whether newspapers maintain consistent support, become more critical, or adopt neutral stances across election cycles, highlighting potential differences in how media hold populist leaders accountable over time and across national contexts.

To examine the distribution of different tones (Supportive, Critical, Neutral) towards populist leaders of both India (Narendra Modi) and Pakistan (Imran Khan) in selected newspapers and time periods (Pre-Election Pakistan, Post-Election Pakistan, Pre-Election India, Post-Election India) table-7 represents the count and percentage of news stories falling into a specific combination of these variables.

Table 7 Coverage Tone in Pre-Election and Post-Election Time Period

Time Period	Tone			Total	Chi-Square/ P-value
	Supportive	Critical	Neutral		
Pre-Election Pakistan	96 (80.6%)	14 (11.7%)	9 (7.5%)	119 (100%)	13.816, P= .001
Post-Election Pakistan	45 (35.7%)	32 (25.4%)	23 (18.2%)	126 (100%)	11.618, P= .003
Pre-Election India	71 (61.7%)	29 (25.2%)	15 (13.1%)	115 (100%)	13.816, P= .001
Post-Election India	41(39.0%)	46 (43.8%)	18 (17.1%)	105 (100%)	9.924, P= .007

Table- 7 shows that in the time of “Pre-Election Pakistan”, total 119 news stories were published. In which, 96 news stories, with 80.6% were *supportive*, 14 (11.7%) news were *critical* and only 9 (7.5%) news stories were *neutral* in the coverage. The majority of news were supportive (80.6%), indicating a strong favourable bias in newspaper coverage during the pre-election period. Critical and neutral tones were significantly less common, making up 11.7% and 7.5% of the coverage, respectively. While, at the time of “post-election Pakistan”, 45 news stories, with 35.7% were *supportive*, 32 (25.4%) news were *Critical*, and 23 (18.2%) news stories were *Neutral*. Total 126 news stories were published for the coverage of populist leaders of India and Pakistan. There was a notable shift in tone post-election, with supportive coverage dropping to 35.7%. Critical news increased to 25.4%, and neutral news rose to 18.2%. This suggests a more balanced or critical approach in post-election reporting compared to the pre-election period.

In contrast, at the time of “Pre-Election India” total 115 news stories were published. In which, 71 news stories with 61.7% were *supportive*, 29 (25.2%) news stories were *Critical*, and 15 (13.1%) news stories were *Neutral*. The coverage was predominantly supportive

(61.7%), but there was also a significant portion of critical (25.2%) and neutral (13.1%) news stories. This indicates a somewhat diverse range of tones but with a leaning towards supportiveness during the pre-election phase.

While, at the time of “Post-Election India”, total 105 news stories were published. In which, 41 news stories with 39.0% were *Supportive*, 46 (43.8%) news were *Critical*, and 18 (17.1%) were *Neutral* in the coverage. Post-election coverage saw a shift, with critical articles (43.8%) surpassing supportive ones (39.0%). Neutral news stories made up 17.1% of the coverage. This indicates a more critical stance in the post-election phase, with a decrease in supportive tone. (Table-7)

The p-values indicate the significance of the differences in tone distributions between the pre-election and post-election phases: Pre-Election Pakistan (p-value: 0.001) shows significant differences in tone, predominantly supportive. Post-Election Pakistan (p-value: 0.003) indicates significant differences in tone, with a notable decrease in supportive tone and increases in critical and neutral tones. While, Pre-Election India (p-value: 0.001) presents significant differences in tone, with a majority being supportive. And Post-Election India (p-value: 0.007) displays significant differences in tone, with a decrease in supportive tone and an increase in critical tone.

In summary, in Pakistan Pre-Election newspapers were predominantly supportive, reflecting a favourable view or endorsement of the existing political situation or candidate. There is a notable shift in Pakistan Post-Election times with a significant decrease in supportive articles and increases in both critical and neutral tones. This suggests a more balanced. The phase of India Pre-Election similar to Pakistan, a majority of the news were supportive, indicating favourable coverage. And India Post-Election phase the tone shifts significantly, with a substantial increase in critical articles and a corresponding decrease in supportive ones, indicating increased scrutiny or dissatisfaction with the post-election phase.

Overall, the data indicates that the tone of newspaper in both countries tends to be more supportive during the pre-election period. However, post-election, there is a significant shift towards a more critical tone. This shift is more pronounced in the context of India, where the

critical tone surpasses the supportive tone post-election. The chi-square values confirm that these changes in tone are statistically significant.

RH1: The framing strategies significantly different in the pre-election and post-election phases.

To test this hypothesis, the chi-square p-values provided for each framing strategy in Table-8 The p-value helps us determine if the differences observed between pre-election and post-election periods are statistically significant.

Table 8 Framing Strategies in Pre-Election and Post-Election Scenarios

Approach-Based Frames	Time Period		Total	Chi-Square P-value
	Pre-Election	Post-Election		
People Centric Frame	98 (65.9%)	53 (35.1%)	151 (100.0%)	6.311, P= .012
Anti-Elitist Frame	79 (38.5%)	126 (61.5%)	205 (100.0%)	10.828, P= .001
Nationalism Frame	40 (53.7%)	36 (47.3%)	76 (100.0%)	3.776, P= .052
Moralism Frame	35 (63.7%)	20 (36.3%)	55 (100.0%)	5.412, P= .020
Personalization Frame	30 (75.0%)	10 (25.0%)	40 (100.0%)	10.828, P= .001

Table-8 shows that People Centric Frame was used in 98 (65.9%) news stories. While in the post-election time 53 (35.1%) news stories used People Centric Frame for the coverage

of populist leaders. Combining both periods, there were 151 news stories used People Centric Frame. This frame saw a higher usage in the pre-election period compared to the post-election period, indicating a stronger emphasis on people-centric narratives during the campaign phase. The Chi-Square p-value of People Centric Frame is 0.12. Since the p-value is less than 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis for the people-centric frame. This indicates a significant difference in the use of the people-centric frame between the pre-election and post-election periods.

Anti-Elitist Frame was used in 79 (38.5%) news stories that published at the time of pre-election. And at the post-election time 126 (61.5%) news stories used anti-elitist frame. Total 205 news stories were published. Anti-Elitist Frame was more prevalent in the post-election period, suggesting that anti-elitist sentiments became more pronounced after the election, possibly as a reaction to the outcomes or to consolidate the support base. Chi-Square p-value of Anti-Elitist Frame is .001, so the p-value is much less than 0.05, leading us to reject the null hypothesis for the anti-elitist frame. There is a significant increase in the use of this frame post-election.

For the coverage of populist leaders of India and Pakistan Nationalism Frame was used in 76 news stories. In which, 40 (53.7%) news stories were published at the time of pre-election. While, 36 (47.3%) news stories were published after the election. The use of nationalism framing remained relatively consistent across both periods, with a slight decrease post-election. This indicates that nationalism was a stable theme throughout the election cycle. Nationalism Frame Chi-Square p-value is .052, so the p-value is slightly above 0.05, indicating a marginal significance. While we cannot strongly reject the null hypothesis, there is a suggestion of a difference that might be explored further with a larger sample size or additional data.

Moralism Frame was used in 55 news stories for the coverage of populist leaders of India and Pakistan. In the pre-election time, there were 35 (63.7%) news stories were published and 20 (36.3%) news stories were published after the election. This frame was used more in the pre-election period, showing a decline post-election. Moralism may have been a

more compelling strategy during the campaign to appeal to voters' ethical values. Moralism Frame Chi-Square p-value is .020, which is less than 0.05, leading us to reject the null hypothesis for the moralism frame. This indicates a significant reduction in the use of this frame post-election.

Personalization Frame was used in 40 news stories. In which, 30 (75.0%) news stories were published in the pre-election phase. And 10 news (25.0%) were published in the post-election phase. The personalization frame was used more during the pre-election period, suggesting a tactic to humanize candidates or issues to garner personal voter connection before the election. Chi-Square p-value of Personalization Frame is .001, which is much less than 0.05, so we reject the null hypothesis for the personalization frame. There is a significant decrease in the use of this frame post-election.

Based on the hypothesis (RH1) and the chi-square p-values is significant for the People-Centric ($p = .012$), Anti-Elitist ($p = .001$), Moralism ($p = .020$), and Personalization ($p = .001$) frames suggest that the framing strategies applied by the press differ significantly between the pre-election and post-election periods for these frames. The Nationalism frame ($p = .052$) shows a marginally significant difference, indicating that this frame's usage might not be as strongly affected by the election cycle as the others, but still suggests a potential difference.

To know the language-based framing strategies of applied by the selected press of India, categorized into Demonizing Language Frame and Emotive Language Frame, during both pre-election and post-election phases. Following are the details:

Table 9 Language-Based Frames in the Press

Language-Based Frames	Time		Total	Chi square p-value
	Pre-Election	Post-Election		
Demonizing Language Frame	96 (39.2%)	149 (60.8%)	245 (100.0%)	10.828, P= .001
Emotive Language Frame	171 (60.6%)	111 (39.4%)	282 (100.0%)	10.828, P= .001

Table-9 presents that in the Pre-Election setting Demonizing Language Frame was used in 96 (39.2%) news stories. And Emotive Language Frame was used in 171 (60.6%) news stories. While, in the post-election time Demonizing Language Frame was used in 149 (60.8%) news stories and Emotive Language Frame in 111 (39.4%) news stories. Out of 527 (100.0%) news stories Demonizing Language Frame was used in 245 (46.5%) news stories and Emotive Language Frame in 282 (53.5%) news stories. Chi-square, P-value is .001, much less than 0.05, allowing us to reject the null hypothesis for the emotive language frame. This indicates a significant decrease in the use of emotive language post-election compared to pre-election. Based on the hypothesis (RH1) and the chi-square p-values for language-based frames, Demonizing Language Frame (P = .001) shows a significant increase post-election, suggesting a shift towards more negative framing after the election. And Emotive Language Frame (p = .001) shows a significant decrease post-election, indicating a reduction in the use of emotionally charged language after the election.

In summary, Tables-8 and Table-9 provide valuable perceptions of framing strategies used by the selected newspapers in covering populist leaders before and after election. The

findings from both tables suggest a discernible shift in media coverage from pre-election to post-election periods. Each cell and summing them up, for "Approach Based Frames" and "Language Based Frames" the P-values show statistically significant results, indicating that there is a significant difference between frames, and time periods. The chi-square tests confirm that there are significant associations between these variables, suggesting that the framing of populist leaders significantly differed in pre-election and post-election phases. Hence the RH1 is supported.

RH2: Populist Leaders receive more supportive coverage in the pre-election phase as compared to post-election.

Following table delivers data on the tone of media coverage for populist leaders during pre-election and post-election periods. The tones are categorized as supportive, critical, and neutral. Table-10 shows that the tone of the total 273 (51.8%) news stories was Supportive in their nature. In which, 180 (34.2%) news stories were published at the time of "pre-election". While 93 (17.6%) news stories were published in "post-election" time period. The supportive tone is significantly more prevalent in the pre-election period, with 34.2% of the coverage compared to 17.6% post-election. This indicates a strong media bias in favor of populist leaders during the campaign phase, which decreases substantially after the election.

While the tone of 168 (31.9%) new stories were Critical. In which, 54 (10.2%) news stories were published at Pre-Election time and 114 (21.6%) news stories were published after the election. Critical coverage is more common in the post-election period, increasing from 10.2% pre-election to 21.6% post-election. This suggests that the media adopts a more scrutinizing stance towards populist leaders after the election, potentially reflecting a shift towards accountability.

Table 10 Coverage of Populist Leaders in Pre-Election and Post-Election

Tone	Time Period		Total
	Pre-Election	Post-Election	
Supportive	180 (34.2%)	93 (17.6%)	273 (51.8%)
Critical	54 (10.2%)	114 (21.6%)	168 (31.9%)
Neutral	33 (6.3%)	53 (10.1%)	86 (16.3%)
Total	267 (50.7%)	260 (49.3%)	527 (100.0%)
Chi-Square: 53.722, P-Value= .001			

Total 86 (16.3%) new stories are Neutral in their tone. In the pre-election time 33 (6.3%) news stories were show Neutral tone for the coverage of populist leaders of both countries and 53 (10.1%) news storis were published in post-election time. Neutral coverage also increases post-election, from 6.3% to 10.1%. This indicates a trend towards more balanced reporting after the election, where the media might present information more objectively.

Overall, out of 527 news stories in pre-election phase total 267 (50.7%) news stores were published. While 260 (49.3%) news stories were published in the post-election phase. The total number of articles is almost evenly split between the pre-election and post-election periods, with a slight majority in the pre-election phase. In general, it appears that the press of both countries is more supportive in the pre-election times as compared to post-election times. There is a distinguished change in tone from supportive to other tones after the election This suggests that the tone of the selected newspapers in coverage of populist leaders may

diverge depending on the timing comparative to the election cycle, with more supportive coverage leading up to the election.

The p-value is very low ($p=.000$). The p-value indicates that the differences in the tone of coverage between the pre-election and post-election periods are statistically significant (see Table: 10). Hence, RH2 is supported.

RH3: There is a significant difference in the key topics covered in the pre-election and post-election phases.

To examine the shift of topics in pre-election and post-election phases following table provides information about the number of mentioned specific topics in the selected newspapers during the pre-election and post-election phases, and it also computes percentages and a chi-square statistic.

Table-11 shows that the "Corruption " topic, there were 65 news stories published (65.7% of the total) during the pre-election phase and 34 news stories were published (34.3% of the total) during the post-election phase. The overall coverage of Corruption was 99 in the selected press. 28 news stories (40.0% of the total) were covered under the "Economic Inequality" topic, during the pre-election phase and 42 news stories (60.0 % of the total) during the post-election phase.

Table 11 Topics in Pre-Election and Post-Election

Topic	Time Period		Total	Chi-Square P-Value
	Pre-Election	Post-Election		
Corruption	65 (65.7%)	34 (34.3%)	99 (100.0%)	6635, P= .010
Economic Inequality	28 (40.0%)	42 (60.0%)	70 (100.0%)	9.550, P= .002
Election	93 (62.0%)	57 (38.0%)	150 (100.0%)	10.828, P= .001
Defense & Foreign Affairs	21 (38.1%)	34 (61.9%)	55 (100.0%)	8284, P= .004
Government Performance	48 (36.3%)	84 (63.7%)	132 (100.0%)	10.828, P= .001
Other	11 (52.3%)	10 (47.7%)	21 (100.0%)	4.958, P= .032

The overall coverage of Economic Inequality was 70 news stories. 93 news stories (62.0% of the total) were covered under the "Election" topic, during the pre-election phase and 57 news stories (38.0% of the total) during the post-election phase. The overall coverage of Election in a selected newspapers was 150 news stories. While, 21 news stories (38.1% of the total) were covered under the " Defense & Foreign Affairs" topic, during the pre-election phase and 34 news stories (61.9% of the total) during the post-election phase. The overall coverage of Defense & Foreign Affairs was 55 in the selected newspapers. And under the

"Government Performance" topic, there were 48 news stories published (36.3% of the total) during the pre-election phase and 84 news stories were published (63.7% of the total) during the post-election phase. The overall coverage of Government performance in the selected newspapers was 132 news stories. Whereas, "Other" topic was covered in 11 (52.3%) news stories in pre-election phase and 10 (47.7%) news stories were published in post-election phase. Other topics were covered in 21 news stories in overall coverage in the selected newspapers.

Based on the hypothesis (RH3) and the p-values for each topic, *Corruption* ($p = .010$): significant decrease in post-election. *Economic Inequality* ($p = .002$) significant increase in post-election. *Election* ($p = .001$) show significant decrease in post-election. *Defence & Foreign Affairs* ($p = .004$) show significant increase in post-election phase. *Government Performance* ($p = .001$) indicate significant increase in post-election. While, *Other Topics* ($p = .032$) display significant difference.

The hypothesis that "*There is a significant difference in the key topics covered in the pre-election and post-election phases*" is supported by the significant differences observed in the coverage of all the topics analysed. So, RH3 is approved.

RH4: Populist leaders receive more Human-Interest Attributes in the pre-election phase as compared to post-election.

The table is broken down into following sections: Pre-Election, Post-Election, and the overall Total. It focuses on two types of Media-Genic Attributes: Human-Interest Attributes and Controversial Attributes. Here's a detailed summary of the data:

Table 12 Period Media-Genic Attributes in Pre-Election and Post-Election

Media-Genic Attributes	Time		Total
	Pre-Election	Post-Election	
Human-Interest Attributes	186 (59.2%)	128 (40.8%)	314 (100.0%)
Controversial Attributes	81 (38.0%)	132 (62.0%)	213 (100.0%)
Chi-Square= 21.995, P-Value= .001			

Table-12 shows the variances of Media-Genic Attributes, in the pre-election phase there were 186 (59.2%) news stories were used Human-Interest Attributes and 81 (38.0%) of Controversial Attributes of populist leaders in the coverage. While, in the post-election phase 128 (40.8%) news stories used Human-Interest Attributes and 132 (62.0%) news stories were used Controversial Attributes of populist leaders the coverage. Out of 527 news stories of the selected newspapers of India and Pakistan total 314 news stories used Human-Interest Attributes, and 213 news stories used Controversial Attributes in the coverage of populist leaders of India and Pakistan.

During the pre-election period, media coverage was largely focused on Human-Interest Attributes (59.2%), which suggests that news stories emphasized the personal, emotional, and relatable aspects of populist leaders. This could include their background, struggles, connection with the public, and charismatic appeal. The use of Controversial Attributes was comparatively lower (38.0%), indicating that fewer stories focused on conflicts, scandals, or contentious remarks made by these leaders during this phase.

In summary, the analysis of media-genic attributes in pre-election and post-election phases reveals a significant shift in media focus. During the pre-election phase, human-interest stories are more common, while the post-election phase perceives a marked increase in the prevalence of controversial stories. The significant p-values for both human-interest

and controversial attributes support this hypothesis. The distribution of human-interest attributes shows a significant decrease post-election. The distribution of controversial attributes shows a significant increase post-election. Thus, Chi-Square value of 21.995 is very high. The P-value of 0.000 indicates a highly significant association between the Media-Genic Attributes and the Time Period. The Human-Interest Attributes were more prevalent Pre-Election (59.2%), while the Controversial Attributes were more prevalent post-election (62.0%). The analysis supports the hypothesis RH4, indicating a significant shift in media-genic attributes between pre-election and post-election news coverage. Hence, RH4 is supported.

The analysis reveals notable contrasts in how the press in Pakistan and India frame and portray populist leaders, reflecting divergent socio-political contexts and media strategies. Pakistani newspapers such as Dawn and The News display a stronger use of anti-elitist framing, especially in pre-election periods marked by highly supportive coverage of Imran Khan, which later shifts toward more critical and balanced reporting post-election. This pattern indicates a media environment that initially amplifies moralistic, people-centric narratives tied to Islamic populist appeals but grows more scrutinizing once in power. Conversely, Indian newspapers like The Hindu and Times of India show a significant emphasis on people-centric and personalization frames, especially in pre-election phases supporting Narendra Modi, alongside the use of nationalist frames tied to Hindutva ideology. Post-election, Indian coverage becomes more critical, with a marked rise in anti-elitist and demonizing language frames, suggesting a shift from electoral mobilization to holding power to account. These differences highlight how Pakistani and Indian media adapt framing strategies to local political cultures: Pakistan's press leveraging Islamic moralism and anti-elite appeals, while India's press navigates majoritarian Hindu nationalism and charismatic leadership, both contributing to the shaping of populist discourse in distinct national contexts.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Discussion

The key findings of this study focused on newspapers (e.g. Dawn, The News, The Hindu and Times of India) coverage of Imran Khan and Narinder Modi during pre-election and post-election settings of both India and Pakistan. This investigation was exclusive to prior studies because it not only looked into composite and multilayered topic of pre-election and post-election coverage of populist leaders, but also exposure the populist larders in leading press of India and Pakistan at the same time.

The most dominant frame across all newspapers was the Anti-elitist Frame, emphasised on issues related to challenging or opposing elitist perspectives. Their emphasis varied by news in the papers. For example, The Hindu focused on Anti-elitist Frame and a lesser highlighted on People Centric Frame compared to others. *Times of India* gave the highest prominence on People Centric Frame, suggested a focus on issues directly affecting people. *Dawn* and *The News* showed relatively higher coverage on the Nationalism Frame compared to other newspapers.

The results indicated a significant association between the selected newspaper and the approach-based frames used in the press of India and Pakistan. This proposed that the

framing of news stories differs significantly among the selected newspapers. Similarly, the selected newspapers were significantly related with the use of language-based frames (Canovan, 1999). "*Dawn*" tended to use more of the "Demonizing Language Frame," while "*The News*" leaned towards the "Emotive Language Frame." These findings provide insights into how different newspapers employ language in their news stories, which might have implication for their communication strategies and audience engagement.

Regarding Language based frames, across all the selected newspapers, there was a higher used of emotive language as compared to demonizing language. This suggested that newspapers often employed language to suggest emotions in their readers. *The News* significantly emphasised on emotive language, indicated a deliberate effort to appeal to the emotions of its audience. While *The Hindu* was utilized more balanced approach between demonizing and emotive language, in which both frames were relatively close in percentage. The use of demonizing language was comparatively consistent across newspapers. The high use of emotive language suggests that newspapers aim to engage their readers emotionally. This might impact how readers perceive and interpret news stories. The use of demonizing language raises ethical considerations about the role of media in shaping public opinion and its potential impact on social discourse.

People Centric Frame and Moralism Frame were more prominent in the pre-election phase. This suggests a focus on engaging the electorate through people-focused and moral narratives to attract votes. Anti-Elitist Frame was significantly more prevalent post-election, indicating a shift towards challenging elite power structures, possibly as a reaction to the election results. While Nationalism Frame maintained a stable presence across both phases, showing its consistent importance in political discourse. And, Personalization Frame was used more in the pre-election phase, likely to create a more relatable and personal appeal to voters. The total distribution of framing strategies reflects the tactical shifts that occur before and after election, highlighting the dynamic nature of political communication strategies.

Newspapers of both countries showed a relatively balanced distribution of approach-based frames between Pre-Election and Post-Election periods. The shift in percentages was

marginal, suggested continuity in framing strategies. There was an obvious difference in the use of language-based frames between the selected newspapers. The shift in framing strategies from Pre-Election to Post-Election suggests that the media might adapt its framing strategies based on the changing political landscape and public sentiment during election cycles. The variation in framing strategies across newspapers and time period indicates that the different media outlets contribute to shaping public perception during crucial phases like election.

Additionally, the types of issues and frames used by the press vary between the two phases, suggesting that media outlets adjust their framing to reflect the changing political landscape (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Hawkins, 2009). For example, Corruption was predominantly framed using approach-based frames, while the topic of Defence & Foreign Affairs was with higher percentage of approach-based frames. Overall, there was a higher percentage of approach-based frames for most topics, suggested that the media tends to focus on the approach or strategy taken in reporting these issues. So, the framing choices for different topics can influence how the public perceives these issues. For example, a higher use of approach-based frames for topics like Government Performance may shape public opinion on the effectiveness of the government.

The overall tone across both countries and election time phases time tended to be supportive, advised that a significant portion of news coverage was positive or favourable. The study finds that coverage of populist leaders is significantly more supportive during the pre-election phase, where populist leaders receive favourable attention as part of the political buildup (Pappas, 2012; Mudde, 2007). There was a prominent change in tone from Pre-Election to Post-Election in both newspapers of Pakistan and India. In Pakistan, there was a decline in supportive tone and an increase in critical tone in post-election phase. In India, the supportive tone also decreased, while the critical tone increased in post-election phases. The increase of critical tone in the post-election period in both countries indicated a more scrutinizing approach by the media towards the government or political events after the election. While, the distribution of a neutral tone remained relatively consistent across time periods, with a slight increase in the post-election phase. Neutral tones indicated a more

objective and unbiased reporting style. The shift in tone post-election suggested that news coverage becomes more evaluative and critical after the political landscape has undergone change. This could be influenced by policy decisions, political developments, or public reactions.

In post-election there was a notable decrease in the supportive tone and an increase in the critical tone for the coverage of Modi and Imran Khan in both Pakistan and India. This indicated a heightened level of scrutiny or more critical analysis by the newspapers after the election. The distribution of a neutral tone also varied between Pre-Election and Post-Election phases, showing a slight increase in the neutral tone post-election in both countries. Pakistan appeared to exhibit a more substantial shift in tone post-election compared to India. There was a more significant decrease in supportive tone and a higher increase in critical tone in Pakistan compared to India. These shifts in tone could have been influenced by changes in political scenarios, policy decisions, socio-economic factors, or public sentiment post-election, prompting the media to adjust their reporting style. The media's shift towards a more critical tone post-election could have impacted public perceptions by providing more evaluative coverage, potentially influencing public opinion and discourse.

The analysis proposes a noticeable shift in framing strategies from pre-election to post-election phases. The increased emphasis on Anti-Elitist framing post-election may reflect evolving public sentiments or changes in the political landscape following the election. This shift underscores the dynamic nature of media discourse and its responsiveness to changing socio-political dynamics. Similarly, language-based frames utilized by the press, specifically focusing on Demonizing Language Frame and Emotive Language Frame, in both pre-election and post-election phases. The data suggests a change in the language used by the selected newspapers in discussing political figures or issues before and after election. The increase in Demonizing Language Frame post-election may indicate a more adversarial or polarized discourse within the media landscape, potentially influencing public perceptions and political discourse. Understanding these language-based frames is crucial for assessing media bias and its impact on public opinion formation and political dynamics. And the increased prevalence of Anti-Elitist framing and Demonizing Language Frame post-election

indicates a heightened focus on critiques of elite power structures and a more adversarial approach towards political figures.

Dawn balances its coverage between human interest and controversial stories, with a slight preference for human interest attributes. While The News shows a notable preference for human interest stories over controversial ones, indicating a strategy to engage readers through personal narratives. The Hindu maintains a balanced approach but still leans slightly towards human interest coverage. Whereas, Times of India strongly favors human interest stories, suggesting an editorial focus on engaging and emotive content. Overall, the data shows that human interest stories are more prevalent across all four newspapers, reflecting a common strategy to attract and retain readership through emotionally engaging and personal content. Controversial stories, while still significant, are less frequently covered, indicating a secondary focus. This trend highlights the media's role in shaping public perception and engagement during pre-election and post-election periods by balancing the appeal of personal stories with the impact of controversial issues.

Human-interest attributes constituted a substantial portion of coverage across both time periods and newspapers suggesting a focus on emotive and personal aspects of stories. The emphasis on human-interest attributes indicates a media inclination towards stories that resonate emotionally with the audience, potentially impacting engagement and readership. There is a slight decrease in their proportion and a slight increase in Controversial Attributes from the pre-election to the post-election phase. This suggests a shift in the focus of press coverage towards more critical scrutiny of government performance and controversial issues following the election. The newspapers tend to emphasize human-interest aspects to engage and appeal to the public. While, there is a shift towards highlighting controversial attributes, indicating a greater focus on scrutinizing government performance and policies.

To enhance the comparative dimension of this study, following table synthesizes the key differences and similarities in media framing, tone, and coverage of populist leaders in Pakistan and India, based on the empirical results discussed above:

Table 13 Comparative Media Framing and Coverage of Populist Leaders in Pakistan and India

Dimension	Pakistan (Dawn, The News)	India (The Hindu, Times of India)
Dominant Framing Strategies	Anti-elitist, Moralism, People-Centric frames prominent (esp. pre-election); shift to more critical anti-elitist framing post-election.	People-Centric, Personalization, Nationalism frames strong pre-election; shift to anti-elitist and critical frames post-election.
Religious/Nationalist Appeals	Islamic symbolism and moralistic anti-elite rhetoric.	Hindu nationalism (Hindutva), majoritarian identity politics.
Tone of Coverage	Highly supportive pre-election (esp. 80%+ Imran Khan), shifts to critical and neutral post-election.	Supportive pre-election (60%+ Modi), but even more pronounced shift to critical tone post-election.
Language-Based Frames	Dawn shows preference for Demonizing Language Frame; The News uses more Emotive Language Frame.	Both Indian newspapers prefer Emotive Language Frames, but use Demonizing Language post-election.
Media-Genic Attributes	Balanced Human-Interest and Controversial Attributes; slight shift to Controversial post-election.	Higher use of Human-Interest Attributes overall; significant shift from Human-Interest to Controversial post-election.
Overall Coverage Strategy	Supports moral renewal, anti-corruption narrative tied to Islamic populism.	Reinforces Hindu nationalist identity and personalization of leadership.

Note: Based on thesis data from selected newspapers in Pakistan (Dawn, The News) and India (The Hindu, Times of India). Frames and tones shift significantly between pre-election and post-election phases, reflecting context-specific populist strategies.

Overall framing strategies for the coverage of Modi and Imran Khan in the selected newspapers of India and Pakistan are similar, subtle differences in the topics covered and the framing approaches highlight the unique political contexts of each country. This comparative analysis underscores the importance of contextual political cultures in shaping media representations of populist leaders, supporting the thesis's objective of identifying both commonalities and differences in the coverage of populism in Pakistan and India. In both cases, the media plays a crucial role in shaping public opinion, but the extent and nature of this influence vary depending on the timing and political phase (Kaltwasser, 2014).

5.2 Conclusion

The study of press coverage of populist leaders in India and Pakistan discloses vital insights into the overall dynamics of populism, press's role in political discourse, and the insinuations for democratic authority. In both countries, leaders like Narendra Modi and Imran Khan have excellently operated media platforms to hypothesis and spread their populist ideology, attractive directly to the crowds while frequently avoiding traditional political institutions. The press's role in this process is complicated, acting as both a channel and a filter for these communications, formed by aspects such as media ownership, political associations, and the larger socio-political setting.

Furthermore, the news depiction of these leaders has important consequences for public discernment and democratic developments. In India, media polarization and the destruction of democratic rules are mainly marked, while in Pakistan, religious sensitivities enhance additional coating of complexity. The comparative study of these media settings suggests appreciated perceptions on the challenges met by reporters and media outlets in upholding impartiality and liberation in politically charged contexts.

The findings of the study underline the importance of a critical scrutiny of press performs and their influence on political leadership in South Asia. As India and Pakistan endure to play essential roles on the global stage, considerate the relationship between populism, media, and consensus in these countries is crucial for both regional constancy and the larger dissertation on global populism.

Thus, the collective analysis underlines the dynamic nature of press coverage, showcasing variations in frames, tones, topics, and attributes emphasis between the selected newspapers, across different time periods and specific contexts (pre-election/post-election). These differences point to potential media strategies, audience targeting, or shifts in public interest that shape media narratives and portrayals. Understanding these nuances is crucial for knowing media influence and its impact on public perceptions and opinions. Newspapers focus more on image-building, charisma, and campaign narratives during the pre-election phase, while the post-election phase shifts attention to administrative performance, policy implementation, and accountability. The pre-election phase in newspapers stresses candidate promotion, campaign strategies, and promises, while the post-election phase shifts focus to policy implementation, performance evaluation, and governance challenges. Press coverage in the pre-election phase highlights the personal appeal and emotional rhetoric of populist leaders, while the post-election phase shifts focus to their governance performance, decision-making, and policy execution.

The findings also supported Thomas's views (2023) suggested that the media have an imperative role in regularisation of the well-developed variant of populism that is now extensive. Similarly, this research rotates around the dynamic relationship between politicians' efforts to locked favorable media coverage. And contribute to the broader understanding of the media's influence in political communication, particularly in relation to populist leaders who rely heavily on media exposure to sustain their public personas (Hawkins, 2010). Although politicians habitually try to find positive portrayal in the media, their attempts may unintentionally call scrutiny and critical coverage due to the media's commitment to holding them accountable. Also, populist leaders, dependent on storing favorable coverage, commonly use anti-elite and people-centric strategies. But, as these

populist figures succeed positions of power and become part of the elite themselves, the extent to which they uphold their favored media portrayal becomes uncertain. The supportive tone of coverage changed into Critical tone for the coverage of populist leaders.

So, this study indicates a clear shift in media framing across electoral phases. During the pre-election period, coverage was largely supportive, with a dominant use of People-Centric framing and Human-Interest attributes, portraying populist leaders positively. However, in the post-election period, the media adopted a more critical stance, with a rise in Anti-Elitist framing, Demonizing Language, and Controversial Attributes.

This comparative study of media coverage of populist leaders in Pakistan and India demonstrates that the four selected newspapers e.g. *Dawn*, *The Hindu*, *The News International*, and *The Times of India* vary significantly in their reporting approaches, particularly in terms of supportive and critical coverage, issue-oriented reporting, and the use of human-interest attributes. While the research design did not explicitly set out to classify the newspapers into elite and popular press categories, the findings resonate strongly with this theoretical distinction.

Consistent with earlier scholarship (Merrill, 1968; Goren, 1993; Magin, 2022), *Dawn* and *The Hindu* may be interpreted as elite press outlets, targeting an educated readership and exhibiting stronger adherence to democratic watchdog roles and journalistic ethics. In contrast, *The News* and *The Times of India* align more closely with characteristics of the popular press, including a greater focus on personalization, sensationalism, and broad audience appeal (Johansson, 2007; Esser, 1999).

By situating the empirical results within the elite–popular press framework, this study contributes to understanding how press traditions shape populist discourse in South Asia. The elite outlets tend to critically evaluate populist leaders within a governance and accountability frame, whereas popular outlets show a stronger inclination toward human-interest framing. Thus, the study not only highlights variations across individual newspapers but also offers insight into broader press cultures in India and Pakistan.

So, the findings of this study reveal a clear pattern in media coverage of populist leaders, supportive before elections and increasingly critical afterward. During the pre-election phase, the media tends to highlight the charismatic, people-centric, and anti-elitist appeals of populist leaders. These narratives resonate with the public, generate attention, and align with the media's commercial logic of capturing audience interest. Populist leaders are thus framed as authentic voices of the people and receive favourable exposure that amplifies their promises and personal attributes. However, once in power, the media's orientation shifts from amplification to accountability. Post-election coverage becomes more critical, with greater emphasis on governance, performance, and policy shortcomings. This transition underscores the media's dual role, while it amplifies populist rhetoric during election campaigns, it confirms its watchdog function after elections by scrutinizing those in power. Consequently, the relationship between media and populist leaders is not static but dynamic, moving from support to critique depending on the political context and democratic expectations.

5.3 Implication of the Study

This study wants to identify the nature and coverage of the selected newspapers of India and Pakistan towards the populist leaders of both states. The study has major implementations for academicians, policy makers and media that are debated as under: Academicians and researchers working on media framing would benefit most from the coding scheme. It will help the populist leaders of both regimes to understand the media role and how much media is supportive to them in two different genres. The goal is to discover and recognize that which sort of strategy and policies should be made. It will be effective to understand the differences of coverage in pre-election and post-election phases. State policymakers involved in media management in general, and in India and Pakistan in particular, might examine their rules regulating media coverage of election phases in light of

the study's results. Also, it can assist the government of both countries to reconsider and modify their policy concerning media laws and regulations.

5.4 Delimitation of the Study

Due to time and resources limitations, the study only looked at four of the most influential newspapers of India and Pakistan. The investigation was further restricted to English-language newspapers alone in the instance of Pakistan. This restriction resulted from the fact that the material was gathered from the Lexis-Nexis database, which is a well-known legitimate source of data and is often utilized for research. However, they were not chosen since there was not an authentic database for Urdu newspapers, also it is difficult to interpret Hindi language newspapers as popular press. Moreover, the study was restricted to the one-year period of election in countries.

Furthermore, the classification of topics and frames was likewise restricted to the content categories in this study. In the case of the topic of coverage, the study was delimited to six topics. As these topics are the trending topics of selected time frame. While in the case of frames, the study was restricted to two major frames only as mentioned in the content categorization scheme. Also, the scope of this study was restricted to the three categories of supportive, critical and neutral in the case of the tone variable, which was only, detected in relation to the political figures involved in General Election of both states.

5.4 Recommendations

The following recommendations can be made for upcoming researchers considering the study that was done:

1. Newspapers served as the primary data source for this study's application of the framing theory in print media. This decision was made thoughtfully and conscientiously, taking into account the value of print media and its readability, especially for the general public as well as legislators, policymakers, and think tanks. Nonetheless, by gathering information from social media and expanding on the body of knowledge already available on framing theory against the backdrop of social media, future academics will be able to examine the different aspects of the populist coverage.
2. Within the theoretical framework of the mass media framing theory, this study investigated how the populist leaders were framed. The main goal of this study was to examine the many frames of coverage utilized for presenting the subject in the media. Future researchers, however, can go a step further and look into the elements that affect how the news content is shaped, such as the editor's influence, politicians' influence, or interest groups' influence in how the media content is shaped and how the topics and frames are chosen.
3. The methodological approach of this study is one of a significant limitation, as it is designed as a quantitative analysis of the newspaper's coverage of populist leaders in India and Pakistan. While qualitative methods could provide richer, more relevant insights into the framing and narrative construction of populist leaders. The findings of this study are valuable for thoughtful trends and patterns in news coverage, but may not entirely mirror the difficulty and complex nature of populist media depiction.

Notes

[1] Pakistan had two wings that were not geographically contiguous in 1947. The east wing represents contemporary Bangladesh, and the west wing represents modern Pakistan. The two wings were separated by more than 2000 kilometers of Indian Territory and were ethnolinguistically poles apart. The only thing they had in common was their religious identity as Muslims. The West Pakistani elite, which dominated the military and bureaucracy, refused to share power with the larger population of the East and accept Bengali language and culture as equal.

[2] An Arabic term that generally mentions to individuals who involve in jihad (lit.'struggle or striving, taken in Islamic jurisprudence as the battle for the Allah, religion, or the community).

[3] Pakistan received approximately 18 billion USD military and economic aids from the United States for its participation in the "War on Terror" from 2002 to 2011.

[4] Asia Bibi worked as a fruit picker in the Sheikhpura district (outside of Lahore). According to reports, Bibi and her family were the only Pakistani Christian family in the small village of Ittan Wali. In 2009, she was charged with blasphemy after refusing "advice" to convert to Islam. According to various accounts, while picking falsa berries, Asia and her fellow berry pickers got into a fight. The conflict is said to have begun when Asian women drank from the same glass as Muslim women. Asia was fired from the farm after a heated argument and falsely accused of blasphemy. Under these charges, she was sentenced to death by the local district court in 2010.

[5] Taseer was of Anglo-Indian origin (with a Christian mother and a Muslim father). Many people were skeptical of his intentions because of his mixed-race background, so his identity as a Pakistani was not fully accepted.

[6] Mumtaz Qadri was an Elite Police commando and a member of the squad of personal bodyguards assigned to protect Salmaan Taseer at the time of the assassination. He

assassinated Taseer on January 4, 2011. He claimed he assassinated the Governor because Taseer defended Asia Bibi, a Pakistani Christian woman convicted of blasphemy and sentenced to death. In February 2016, Qadri was convicted by the Islamabad High Court, sentenced to death, and hanged.

[7] Khadim Hussain Rizvi founded the party in August 2015. It was the fifth-largest party in Pakistan's general election in 2018, but it did not win any seats in the National and Punjab Assembly. It did, however, gain three seats in the Sindh Assembly. Tehreek-e-Labbaik is well-known for its protests against changes to Pakistan's blasphemy law. It calls for Sharia to be established as the Islamic fundamental law in Pakistan over time, through a legal and political process. The party received over 2.2 million votes in the 2018 election.

[8] It influenced an approach alternating among nonaggressive civil rebellion and social work to rebuild community social infrastructure, assembling laborers and crafts worker as well as middle and upper class and caste status.

[9] Freedom House uses a standard based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to assess civil freedoms and political rights. Each nation is rated on 10 indices of political rights and 15 indications of civil liberties, with zero being the least free on a 4-point Likert scale. Details are here

CHAPTER 6

REFERNCES

- Aalberg, T., Esser, F., Reinemann, C., Strömbäck, J., & de Vreese, C. (Eds.). (2017). *Populist Political Communication in Europe*. New York: Routledge. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315623016>
- Abadi, D., Bertlich, T., Duyvendak, J. W., & Fischer, A. (2024). Populism Versus Nativism: Socio-Economic, Socio-Cultural, and Emotional Predictors. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 0(0). <https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642241240336>
- Ab-Hassan, S. (2015). Populist discourse and the remaking of political opposition in Venezuela. *Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política*, 24(2).
- Abts, K., & Rummens, S. (2007). Populism versus democracy. *European Journal of Political Theory*, 6(4), 341–362. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885107082206>
- Acemoglu, D., Egorov, G., & Sonin, K. (2011). A Political Theory of Populism. *NBER Working Papers*, 17306. Available at <https://www.nber.org/papers/w17306>
- Ahmad, U. (2019). The Evolution of the Role of the Objectives Resolution in the Constitutional Paradigm of Pakistan – from the framers’ intent to a tool for judicial overreach. *LUMS Law Journal*, 5. Retrieved from <https://sahsol.lums.edu.pk/law-journal/evolution-role-objectives-resolution-constitutional-paradigm-pakistan-%E2%80%93-framers%E2%80%99-intent>

- Aiyar, Y. (2019). Modi Consolidates Power: Leveraging Welfare Politics. *Journal of Democracy*, 30, 78–88. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/735460>
- Akkerman, A., Mudde, C., & Zaslove, A. (2014). How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(9), 1324–1353.
- Akkerman, T. (2011). Friend or foe? Right-wing populism and the popular press in Britain and the Netherlands. *Journalism*, 12(8), 931–945. doi:10.1177/1464884911410019
- Al Jazeera. (2014, May 27). *Modi: From tea boy to India's leader*. News. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/5/27/modi-from-tea-boy-to-indias-leader>
- Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (Eds.). (2008). *Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Alschuler, L. R. (2020). Populism and the psychopolitics of morality. *PCS – Politics, Culture and Socialization*, 8(1+2-2017), 95–103. <https://doi.org/10.3224/pcs.v8i1-2.05>
- Altheide, D. L., & Snow, R. P. (1979). *Media Logic*. Sage.
- Ammassari, S. (2018). Contemporary Populism in India: Assessing the Bharatiya Janata Party's Ideological Features (Student Paper Series 48). Retrieved from https://www.ibei.org/ibei_studentpaper48_162065.p
- Amrish, Z. (2011). US Image in Pakistani Print Media: Framing Analysis of the Editorials of Dawn, The News, and The Nation.
- Andrade, M. K. M. (2013). Julian Assange: A Content Analysis of Media Framing in Newspapers around the World. (Masters of Arts in Profession Communication Dissertation, East Tennessee State University). Retrieved from <http://dc.etsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2336&context=etd>
- Andreadis, I., Stavrakakis, Y., & Katsambekis, G. (2016). Using Surveys to Measure the Populist Attitudes of Political Elites and Voters: A Greek Pilot Study of Supply and Demand

Araújo, B. B. de, & Prior, H. (2020). Framing Political Populism: The Role of Media in Framing the Election of Jair Bolsonaro. *Journalism Practice*, 15(2), 1–17. DOI: 10.1080/17512786.2019.1709881

» <https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2019.1709881>

Ardèvol-Abreu. (2015). Framing theory in communication research in Spain. Origins, development and current situation. *Revista Latina de Comunicación Social*. <http://www.revistalatinacs.org/070/paper/1053/23en.html> DOI: 10.4185/RLCS-20151053en

Audit Bureau of Circulations. (2017, May 8). Retrieved from <http://www.auditbureau.org/downloads.html>

Aziz, S. (2015, August 2). *A leaf from history: Zia's referendum*. *Dawn*. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1197376>

Bakker, B., Rooduijn, M., & Schumacher, G. (2010). The psychological roots of populist voting: Evidence from the Netherlands. [Unpublished manuscript].

Baran, S. J., & Davis, D. K. (2015). *Mass Communication Theory: Foundations, Ferment, and Future: Seventh Edition*. Delhi: Cengage Learning.

Bardhan, P. (2018, August 12). Populism in less developed countries is somewhat different. *Business Standard*. Retrieved May 31, 2022, from https://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/populism-in-less-developed-countries-is-somewhat-different-118081200657_1.html

Barr, R. R. (2009). Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics. *Party Politics*, 15(1), 29-48. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068808097890>

Baru, S. (2021). An excerpt from India's 'Power Elite: Class, Caste and a Cultural Revolution'. Retrieved from <https://scroll.in/article/992808/narendra-modi-used-indias-media-elite-for-his-own-advantage-sanjaya-baru-explains-how-he-did-it>

Batool, F. (2021). India and Pakistan's Democratic Backslide. *South Asian Voices*. Available at <https://southasianvoices.org/india-and-pakistans-democratic-backslide/>

- Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26(1), 611–639. <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.611>
- Berger, A. A. (2019). *Media and communication research methods - International student edition: An introduction to qualitative and quantitative approaches*. <https://methods.sagepub.com/book/media-and-communication-research-methods-3e/i314.xml>
- Betz, H.-G. (1994). *Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe*. Macmillan.
- Betz, H.-G., & Immerfall, S. (1998). *The New Politics of the Right; Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies*. London: MacMillan.
- Block, E., & Negrine, R. (2017). The populist communication style: Toward a critical framework. *International Journal of Communication*, 11, 178–197. Retrieved from <https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/5637>
- Bonikowski, B. (2016). Three lessons of contemporary populism in Europe and the United States. *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, 23(1), 49–60. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bonikowski/files/bonikowski_-_three_lessons_of_contemporary_populism_in_the_united_states_and_europe.pdf
- Bonikowski, B., & Zhang, Y. (2020). Populism as dog-whistle politics: Anti-elite discourse and sentiments toward out-groups. [Unpublished manuscript].
- Bonikowski, B., Halikiopoulou, D., Kaufmann, E., & Rooduijn, M. (2019). Populism and nationalism in a comparative perspective: A scholarly exchange. *Nations and Nationalism*, 25(1), 58–81. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12480>
- Boomgaarden, H. G., & Vliegenthart, R. (2009). ‘How News Content Influences Anti-Immigration Attitudes: Germany, 1993-2005’. *European Journal of Political Research*, 48(4), 516–542. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.01831.x.

Bos L, Van der Brug W, De Vreese C (2011) How the media shape perceptions of right-wing populist leaders. *Political Communication* 28(2): 182–206.

Bos, L., & Brants, K. (2014). Populist rhetoric in politics and media: A longitudinal study of the Netherlands. *European Journal of Communication*, 29(6), 703–719. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323114545709>

Boyratz, C. (2018). Neoliberal populism and governmentality in Turkey: The foundation of communication centers during the AKP era. *Journal of Global Communication*, 306, 1–16.

Brinkley, A. (1985). Richard Hofstadter's the Age of Reform: A Reconsideration [Review of The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R., by R. Hofstadter]. *Reviews in American History*, 13(3), 462–480. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2702106>

Brubaker, R. (2020). Populism and nationalism. *Nations and Nationalism*, 26(1), 44–66. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12522>

Bryant, J., & Miron, D. (2004). Theory and Research in Mass Communication. *Journal of Communications*, 54(4), 662-704.

Butt, A.J., Munawar, S. and Masood, J. 2023. Populism and Pakistani Politics in the Post Musharaf Era 2008-2023. *Journal of Policy Research*. 9, 1 (May 2023), 598–605. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.61506/02.00014>.

Cacciatore, M. A., Scheufele, D. A., & Iyengar, S. (2016). The End of Framing as we Know it ... and the Future of Media Effects. *HMCS*, 19(1), 7–23. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2015.1068811>

Calléja, L. (2020, February 9). *The rise of populism: A threat to civil society? E-International Relations*, 1–6. <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/02/09/the-rise-of-populism-a-threat-to-civil-society/>

Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy. *Political Studies*, 47(1), 2–16.

- Canovan, M. (2002). Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy. In Y. Mény & Y. Surel (Eds.), *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*. New York: Palgrave.
- Canovan, M. (2004). Populism for Political Theorists? *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9(3), 241–252.
- Chacko, P. (2018). The Right Turn in India: Authoritarianism, Populism and Neoliberalisation. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 48, 541–565. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00472336.2018.1446546>
- Chakravartty, P., & Roy, S. (2017). Mediatized Populisms: Inter-Asian Lineages Introduction. *Mass Communication and Society*, 20(4), 481–504.
- Choudary, A. I. (2013). Coverage of Ex-Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani's Contempt of Court Case in Leading Urdu and English Dailies of Pakistan: Exploring Frames and Slants (Unpublished M.Phil's Thesis). Allam Iqbal Open University.
- Cocco, J. (2022). Measuring Populism: New Frontiers. *POP*. Retrieved from <https://populismobserver.com/2022/04/20/populism-and-text-as-data/#more-5468>
- Dalio, R., Kryger, S., Rogers, J., & Davis, G. (2017). Popularism: The phenomenon. *Bridgewater Daily Observations*, March 22(203), 1–61.
- Dalton, R. J., & Klingemann, H. (2011). Overview of political behavior. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, 17, 319–336. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199604456.013.0017>
- Danaj, A., Lazányi, K., & Bilan, S. (2018). Euroscepticism and populism in Hungary: The analysis of the prime minister's discourse. *Journal of International Studies*, 11(1), 240–247. <https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-8330.2018/11-1/18>
- D'Angelo, P., & Kuypers, J. A. (2010). *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*. Abingdon: Routledge.

- De la Torre, C. (2012). The People, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Rafael Correa's Ecuador. Paper presented at the Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, San Francisco, May 23–26.
- De Lange, S. (2011). De complexe relatie tussen diplomademocratie en populisme [The complex relationship between diplomatic democracy and populism]. *Beleid en Maatschappij*, 38(1), 93–97.
- De Souza, R. (2010). NGOs in India's elite newspapers: A framing analysis. *Asian Journal of Communication*, 20(4), 477–493. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01292986.2010.496863>
- De Veerse, C. H. (2012). New Avenues for Framing Research. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 56, 365-375.
- De Vreese, C. H., Esser, F., Aalberg, T., Reinemann, C., & Stanyer, J. (2018). Populism as an Expression of Political Communication Content and Style: A New Perspective. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161218790035>
- Decadri, S., & Boussalis, C. (2020). Populism, party membership, and language complexity in the Italian Chamber of Deputies. *Journal of Election, Public Opinion and Parties*, 30(4), 484–503. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2019.1593182>
- Denney, R. (1954). [Review of *Content Analysis in Communication Research*, by B. Berelson]. *Audio Visual Communication Review*, 2(1), 64–67. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30216709>
- Druckman, J. N. (2017). An inside view of congressional campaigning on the web. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 1–34.
- Dutt, S. (2000). *Inside Pakistan: 52 Years Outlook*. New Delhi: APH Pub. Corp. ISBN 8176481572.
- Edingerh, M. (2021). Fighting the establishment: The role of anti-elitism in contemporary populism. *Advancing Political Science, THE EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH*.

Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 51–58.

Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Towards clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 51-58. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x>

Ernst, N., Engesser, S., & Esser, F. (2017). Bipolar populism? The use of anti-elitism and people-centrism by Swiss parties on social media. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 23(3), 253–261. <https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12264>

Esser, F., & Strömbäck, J. (Eds.). (2014). *Mediatization of Politics: Understanding the Transformation of Western Democracies*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Esser, F., & Strömbäck, J. (Eds.). (2014). *Mediatization of Politics: Understanding the Transformation of Western Democracies*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Esser, F., Stępińska, A., & Hopmann, D. N. (2016). Populism and the media: Cross-national findings and perspectives. *Populist Political Communication in Europe*, 17(1), 1–13.

Esser, F., Stępińska, A., & Hopmann, D. N. (2017). Populism and the media: Cross-national findings and perspectives. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 22(4), 441–458. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161217709286>

Esser, F., Stępińska, A., & Hopmann, D. N. (2017). Populism and the media: Cross-national findings and perspectives. In C. de Vreese, F. Esser, & D. N. Hopmann (Eds.), *Populist Political Communication in Europe* (pp. 365–380). Routledge.

Ferree, M. M., Gamson, W. A., Gerhards, J., & Rucht, D. (2002). *Shaping Abortion Discourse: Democracy and the Public Sphere in Germany and the United States*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Filc, D. (2010). *The Political Right in Israel: Different Faces of Jewish Populism*. London: Routledge.

- Filc, D. (2011). Post-populism: Explaining Neo-liberal Populism through the Habitus. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 16(2), 221–238.
- Finchelstein, F. (2017). *From Fascism to Populism in History*. Oakland: Univ. Calif. Press.
- Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). *Social Cognition* (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Franzosi, R. (2008). Content Analysis: Objective, Systematic, and Quantitative Description of Content. PDFs.semanticscholar.org. <http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c614/2310012f03943b149e07217116bbf083639c.pdf>
- Freeden, M. (1998). Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology? *Political Studies*, 46(4), 748-765. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00165>
- Gagnon, J.-P., Beausoleil, E., Son, K.-M., Arguelles, C., Chalaye, P., & Johnston, C. N. (2018). What is populism? Who is the populist? *Democratic Theory*, 5(2), vi–xxvi. <https://doi.org/10.3167/dt.2018.050201>
- Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1987). The changing culture of affirmative action. In R. G. Braungart & M. M. Braungart (Eds.), *Research in Political Sociology*. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Germani, G. (1978). *Authoritarianism, Fascism and National Populism*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- Geurkink, B., Zaslove, A., Sluiter, R., & Jacobs, K. (2020). Populist attitudes, political trust, and external political efficacy: Old wine in new bottles? *Political Studies*, 68(1), 247–267. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719842768>
- Gherghina, S., & Soare, S. (2013). Introduction: Populism - A Sophisticated Concept and Diverse Political Realities. *Contemporary Populism: A Controversial Concept and Its Diverse Forms*, Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 1-14, Available. SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2984603> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2984603>

- Gidron, N., & Bonikowski, B. (2013). *Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda*, Weatherhead Working Paper Series, No. 13-0004.
- Giebler, H., & Regel, S. (2018). Who votes right-wing populist? Geographical and individual factors in seven German state election. *WISO Diskurs*, 14, 36.
- Gillani, M. S. (2020). Populism: Effects on Global Politics and Pakistan. *Modern Diplomacy*. <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/06/02/populism-effects-on-global-politics-and-pakistan>
- Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. New York. <https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/podzim2013/SOC571E/um/E.Goffman-FrameAnalysis.pdf>
- Goodwin, M., Ramalingam, V., & Briggs, R. (2012). *The New Radical Right: Violent and Non-Violent Movements in Europe*. Briefing Paper, Institute for Strategic Dialogue. London.
- Goren, D. (1993). *Communications and Reality*. Jerusalem: Keter. [Hebrew]
- Goren, H. (1993). *The elite press: Between professionalism and political influence*. *Journal of Communication*, 43(3), 33–45.
- Gottenhuber, S. (2020). *Implementing the Sustainable Development Goals in times of rising right-wing populism in Europe*. [Unpublished manuscript].
- Gudavarthy, A. (2020). *Theorizing Populism in India*. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34098-8_5
- Haas, I. J. (2020). *Populism and the significance of the intellectual virtues*. [Unpublished manuscript]. Retrieved from
- Hajdari, U. (2018). *Populism: A Case-by-case Study*. Massachusetts Institute of Technology News. Retrieved from <http://news.mit.edu/2018/mit-cis-starr-forum-populism-case-studies-1129>
- Hameleers, M. (2020). Populist disinformation: Exploring intersections between online populism and disinformation in the US and the Netherlands. *Politics and Governance*, 8(1), 146–157. <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i1.2478>

- Hameleers, M., & Vliegenthart, R. (2020). The rise of a populist zeitgeist? A content analysis of populist media coverage in newspapers published between 1990 and 2017. *Journalism Studies*, 21(1), 19–36. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2019.1620114>
- Hameleers, M., Bos, L., & de Vreese, C. H. (2017). The Appeal of Media Populism: The Media Preferences of Citizens with Populist Attitudes. *Mass Communication and Society*, 20(4), 481–504. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15205436.2017.1291817>
- Haque, M., & Narag, S. (1983). The Coverage of Two Indian Election by Three Prestigious Dailies. *Media Asia*, 10(1), 35–43.
- Hassan, S. (2020). Populism and popularity in Imran Khan’s 2018 election speeches.
- Haustein, J., & Tomalin, E. (2021). Religion, populism, and the politics of the Sustainable Development Goals. *Social Policy and Society*, 20(2), 296–309. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S147474642000072X>
- Hawkins, K. A. (2009). Is Chávez populist? Measuring populist discourse in comparative perspective. *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(8), 1040-1067.
- Hawkins, K. A. (2010). *Venezuela’s Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hawkins, K. A. (2010). *Venezuela’s Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hawkins, K., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2018). *The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis*. Routledge.
- Hayat, N., & Juliana, A. W. (2016). A Comparative Analysis of Pakistani English Newspaper Editorials: The Case of Taliban's Attack on Malala Yousafzai. *Social Science & Humanities*, 24(3), 1087-1101.
- Heckman, J. J., Pinto, R., & Savelyev, P. A. (2021). The strategic approach to populism. *Routledge Handbook of Populism in the Asia Pacific*, June.

- Hjarvard, S. (2013). *The Mediatization of Culture and Society*. Routledge.
- Hopmann, D. N., De Vreese, C. H., & Albæk, E. (2010). Effects of election campaigns: Changes in media framing, attitudes, and voting intentions. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 22(4), 389–410. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edq019>
- Hovden, J. A. N. F. (2019). Populism in Scandinavian immigration discourse 1970–2016. *Journal of Multicultural Discourses*, 13(6), 5483–5504.
- https://www.researchgate.net/publication/363081559_Introduction_Populism_and_the_Significance_of_the_Intellectual_Virtues
- Human Rights Watch. (2017, January 12). *World Report 2017: Rights Trends in India*. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/india>
- Hussain, S., Abbas, Q., & Shah, Sayyed Fawad Ali. (2024). “Populism Fuels Hate Speech and Disinformation: Evidence from Political Discourse on X (Formerly Twitter) in India and Pakistan.” *International Journal of Communication*, 18, Article 5694-5713
- Ibrahim, A. (2009). US. Aid to Pakistan: U.S Taxpayers have Funded the Corruption in Pakistan. *Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs*. https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009.pdf
- IDEA. (2020). Populist government and democracy: An impact assessment using the Global State of Democracy Indices: GSoD In Focus No. 9.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence. *Cambridge University Press*.
- Ionescu, G., & Gellner, E. (Eds.). (1969). *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Iyengar, S. (1991). *Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues*. University of Chicago Press.

- Iyengar, S. (2005). Speaking of value: the framing of American politics. *The Forum*, 3(3), 1-8. <http://pcl.stanford.edu/common/docs/research/iyengar/2005/speaking.pdf>
- Jaffrelot, C. (2017). Populism, Remixed. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from <https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/24/populism-remixed-pub-68405>
- Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(3), 319–345. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00690
- Jain, V. (2017). Neighbours Envy Owners Pride: A Case Study of Charismatic Leadership in Indian Sub-Continent. *International Scientific Journal of Contemporary Research in Engineering, Science and Management*, 2(1), 17–23. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/39000318/Neighbours_Envy_Owners_Pride_A_Case_Study_of_Charismatic_Leadership_in_Indian_Sub-Continent
- Jalal, A. (2010). *The Sole Spokesman*. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication.
- Javed, M. (2016). Changing media landscape: Radio and Newspapers in Pakistan. *Gallup Pakistan History Project - Weekend Read 19*. Retrieved from <http://gallup.com.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/gpwr19.pdf>
- Javed, U. (2021, June 14). Populism and Pakistan. Dawn. Available at <https://www.dawn.com/news/1629273/populism-and-pakistan>
- Jenne, E. K. (2021). Populism, nationalism and revisionist foreign policy. *International Affairs*, 97(2), 323–343. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa230>
- Jensen, C. (2017). Populism and the claim to a moral monopoly: An interview with Jan-Werner Müller. *Politik*, 4, 71–85.
- Johansohn, S. (2007). *Reading Tabloids: Tabloid Newspapers and Their Readers*. Stockholm: Södertörns högskola.

- Johansson, S. (2007). *Reading tabloids: Tabloid newspapers and their readers*. Huddinge: Södertörn University.
- Kaid, L. L., & Wadsworth, A. J. (1989). Content Analysis. In P. Emmert, & L. L. Barker (Eds.), *Measurement of Communication Behavior* (pp. 197-217). New York: Longman.
- Kalogeropoulos, A. (2019). How younger generations consume news differently - Reuters Institute Digital News Report. *Digital News Report*, 54–59.
- Kaltwasser, C. R. (2014). The responses of populism to Dahl's democratic dilemmas. *Political Studies*, 62(3), 470-487.
- Kapur, S., & Ganguly, S. (2012). The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia. *International Security*, 37(1), 111–141. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23280406>
- Karnad, B. (2004). A strategy to counter Pakistan supported terrorism. In *Pakistan in a changing strategic context*. New Delhi: Knowledge World.
- Karvánková, P., Vančura, M., Popjaková, D., & Mládek, J. (2017). Current topics in Czech and Central European geography education. In *Current Topics in Czech and Central European Geography Education*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43614-2>
- Katsourides, Y., & Pachita, E. K. (2021). Normalizing far right party rhetoric: the impact of media populist frames and coverage on the electoral prospects of far-right parties in the case of Cyprus. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2021.1951184>
- Kaushal, N. (1997). Press and Democracy in India. In G. H. Peiris (Ed.), *Studies on the Press in Sri Lanka and South Asia* (pp. 53–79). Kandy, Sri Lanka: International Centre for Ethnic Studies.
- Kazin, M. (1995). *The Populist Persuasion: An American History*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kenny, P. D. (2021). The strategic approach to populism. *Routledge Handbook of Populism in the Asia Pacific*, June.

- Khalid, M. U. (2020). *Valence Populism in Pakistan: Making Sense of Imran Khan's Ideological Cluelessness*. Central European University.
- Kim, S. (2021). Taking stock of the field of populism research: Are ideational approaches 'moralistic' and post-foundational discursive approaches 'normative'? *Politics*, 0–13. <https://doi.org/10.1177/02633957211007053>
- Klar, S., Robinson, J., & Druckman, J. (2013). Political Dynamics of Framing. In *New Directions in Media and Politics* (2nd ed., pp. 173–192).
- Knight, A. (1998). Populism and Neo-Populism in Latin America, Especially Mexico. *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 30(2), 223–248.
- Kovalcsik, T., & Nzimande, N. P. (2019). Theories of the voting behaviour in the context of electoral and urban geography. *Belvedere Meridionale*, 31(4), 207–220. <https://doi.org/10.14232/belv.2019.4.15>
- Krämer, B. (2014). Media populism: A conceptual clarification and some theses on its effects. *Communication Theory*, 24(1), 42–60. <https://doi.org/10.1111/comt.12029>
- Krekó, P. (2020). Populism in power: The tribal challenge. [Unpublished manuscript].
- Krekó, P., & Juhász, A. (2019). Beyond populism: Political tribalism in Poland and Hungary. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 18(3), 69–81.
- Kriesi, H., & Pappas, T. S. (Eds.). (2015). *European populism in the shadow of the great recession*. Colchester: ECPR Press. Retrieved from Cadmus, EUI Research Repository. [POLCON].
- Krippendorff, K. (2018). *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology* (4th ed.). Sage.
- Kroll, C., & Zipperer, V. (2020). Sustainable development and populism. *Ecological Economics*, 176, 106723. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106723>

- Kumar, S., & Sarma, V. V. S. (2015). Performance and challenges of newspapers in India: A case study on English versus vernacular dailies in India.
- Kurlantzick, J. (2018). Southeast Asia's populism is different but also dangerous. *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved May 31, 2022, from <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/southeast-asias-populism-different-also-dangerous>
- Kustov, A., & Dai, H. (2020). Media framing and populism: A study on political media in Europe. *Journal of Political Communication*, 55(2), 220-236.
- Kustov, A., & Dai, Y. (2020). When do politicians use populist rhetoric? Populism as a campaign gamble. [Unpublished manuscript].
- Kyle, J. (2018). Populists in power around the world. *Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies*.
- Laclau, E. (2005). On Populist Reason (pp. 1-130). New York, NY: Verso
- Leavy, P. (2000). Feminist content analysis and representative characters. *The Qualitative Report*, 5(1), 1-16. <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR5-1/leavy.html>
- Levitsky, S., & Roberts, K. M. (Eds.). (2011). *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Ley, S. (2014). Citizens in fear: Political participation and voting behavior in the midst of violence. [Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago].
- Looney, R. (2008). The Musharraf Paradox: The Failure of an Economic Success Story. *The Open Area Studies Journal*, 1, 1–15. <https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1028.7995&rep=rep1&type=pdf>
- Lührmann, A., & Hellmeier, S. (2020). Populism, nationalism and illiberalism: A challenge for democracy and civil society. [Unpublished manuscript].
- Lyengar, S. (1991). *Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues*. University of Chicago Press. <https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226388533.001.0001>

- Madrid, R. L. (2008). The Rise of Ethnopolitism in Latin America. *World Politics*, 60(3), 475–508.S
- Magin, M. (2022). Elite versus Popular Press. In T.P. Vos, F. Hanusch, D. Dimitrakopoulou, M. Geertsema-Sligh, & A. Sehl (Eds.), *The International Encyclopedia of Journalism Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118841570.iejs0226>
- Magin, M. (2022). *The elite–popular divide in journalism revisited: Conceptual structure and empirical findings*. *Journalism*, 23(6), 1321–1341.
- Majidifard, A., Fouladiyan, M., & Yousofi, A. (2025). *The populist people and mediatized populism: the construction of “The People” by Iranian politicians on Twitter*. *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications*, 12, Article 1089. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-025-05130-1>.
- Malik, H. (2018, November 10). TLP protests ‘cost Punjab millions of rupees loss’. *The Express Tribune*. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1844238/1-tlp-protests-cost-punjab-millions-rupees-loss>
- Manerikar, V., & Manerikar, S. (2014). A note on exploratory research. *Prin. LN Welingkar Institute of Management Development & Research*, 95.
- Mansbridge, J., & Macedo, S. (2019). Populism and democratic theory. *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, 15, 59–77. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-101518-042843>
- Manucci, L. (2016). Populism and the media. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Communication*, 117(404), 404–424. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.001.0001>
- Manucci, L., & Weber, E. (2017). Why the big picture matters: Political and media populism in Western Europe since the 1970s. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 23(4), 313–334. <https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12267>

Markus, H., & Zajonc, R. B. (1985). The cognitive perspective in social psychology. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology: Vol. 2 Special Fields and Applications* (pp. 137-230). New York: Random House.

Martinelli, A., editor. (2018) *When Populism Meets Nationalism: Reflections on Parties in Power*. [Milan: ISPI] [Pdf] Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/2020715358/>.

Marying, P. (2000). Qualitative Content Analysis, 1(2), 20th ser. *Qualitative Research*. <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1089/2385>

Maurer, P., & Diehl, T. (2019). What kind of populism? Tone and targets in the Twitter discourse of French and American presidential candidates. *European Journal of Communication*, 35(5), 453-468. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323120909288>

Mazhar, M. (2022). From leader to messiah: Imran Khan's power of populism. *The Express Tribune*. Retrieved from <https://tribune.com.pk/article/97577/from-leader-to-messiah-imran-khans-power-of-populism>

Mazzoleni, G. (2003). The media and the growth of neo-populism in contemporary democracies. In G. Mazzoleni, J. Stewart, & B. Horsfield (Eds.), *The Media and Neo-populism: A Contemporary Comparative Analysis* (pp. 1-20). London: Praeger.

Mazzoleni, G. (2008). Populism and the Media. In D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (Eds.), *Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy* (pp. 49–64). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mazzoleni, G. (2008). Populism and the media. In D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (Eds.), *Twenty-First Century Populism* (pp. 49–64). Palgrave Macmillan.

Mazzoleni, G. (2014). Mediatization and political populism. In *Mediatization of Politics: Understanding the Transformation of Western Democracies* (pp. 42–56).

Mazzoleni, G., Stewart, J., & Horsfield, B. (2003). *The Media and Neo-Populism*. Westport: Praeger.

- McDonnell, D., & Ondelli, S. (2020). The Language of Right-Wing Populist Leaders: Not So Simple. *Perspectives on Politics*, 1-14. doi:10.1017/S1537592720002418.
- Mendes, K. (2011). *Feminism in the News: Representations of the Women's Movement Since the 1960s*. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Meny, Y., & Surel, Y. (2002). The constitutive ambiguity of populism. In Y. Meny & Y. Surel (Eds.), *Democracies and the Populist Challenge* (pp. 1-21). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Merrill, J. C. (1968). *The elite press: Great newspapers of the world*. New York: Pitman.
- Merrill, J. C. (1968). *The elite press: great newspapers of the world*. Pitman Publishing Corporation.
- Mezzer, M., & Sial, S. (2010). IFP Democratisation and Transitional Justice Cluster Country case study: Pakistan Media and Governance in Pakistan: A controversial yet essential relationship.
https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20101109_CRU_publicatie_mmezzer.pdf
- Moffitt, B. (2016). *The global rise of populism: Performance, political style, and representation*. Stanford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9780804799333>
- Moffitt, B. (2016). *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation*. Stanford University Press.
- Moffitt, B., & Tormey, S. (2014). Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political Style. *Political Studies*, 62(2), 381–397.
- Mouffe, C. (2016). *The Populist Moment*. OpenDemocracy.net.
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/chantal-mouffe/populist-challenge>
- Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, 39(4), 542–563. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x
- Mudde, C. (2004). The populist zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, 39(4), 541–563.

- Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist radical right parties in Europe*. Cambridge University Press.
- Mudde, C. (2017). Populism: An Ideational Approach. In C. R. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 27–47.
- Mudde, C. (2019). *The Far Right Today*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. (2017). *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2014). Populism and Political Leadership. In R. A. W. Rhodes & P. 't Hart (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership* (pp. 376–388).
- Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (Eds.). (2012). *Populism in Europe and the Americas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mulla, A. (2017). Broadcasting the dharna: Mediating “contained” populism in contemporary Pakistan. *International Journal of Communication*, 11, 4181–4196.
- Nabi, R. L. (2003). Exploring the framing effects of emotion. *Communication Research*, 30(2), 224–247.
- Nadeem, M. U., Bokhari, I. H., Khan, M. A., & Mustafa, F. (2019). An Examination of Media Frames Regarding Taliban: A Comparative Study of the Editorials of Dawn and The Nation. *Pakistan Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, 17(1), 68-72.
- Nanda, V. (1972). Self–Determination in International Law: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities–Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan). *American Journal of International Law*, 66(2), 321–336.
- Naqvi, H. (2007). *Journalism and Mass Communication*. Upkar Prakashan.
- Narayana, S., & Kapur, P. (2011). Indian Media Framing of the Image of Muslims. *Media Asia*, 38(3), 153-162. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01296612.2011.11726895>

- Narayana, U., & Kapur, P. (2011). Indian Media Framing of the Image of Muslims: An Analysis of News Coverage of Muslims in English Newspapers of India. *Media Asia* 38(3):153-162
- Naseer, N. (2022). Imran Khan and Populist Rhetoric: Demagogue or Messiah? South Asian Voices. Retrieved from <https://southasianvoices.org/imran-khan-and-populist-rhetoric-demagogue-or-messiah/>
- Neuendorf, K. A. (2002). *The Content Analysis Guidebook*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Neuendorf, K. A. (2017). *The Content Analysis Guidebook* (2nd ed.). Sage.
- Oldenburg, P. (2010). India, Pakistan, and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203847152>
- Pabriks, A. (2017). *The Rise of Populism*.
- Pakistan Media and Telecom Landscape Guide. (June, 2012). Retrieved from [https://www.internews.org/sites/default/files/resources/InfoasAid_Pakistan_Media uide.pdf](https://www.internews.org/sites/default/files/resources/InfoasAid_Pakistan_Media%20uide.pdf)
- Pal, I. (2010). Objectives Resolution: the root of religious orthodoxy. *Dawn*. Jun. 20, 2010. <https://www.dawn.com/news/881205/objectives-resolution-the-root-of-religious-orthodoxy>
- Panizza, F. (2005). *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*. London: Verso.
- Pankowski, R. (2010). *The Populist Radical Right in Poland: The Patriots*. London: Routledge.
- Pappas, T. S. (2012). Populism Emergent: A framework for analyzing its contexts, mechanics, and outcomes. *EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2012/01*.
- Pappas, T. S. (2012). Populism emergent: A framework for analyzing its contexts, mechanics, and outcomes. *Political Science Quarterly*, 127(4), 597-617.

Paracha N. F. (2019). The conflicted self: The existential battle between being Muslim and Islamic in Pakistan. In Zahoor B., and Rumi R. (Eds.), *Rethinking Pakistan: A 21st century perspective* (pp. 41–50). Folio Books.

Pasha, A. (2016). Mumtaz Qadri's shrine: In memory of Salmaan Taseer's assassin. *Dawn*. Dec. 27, 2016. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1302289> (accessed on March 24, 2021).

Paxton, F. (2019). Towards a Populist Local Democracy? The Consequences of Populist Radical Right Local Government Leadership in Western Europe. *Representation*, 0(0), 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2019.1643771>

Peruzzotti, E. (2013). Populism in democratic times: Populism, representative democracy and the debate on democratic deepening. In C. De la Torre & C. J. Arnson (Eds.), *Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century* (pp. 61–84). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.

Populism, Imran Khan and Pakistan. (2022, July 31). Daily Times. <https://dailytimes.com.pk/914317/populism-imran-khan-and-pakistan>

Press Reference. (2009). *Press Reference Pakistan*. Retrieved from <http://www.pressreference.com/No-Sa/Pakistan.html>

Rahman, T. (2004, January). Language policy and localization in Pakistan: proposal for a paradigmatic shift. *SCALLA Conference on computational linguistics*, 99(2004), 1-9

Rahman, T. (2005). The Muslim Response to English in South Asia: With Special Reference to Inequality Intolerance, and Militancy in Pakistan. *Journal of Language, Identity and Education*, 4(2), 119-135

Ramakrishnan, V. (2018, June 27). The Hindu's Mukund Padmanabhan on how to stay afloat in India's news industry. *Columbia Journalism Review*. <https://www.cjr.org/analysis/the-hindus-mukund-padmanabhan-on-how-to-stay-afloat-in-indias-news-industry.php>

Rana, M. A. (2019, January 29). Pakistani Media in the Era of Imran Khan. *The Diplomat*. <https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/pakistani-media-in-the-era-of-imran-khan/>

- Repucci, S., Pekkanen, R., Hannon, C., Brown, I., Mayberry, A., Stark, D., & Kooten, K. Van. (2018). The Global Implications of Populism. https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Task-Force_C_2018_Pekkanen_robert.pdf
- Riffe, D., Lacy, S., & Fico, F. (2019). *Analyzing Media Messages: Using Quantitative Content Analysis in Research* (4th ed.). Routledge.
- Rooduijn, M. (2014). The mesmerising message: The diffusion of populism in public debates in Western European media. *Political Studies*, 62(4), 726–744.
- Rooduijn, M., De Lange, S. L., & Van der Brug, W. (2014). A populist zeitgeist? Programmatic contagion by populist parties in Western Europe. *Party Politics*, 20(4), 563–575.
- Rumelhart, D. E. (1984). Schemata and the cognitive system. In J. R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), *Handbook of Social Cognition* (Vol. 1, pp. 161-188). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Saleem, S., & Siraj, A. (2019). Framing of Panama Leaks in Pakistani and Western Press. *Global Regional Review*. <https://grrjournal.com/article/Framing-of-Panama-Leaks:-A-Content-Analysis-of-Pakistani-and-Western-Press>
- Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. (1977). *Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Schenkel, M. (2024). Health emergencies, science contrarianism and populism: A scoping review. *Social Science & Medicine*, 312, 114234. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2024.114234>
- Scheufele, D. A., & Tewksbury, D. (2007). Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models. *Journal of Communication*.
- Schreier, M. (2012). *Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice*. London: SAGE Publication Ltd.

Schulz, W. (2004). Reconstructing Mediatization as an Analytical Concept. *European Journal of Communication*, 19(1), 87–101.

Scroggins, D. (2012). *Wanted Women: Faith, Lies, and the War on Terror: The Lives of Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Aafia Siddiqui*. Harper Collins. ISBN 9780062097958.

Sekine, K. (1992). *BENAZIR BHUTTO: HER POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN PAKISTAN*. Masters Thesis submitted to Graduate School of University of Massachusetts. <https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3593&context=theses>

Sheafer, T. (2001). Charismatic skill and media legitimacy: An actor-centered approach to understanding the political communication competition. *Communication Research*, 28, 711–736.

Shehzad, R. (2022, May 22). Is Populism Paralyzing Pakistan? The Tribune. Available at <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2357682/is-populism-paralysing-pakistan>

Siddiqua, A. (2021). *A comparative analysis of conflict reporting on Kashmir issue in Pakistani and Indian press* (Ph. D's thesis). University of Gujrat, Pakistan.

Sinha, S. (2017). Fragile Hegemony: Modi, Social Media, and Competitive Electoral Populism in India. *International Journal of Communication*, 11, 4158–4180. Retrieved from <http://ijoc.org>

Siraj, S. A. (2006). *Image of Pakistan in the US Media: Exploring News Framing*. University of Southern Illinois Carbondale, USA.

Siraj, S. A. (2008, May). War or peace journalism in elite US newspapers: Exploring news framing in Pakistan-India conflict. *Strategic Studies*, 28(1).

Snellinger, A. (2018). Encyclopedia of Asian History. <https://asiasociety.org/education/pakistan-political-history>

- Sonwalkar, P. (2005). Banal Journalism: The centrality of the "us-them binary in news discourse in Allan, S (ed), *Journalism: Critical Issues*. Berkshire. Open University Press, pp.261-273
- Stanyer, J., Aalberg, T., Esser, F., & De Vreese, C. H. (2019). Communicating Populism Comparing Actor Perceptions, Media Coverage, and Effects on Citizens in Europe. In C. Reinemann (Ed.), *Comparing Actor Perceptions, Media Coverage, and Effects on Citizens in Europe*. London: Carsten Reinemann.
- Stewart, J., Mazzoleni, G., & Horsfield, B. (2003). Power to the Media Managers. In G. Mazzoleni, J. Stewart & B. Horsfield (Eds.), *The Media and Neo-Populism: A Contemporary Comparative Analysis* (pp. 217–237). Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Strömbäck, J., & Kaid, L. L. (Eds.). (2008). *The handbook of election news coverage around the world*. Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203889873>
- Subramanian, N. (2007). Populism in India. *The SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 27(1), 81–91. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26999347>
- Taggart, P. (2000). *Concepts in Social Sciences: Populism*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Taggart, P., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2015). Dealing with Populists in Government: Some Comparative Conclusions. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1076230>
- Taguieff, P.-A. (1995). Political Science Confronts Populism: From a Conceptual Mirage to a Real Problem. *Telos*, 103, 9–43.
- Tewksbury, D., & Scheufele, D. A. (2009, January). News Framing Theory and Research. In *Media Effects* (3rd ed., pp. 17-33). Erlbaum. DOI: 10.4324/9780429491146-4
- The Hindu. (2020). Privacy Policy. <https://www.thehindugroup.com/privacy.html>
- The Hindu. (n.d.). About Us. Retrieved from <https://www.thehindu.com/aboutus/>

The News Minute. (2018, March 26). *'We take a stand when it Al Jazeera*. (2018, December 3). Zaffar Abbas: 'Journalism has never been more challenging'. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/3/zaffar-abbas-journalism-has-never-been-more-challenging>

The Times of India. (n.d.). About Us. Retrieved from <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/aboutus.cms>

Thomas, P. N. (2023). Populism, religion, and the media in India. *International Journal of Communication*, 17, 2925–2938. <https://doi.org/1932-8036/20230005>

Thomas, R. (2000). How India sees through western reports. In P. Hammond & E. Herman (Eds.), *Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis* (pp. 185-195). London: Pluto.

Times of India. (2019). Lok Sabha Election Result 2019. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/election/results>

Urbinati, N. (2019). Political Theory of Populism. *Annual Review of Political Science*. Retrieved from <https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-070753>

V Political Process: Public Opinion, Attitudes, Parties, Forces, Groups And Election / Vie Politique: Opinion Publique, Attitudes, Partis, Forces, Groupes Et Élections. (2024). *International Political Science Abstracts*, 74(1), 66-133. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00208345241232781>

Van Aelst, P., Sheafer, T., & Stanyer, J. (2017). The personalization of mediated political communication. In C. de Vreese, F. Esser, & D. N. Hopmann (Eds.), *Political Communication in the Online World* (pp. 39–56). Routledge.

Varshneys, A. (2017). Narendra Modi: A Populist? The Indian Express. Available at <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-prime-minister-narendra-modi-a-populist-populism-democracy-donald-trump-pro-hindu-4901786/>

- Vossen K. (2012) Van marginaal naar mainstream? Populisme in de Nederlandse geschiedenis [From marginal to mainstream? Populism in Dutch history]. *Low Countries Historical Review*, 127(2), 28–54.
- Vreese, C. H. (2005). News framing: Theory and typology. *Information Design Journal + Document Design*, 13, 51-62.
https://claesdevreese.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/devreese_2005_2.pdf
- Vyas, S. (2022, March 22). Indians bored with politics of ideology. Populism speaks—from Modi to Kejriwal. The Print. Retrieved at <https://theprint.in/opinion/indians-bored-with-politics-of-ideology-populism-speaks-from-modi-to-kejriwal/893547/>
- Waisbord, S. (2018) Truth is What Happens to News, *Journalism Studies*, 19:13, 1866-1878, DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2018.1492881
- Walgrave, S., & De Swert, K. (2004). The Making of the (Issues of The) Vlaams Blok. *Political Communication*, 21(4), 479–500. doi:[10.1080/10584600490522743](https://doi.org/10.1080/10584600490522743)
- Ware, A. (2002). The United States Populism as Political Strategy. In Y. Mény & Y. Surel (Eds.), *Democracies and the Populist Challenge* (pp. 101–119). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wear, R. (2008). Permanent Populism: The Howard Government 1996–2007. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 37–41. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10361140802429247>
- Weyland, K. (2001). Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics. *Comparative Politics*, 34(1), 1–22
- Wicks, R. H. (1992). Schema theory and measurement in mass communication research: Theoretical and methodological issues in news information processing. In S. A. Deetz (Ed.), *Communication Yearbook*, 15, 115-145
- Wimmer, R. D., & Dominick, J. R. (1997). *Mass Media Research: An Introduction (5th ed.)*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

- Wimmer, R. D., & Dominick, J. R. (2011). *Mass Media Research: An Introduction: 9th Edition*. Wadsworth Cengage Learning
- Wimmer, R., & Dominick, J. (2013). *Mass Media Research: An Introduction*. Cengage Learning, 47(2), 47–36.
- Wodak, R. (2015). *The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean*. SAGE Publications. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446270073>
- World Association of Newspapers. (2008). *World Press Trends: Newspapers are a growth business*.
- Yilmaz, I. (2016). *Muslim Laws, Politics and Society in Modern Nation States: Dynamic Legal Pluralisms in England, Turkey and Pakistan*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Yilmaz, I., & Saleem, R. M. A. (2021). A Quest for Identity: The Case of Religious Populism in Pakistan. *Populism & Politics*. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). <https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0007>
- Yilmaz, I., & Shakil, K. (2021). Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf: Pakistan's Iconic Populist Movement. ECPS. <https://www.populismstudies.org/pakistan-tehreek-e-insaf-pakistans-iconic-populist-movement/>
- Yousaf, Z., Ahmed, M., & Fiaz, M. (2018). Framing of China Pak Economic Corridor (CPEC) in the Leading Press of Pakistan and China. *The Pakistan Journal of Social Issues*, June, 163–172.
- Zaheer, L. (2017). Editorial Coverage of Kashmir Conflict in Pakistani Media. *Pakistan Vision*, 18(1).
- Zaidi, M. (2022). Khan's populist formula. The News. <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/947414-khan-s-populist-formula>

Zaidman-Zait A. (2014) Content Analysis. In: Michalos A.C. (eds) *Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research*. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0753-5_552

Zain, A. (2019). Rise Of Modi's Tech-Populism In India, 6(1), 199–208. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334114323_Rise_of_Modi's_Tech-Populism_in_India

Zhang, Y., & Wildemuth, B. (2009). Qualitative analysis of content. In B. Wildemuth (Ed.), *Applications of social research methods to questions in information and library sciences* (pp. 308–319). Westport, CT: Libraries Unlimited.

APPENDIX-A

Coding Sheet

ID	Newspaper ID	Topic	Time		Tone	Frames		Level of Frames					Mediagenic Attribute			
			1	2		Approach based frames	Language based frames	1	2	3	4	5	Human-Interest	Controversial		
			A	B												

NOTE:

ID Number: Each story will be assigned a successive number

Newspaper ID: The Dawn (Pakistan) = 1, The News International (Pakistan) = 2, The Hindu (India) = 3, The Times of India (India) = 4

Topic: Corruption = 1, Economy = 2, Election = 3, Defense and Foreign Affairs = 4, Government Performance = 5, Others = 6

Tone: Supportive= 1, Critical = 2, Neutral = 3

APPENDIX-B

Coding Manual

V1-Newspaper

1=Dawn 2=The News International 3 = Hindu 4 = The Times of India

V2-Topics

1=Corruption

2=Economic Inequality

3=Election

4=Defense and Foreign Affairs

5= Government Performance

6= Others

V3-Time

1= Pre-Election Pakistan

2= Post-Election Pakistan

3= Pre-Election India

4= Post-Election India

V4- Tone

1= Supportive

2=Critical

3= Neutral

V5- Approach Based Frames

1= People centric Frame

1= Stressing merits of the people (1=Yes, 2=No)

2=Flattering Accomplishment of the people (1=Yes, 2=No)

3=Indicating closeness of the people (1=Yes, 2=No)

4=Treating the people as a discrete entity with common feelings, desires and will (1=Yes, 2=No)

2= Anti-elitist Frame

1=Blame Game & Stereotyping (1=Yes, 2=No)

2=Elite as untrustworthy (1=Yes, 2=No)

3=Eliminating the elite from the people (1=Yes, 2=No)

4=Perceived Elite as an enemy (1=Yes, 2=No)

3=Nationalism Frame

1=Sense of Patriotism (1=Yes, 2=No)

2=Ideal Nation (1=Yes, 2=No)

3=Preferring personal national interest (1=Yes, 2=No)

4=Moralism Frame

1=Morally pure and fully unified (1=Yes, 2=No)

2=liable for real or imaginary complaints (1=Yes, 2=No)

3=Appealing Action (1=Yes, 2=No)

5=Personalization Frame

1=Over-exposure of populist leader (1=Yes, 2=No)

2=Imaginary / superficial personality (1=Yes, 2=No)

3= Others (1=Yes, 2=No)

V6-Lanuage Based Frames**1= Demonizing Frame**

1= Name Calling (1=Yes, 2=No)

2=Using Slangs (1=Yes, 2=No)

3=Sarcasm (1=Yes, 2=No)

4=Hyperbole (1=Yes, 2=No)

2=Emotive Frame

1= I vs. We (1=Yes, 2=No)

2=Emotional phrase (1=Yes, 2=No)

3=Determine quotes (1=Yes, 2=No)

V7- Mediagenic Attributes

1=Human-Interest Attributes

2=Controversial Attributes

V8- Level of Frames

1= People centric Frame

2= Anti-elitist Frame

3=Nationalism Frame

4=Moralism Frame

5=Personalization Frame

6=Demonizing Frame

7=Emotive Frame

V9- General Depiction of Frames

1= Approach Based Frames

2=Languages Based Frames

APPENDIX-C

Coding Instructions

Kindly use separate coding sheet for every individual news story

Newspaper

Encircle the name of the newspaper also the statistical digit preceding the name of the newspaper in which the news story was published. Only one option can be encircled.

1=Dawn

2=The News

3= The Hindu

4= Times of India

Topics

Read the list of the Topics carefully. Circle the event according to the topics as well as the numerical digit at the start of the topic, reported in a story. Only One Option can be encircled.

1=Corruption: The incidents relevant to Corruption issues of elites and authorities including bribery, black money, inefficiency, lack of transparency and nepotism etc. Intentionally spreading negative information in the selected time period of both India and Pakistan.

2=Economic Inequality: The announcements of regarding trade tariffs, unemployment, economic disparities, pay rates, open investing, obligation, emergency, charges, business enterprise, contracts, unemployment and self-employment are considered as Economy inequality issue.

3=Election: The stories and announcements about election, changes in electoral law and policies, ending and interference of the establishment, populist campaign strategies etc. are assumed as Election.

4=Defense and Foreign Affairs: Incidents about international relations, foreign policies, pacts, army, military expenditure, and national security are categorized as Defense and foreign affairs

5=Government Performance: Information about laws planned to progress government performance, responsibilities including setting objectives, evaluating consequences, reporting development, focus on the rise of populist leaders, their tactics and rhetoric are etc. are measured as govt. performance

6=Others: Information about religious ideology, technology, climate changes, ethics and moral values, modification in legislation, convictions, pensions, health, education, welfare state and social justice are assumed as Other.

Frames

People-Centric Frame

In order to investigating the incidence of people-centric frame indicators read the story carefully. If the People-centric indicator is present (once or more than once) encircle 1=yes in front of the following indicator; if the indicator is not existing in any paragraph en circle 2=No in front of the following indicator. It is likely that you may find no people-centric indicators in the story. Against each indicator only one option can be circled either 1=yes or 2=No.

1= Stressing merits of the people (1=Yes, 2=No)

2=Flattering Accomplishment of the people (1=Yes, 2=No)

3=Indicating closeness of the people (1=Yes, 2=No)

4=Treating the people as a discrete entity with common feelings, desires and will (1=Yes, 2=No)

Stressing merits of the people

If the story emphasized on common people's rights and merits. And focused only on the issues of common people is considered as stressing merits of the people.

Flattering Accomplishment of the people

If the story highlighted and realized the activities and loyalties of common people towards populist leaders is count as Flattering accomplishment of the people.

Indicating closeness of the people

If the story depicted the sense of representative and assumed the populist leader as the only leader of their representative is assumed as Closeness of the people

Treating the people as a discrete entity with common feelings, desires and will

If the story threatened the people for their rights and propagated their emotions towards their feelings is perceived under this context.

Anti-Elitist Frame

To examining the existence of Anti-Elitist indicators read the story carefully. If the Anti-Elitist indicator is present (once or more than once) encircle 1=yes in front of the following indicator; if the indicator is not present in any paragraph encircle 2=No. It is probable that you may find no relevant indicators in the story. In contradiction of every indicator only one option can be circled either 1=yes or 2=No.

1=Blame Game & Stereotyping (1=Yes, 2=No)

2=Elite as untrustworthy (1=Yes, 2=No)

3=Eliminating the elite from the people (1=Yes, 2=No)

4=Perceived Elite as an enemy (1=Yes, 2=No)

Blame Game & Stereotyping

If the story highlighted the approach that distance from a problem, avoid taking responsibility for blunders, scapegoating or trying to shift the blame it is coded as Blame Game & Stereotyping.

Elite as untrustworthy

If the story concerned doubts on activities and actions of populist leaders, assumed them untrusted for common people and associated the illegal and wrong strategies of them is coded under this category.

Eliminating the elite from the people

If the story disseminated the elite group from common people because of their actions and attitudes and depicted the negative image of the elite is measured for this indicator.

Perceived Elite as an enemy

If the story supposed populist as foe for poor class and identified these elites as evil, corrupt, and an obstacle to focus on public centrism is come under this section.

Nationalism/Nativism Frame

In order to scrutinizing the presence of Nationalism frame, indicators read the story wisely. If the Nationalism indicator is existing (once or more than once) circumscribe 1=yes in front of the relevant indicator; if the indicator is not present in any section encircle 2=No. It is possible that you may find no war indicators in the story. Against each indicator only one option can be encircled either 1=yes or 2=No.

1=Sense of Patriotism (1=Yes, 2=No)

2=Ideal Nation (1=Yes, 2=No)

3=Preferring national interest (1=Yes, 2=No)

Sense of Patriotism

If the story highlighted the nationalist approach to influence the public and focused on ethnocentric values is concluded as Patriotism.

Ideal Nation

If the story provoked the sense of mother land and tried to manipulate the public via emotional appeal is coded as ideal nation.

Preferring national interest

If the story incited the action and activities of national interests and represented Virtuous appeal is slanted as Preferring national interest.

Moralism Frame

To find out Moralism frame indicators read the news story carefully. If the indicator of moralism frame is present encircle 1=yes and if the indicator is not present in any paragraph encircle 2=No. It is possible that you may find no indicators in the story. Then encircled either 1=yes or 2=No.

1=Morally pure and fully unified (1=Yes, 2=No)

2=liable for real or imaginary complaints (1=Yes, 2=No)

3= Repulsive Action (1=Yes, 2=No)

Morally pure and fully unified

If the news stories highlighted the populist leaders in a position of ethical judgment, and recommended ideal social life is considered as morally pure and fully unified.

Liable for real or imaginary complaints

If the news story blamed populists for their act and activities and associated them with fake action is coded as imaginary complaints.

Appealing Action

If the story showcases peaceful or pleasant actions that measured morally or socially acceptable is coded as Appealing Action.

Personalization Frame

To examine personalization frame indicators read the news story carefully. If the indicator of personalization frame is present encircle 1=yes and if the indicator is not present in any paragraph encircle 2=No. It is possible that you may find no indicators in the story. Then encircled either 1=yes or 2=No.

1=Over-exposure of populist leader (1=Yes, 2=No)

2=Imaginary / superficial personality (1=Yes, 2=No)

3= Others (1=Yes, 2=No)

Over-exposure of populist leader

If the news story shared personal views, life style and routine of an individual is considered personalized frame. This is usually related to stories of human interest.

Imaginary / superficial personality

If the story presented populist leaders as imaginary character and highlighted their personality with extra ordinary deeds is called superficial personality.

Others

If the story narrative the additional characteristics of the populist leaders, is considered as others.

Demonizing Language

To investigate the indicators of demonizing frame read the whole story carefully. If the indicator of personalization frame is present encircle 1=yes and if the indicator is not present in any paragraph encircle 2=No. It is possible that you may find no indicators in the story. Then encircled either 1=yes or 2=No. News stories highly covered demonizing

language of populist leaders included name calling and using slangs, sarcasm and hyperbole blaming is considered demonizing language.

Name Calling

If the news story indicated populist leader used various labels to insulting or patronizing called as Name Calling.

Using Slangs

If the story including words and expressions that are thought to be extremely casual, and often confined to a certain setting or group of people, marked as Slangs.

Sarcasm

If the story is characterized deliberate infliction of hurt by mockery, teasing, or ridicule. And the purpose of the mocking is to condemn and reprove is assumed as Sarcasm.

Hyperbole

Exaggeration used as a rhetorical tool or figure of speech is known as hyperbole. It emphasizes, arouses powerful emotions, and leaves a lasting impact in a story.

Emotive Language

To investigate the indicators of demonizing frame read the whole story carefully. If the indicator of personalization frame is present encircle 1=yes and if the indicator is not present in any paragraph encircle 2=No. It is possible that you may find no indicators in the story. Then encircled either 1=yes or 2=No. News stories appealed emotions and motivating the people is considered as Emotive language. Extensive use of 'I and We', emotional phrase and determine quotes to boost the support from public.

I vs. We

If the story particularly showed the intention of populists on the speeches, arguments and comments that highlighting the 'Me' and 'Us' feelings are marked as I vs. We.

Emotional phrase

If the story predicting the expressive phrases and depicted any emotions, e.g. Happy, Anger, Sad or hatred marked as Emotional phrases.

Determine quotes

If the story covered the quotations and motivational phrases of populist leaders especially for the purposes of positive image are assumed as Determine Quotes.

Mediagenic Attribute

To estimate the mediagenic attributes in the news story mediagenic Personalities included labels and appreciating terms related to Human-Interest Attributes or Controversial Attributes of populists. These terms refer to characteristics or abilities that make an individual, appropriate for media coverage and attention. These attributes are often associated with the ability to capture the interest of the media and the public. In this regard two aspects are generated, for Human-Interest Attribute encircle 1=Yes. and for Controversial Attributes marked 2=No.

Time Period

To investigated the media coverage of populist leaders of India and Pakistan time period is divided into two frame 1=No for Pre-election period of Pakistan and 2=No is for Post-election Pakistan phase. Similarly, for each period 1= is represented the coverage of elite press Pakistan in Pre-election phase and 2= is for popular press Pakistan. While 3= is for elite press India and 4= to popular press India is representative of post-election phase. E.g., 25th January, 2018- July 24th, 2018 is assumed for pre-election phase of Pakistan and August 25th, 2018- February 25th, 2019 for post-election phase. While for India October 11th, 2018- April 10th, 2019 is observed for pre-election period and from May 20th, 2019- November 19th, 2019 as post-election phase.

Tone

To understand the tone of the news story that emphasizes political struggle and enthusiastic gestures. Story makes favorable conditions for populist, considered supportive tone marked 1=No. story that presented unfavorable conditions encircle 2=No.

considered as critical tone. If the story no consisted supportive or critical aspects of the category is selected as Neutral and circle No.3.

Level of Frames

If the total number of people centric indicators are higher in the story encircle 1=people centric frame. If the number of Anti-elitist indicators is higher encircling 2= for Nationalist frame encircle 3=No. similarly for Moralism Frame, Personalized Frame, Demonizing Language and Emotive language marked No. 4,5,6,7 respectively.

Source	Method	Journal/ Book	Aim	Summary
(Akker man, 2011)	Case study	Journalism	To investigate the portrayals of right-wing populists and British politicians in Dutch media	The populist media platforms are supposed to prioritize the public wellbeing, express their anti-elite stance, and to focus on conflicts. In this respect, popular media should offer favorable rambling opportunity structure for the populist groups
(Kräm er, 2014).	Literature Review	Communication Theory	To examine the framing of populist in mass media all over the world	Besides construction of several frames and representations, media populism also involves highlighting the characteristics and attitudes of populists to indicate the relevance and gain support from the public. Still, populism is different than merely creating the perceptions of non-elite political actors.
(Manucci & Weber, 2017)	Case study	Swiss Political Science Review	To investigate the media representations of populism	Mainstream political parties are not mainly populist. Despite we can anticipate their stance in the near future, they have gained a strong media exposure due to their manifesto. Whether or not these parties will adopt an explicit populist stance, they are having a stable position in the

				Western European politics along-with their party manifesto as populist and focused towards anti elitism.
(Salojärvi, 2019)	Case study, content analysis	Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies	To examine the media portrayals of Venezuelans populists	Media representation is a multi-dimensional process that is based on the aim and ownership regarding its reporting preferences. Both types of representations studied in the current study witness how the political leaders are portrayed through the media based on their political stance (Political or Populism)
(Hamelers & Vliegthart, 2020),	Case study	Journalism Studies	To examine the altering patterns and frequency of populism in Dutch media	As compared to the older times, contemporary newspapers reporting gave a strong focus to populists in the Dutch newspapers. Yet during the past 28 years, the focus towards populist movements, anti-elitism, increased preference to common man, and left and right exclusionism subsequently increased as one of the major focuses of Dutch news media.

Figure 2 Summary of Media Populism

Source	Method	Journal/ Book	Aim	Summary
(Müller, 2016),	Report	The Research Repository of OpenMinded.com	To highlight the role and stance of populists	Populists have large majorities in the parliaments that further help and support them to create their own regimes. Although, such regimes look like democracies but internally, they are subjected to perpetuate and sustain the populist dominance in the political system
(Gagnon et al., 2018)	Case study	Democratic Theory	To examine what populists stands for in contemporary politics?	When the populists' parties stand against elites it does not mean that populism in the government become "self-contradictory". However, all these failures are mainly attributed to elites whether they are at home or outside the country. Several populists also prefer to behave like victims or mistreated minorities.
(Repucci et al., 2018)	Research Report	The Research Repository of the University of Washington	To analyze the impacts of populism	Despite populism is considered as a voice of common man, it is not a validate version of democracy nor it necessarily voices the public stance. Populism exposes crevices within a society based on such as economic class, race, ethnicity, cultural clash and others.
(Mueller, 2019).	Review article	Philosophy and Social Criticism	To examine the meaning of populism	Existing examples create several concerns as populists have large majorities in the parliaments that further help and support them to create their own regimes. Although, such regimes look like democracies but internally, they are subjected to perpetuate and sustain the populist dominance in the political system.
(Mansbridge & Macedo, 2019)	Review method	Annual Review of Law and Social Science	To examine the populism in the global context	Despite populists opposed cultural elitism in the United States, it was marginal and not considered as targeted against any specific cultural elites. On the

				other hand, the contemporary populist movements have confronted to many military elites commonly as standing against common wellbeing
--	--	--	--	---

Figure 3 Summary of Literature Concerning Populism in General

Source	Method	Journal/ Book	Aim	Summary
(Krekó & Juhász, 2019)	Case study	Turkish Policy Quarterly	To examine the patterns and techniques of populist discourse in Hungary	Populists commonly having a stance against anyone deliberately or not deliberately following the historical political conduct. Also, both Hungarian and Polish populists criticize their position in the European Union as they commonly perceive themselves as treated as Second Class Citizen those further increases distrust and cynicism on European Union.
(Decadri & Boussalis, 2020).	Content analysis., Case study	Journal of Election, Public Opinion and Parties	To examine the populist discourse and focus in the Italian political arenas	Several scholars consider speeches from Donald Trump as simple as understandable for a sixth-grade student. Juan Peron's speech on the other hand, is considered as comprehensively understandable for both educated and uneducated individuals. Member from the French National Front are more likely to use plain language. Silvio Berlusconi's discourse style is described as popular and easily understandable for everyone.
(Krekó, 2020)	Case study	Johns Hopkins University Research Repository	To examine the focus of populist discourse in Hungary and Poland	People-centered agenda in populist discourse and anti-elite stance was equally visible in the both Polish and Hungarian pieces of discourse. Populists in both countries were also found supporting the political pluralism as a primary component of democracy, yet Hungarians were more pluralist than the Polish.
(Hameleers, 2020)		Journalism Studies	To examine the coverage of populist discourse and its focus	Research on media and populism highlights two aspects: First, media help providing a platform to the populist as a source to communicate with the public, share their stance, and attain necessary support. Second, media portray and represent the populist stance in a particular manner, mostly as opposing or sup [porting the

				rhetoric in terms of public wellbeing and development.
(Heckman et al., 2021)	Review method	Handbook of Populism in the Asia Pacific	Examining the nature of populist discourse	Populist discourse is “Public-centered” as they are mainly aimed at highlighting the public issues. Through their discourse, these populists focus on leaving an impression of public wellbeing and awareness.

Figure 4 Summary of Literature Concerning People-Centric Approach

Source	Method	Journal/ Book	Aim	Summary
(Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011b)	Case study, quantitative content analysis	West European Politics	To analyse the populism approaches regarding their agenda	Populism is based on a thin ideology that tends to differentiate the existing society with the ideal society based on demolishing the political powers and elites. Here populism divides its ideological propositions into “elite-centric” and “public-centric” approaches and further identify them as having a people-centric approach against the democratic system.
(Ernst et al., 2017)	Case study	Swiss Political Science Review	To analyse anti-elitism approach in Swiss media	Populists have much affinity in the political spectrum due to their greater association with the mass media resources. These populists are considered as having closest links with the journalists due to elements like news values.
(Polk et al., 2017)	Case study	Research and Politics	To investigate salience of anti-elitism in populist movements to accelerate anti-corruption agenda	Many examples witnessed changing patterns of populist rhetoric based on anti-elite approaches used by populists. Anti-elitist stance is a primary component of populist ideology as the anti-corruption salience is a core concept of populist movements.
(Schulz et al., 2017)	Review study	International Journal of Public Opinion Research	To investigate populism approach through three different dimensions	Anti-elitist stance is a primary component of populist ideology as the anti-corruption conducted case study in Sweden. Populist attitudes that are based on anti-elite and anti-corruption are the major factor behind an increased public support.
(Geurkink et al., 2020)	Longitudinal study	Political Studies	To examine the role of political trust, attitudes, and rhetoric in gaining support	Anti-elitism and political efficacy remain as the most motivating factors behind the relevant voting decisions. However, the varying support for all the populists reveals that, there can be many other factors that result in altering support for all.

Figure 5 Summary of Literature Concerning Political Polarization

Source	Method	Journal/ Book	Aim	Summary
	Review essay	Tony Blair Institute of Global Change Research Repository	To understand the aims of populism all around the world	In populists' political communication, term "the people" is of greater importance due to its potential meaning that are directly linked with its aims. "People" can be referred to the whole population, a fraction of even an individual whose interest are aimed to serve by the populists of the nationality, culture, religion or other significant relevance.
	Case study, comparative analysis	Ecological Economics	Role of populism in sustainable development	The argumentation about emotions and individual-centrism in populism ideologies pose a direct link between populist stance on people's wellbeing. Here these populists are primarily focused on a single group of people that are considered more deprived and suffering, that further help the populists to gain the public support.
	Case study	Sustainability	To examine the implementation of sustainable development goals through populism in Europe	Populists are critical about the performance of democratic government and eager to bring a positive change, supporting the public interests. However, a majority of populists tend to serve the interests of people from a particular group, class, or region, that further narrow down the scope, practices, and goals of populism.
	Literature Review	Religions	To examine the populist's attention towards one's religion and emotions	Populism in every country is a collaborative factor of (i) the demand of populism, (ii) the supply of populism, and (iii) the approaches focused on individual and collective goals. For this purpose, the existing literature widely witness populism movements driven due to issues such as economic declination, immigration concerns, social deprivation, and political instability.

Figure 6 Summary of Literature Concerning Individual-Centric Approach

Source	Method	Journal/ Book	Aim	Summary
(Martinelli, 2018)	Review approach	Book-When Populism Meets Nationalism	To examine the potential relationship between populism and nationalism	The contemporary interpretation of the term “nationalism” and its relationship with the populism is ambiguous, polysemic, changes with time, and needs even more argumentation. Nationalism is a basic component of modernity and culture which changes overtime yet, creates a sensed of solidarity ad and national identity in a modern society.
(Bonikowski et al., 2019)	Research Essay	The Brown Journal of World Affairs	To analyze the use of nationalism by populists	The media narratives of Donald Trump lied on the fact that he is taking stance of national interest through his presence as a populist. However, President Obama contradicted media’s narratives and explained an explicit differentiation between opportunism and nationalism regarding Donald Trump.
(Lührmann & Hellmeier, 2020)	Review	Heinrich Böll Foundation	To examine the nationalistic approach of populists worldwide	The changing trends in political arenas and increased challenges to democratic establishments are mainly caused by political entities that are having aggressive rhetoric to gain support from their supports and demolish the democratic establishment.
(Jenne, 2021)	Research Essay	International Affairs	To introduce a framework for reducing the adverse impacts of nationalism and populism	The role of populism in prioritizing nationalism, and using ethno-nationalist master frame needs much debates as it leads to national revisionism and Omni-revisionism. Many studies also propose nationalism as a destructive factor when merged with the populism due to the adverse consequences.
(Singh, 2021)	Research Essay	Studies in Comparative International Development	To investigate the relationship between populism and nationalism	The current examples of populists in different countries proposes two basic postulations (i) Populism is equal to nationalism, or (ii) Populism is complete opposite to nationalism as indeed the collaboration of populism and nationalism in most of the examples remained destructive.

Figure 7 Summary of Literature Concerning Nationalism Approach

Source	Method	Journal/ Book	Aim	Summary
(Jensen, 2017)	Review study	Politik	To examine moral monopoly in populism	This anti-pluralism is against democracy where every individual has a right to think and act differently based on their personal judgments. On the other hand, populists represent an issue at stake as if it is strongly moral, requires an immediate action. Their stance is accompanied by character assassination, accusations regarding corruption, crooked way of thinking, an explicit negligence regarding public issues and an increased attention to personal interest and gains.
(Vittori, 2017)	Case study	Revista Española de Ciencia Política	To examine moralism as a threat to democratic sovereignty	Political researchers define populists in several ways, yet the core proposition is regarding how people perceive political elites, restoring the thinking where “the people” are righteous and deserved to be served by the political elites. The ideological moralism in populism also assumes that, people should attain their rights and restore the balance of power in a democratic political system.
(McKibben, 2020)	Research review	Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy	To examine the difference between moralism and moral criticism in populism	Moralism is an under-theorized and underrepresented phenomenon, mostly considered as a threat to a society. If populists juxtapose moralism with a moral criticism, aimed solely at highlighting the wrong doings and emphasizing the significance of public welfare in populism, the meaning of moralism will be mutilated. Talking
(Kim, 2021)	Research review	Politics	Examining the nature of populist approach in realms of moralism	Moral criticism in the populism is not merely an act of expressing our own moral agency also, accelerating one’s moral instinct and expecting an active moral action from that agency. As in populism instance, when an accusation is excessive and inappropriate, exhibits a distinct punitive behavior from the political

				elites, populism criticizing the act of negligence and self-centered behavior becomes a fundamental requirement of populist stance.
(Rueda, 2021)	Research essay	Political Studies	Investigating the role of moral criticism in moralism	Criticism as important part of populism as noted that moral criticism is a part of populist morality. We need moral criticism populism to counteract against the abhorrent behavior, to preserve our rights, and the rights of those who are deprived, susceptible and more prone to political oppression. If we stop blaming or looking for the responsible factors, it might leave a message that deprivation, oppression, and imbalanced power distribution, all are acceptable.

Figure 8 Summary of Literature Concerning Moralism Approach

Source	Method/ Design	Journal/ Book	Aim	Summary
(Bakker et al., 2010)	Case qualitative	European Journal of Political Research	To investigate the relationship between populists' rhetoric and anti-establishment agenda	Many times, supporting the populist stance is also seen as irrational which involves a blunt voting decision against the establishment with no realistic purposes regarding public wellbeing and development. But it is also not opposing the voting decision of people against establishment as common man always makes vote for the common wellbeing.
(Vlad, 2019)	Case study (Brexit UK)	NORDSCI Conference	To highlight the populist rhetoric during Brexit	Populist rhetoric has gained a greater attention from the very beginning. However today, with the proliferation of communication platforms, this populist rhetoric is considered as an integral part of political and cultural discourse.
(Bos & Brants, 2014)	Longitudinal Study	European Journal of Communication	To examine the populist rhetoric in the Dutch media platforms	Despite the populists' discourse especially belong to Pim Fortuyn was based on the criticism regarding the existing government policies and their incapability to solve the public problems, his discourse was not anti-establishment rather demanding to bring positive reforms in the existing democratic systems.
(Haas, 2020)	Case study	Book: Populism and the Significance of the Intellectual Virtues	To examine the underlying factors motivating the citizens to consider populists' rhetoric	The populists of Latin America (Left Leaning) are more likely to define their motives in inclusionary terms such as "how the people". On the other hand, European populism (Right Leaning) is strong exclusionary and differs from the populism in Latin America.

(Kustov & Dai, 2020)	Discourse analysis	Yale Jackson Institute's Research Repository	To highlight using the populist rhetoric by the political leaders	A majority of speeches contained populist rhetoric as a core strategy of political campaigns. The ideational approach to the populism in the study further indicated that the relevant speeches widely divided the society into two groups: "antagonistic" and "homogenous" or in other words, the corrupt and pure people with the slogan that, the political parties and their motives should reflect the public will and stance over political interest.
(IDEA, 2020)	Report	The Global State of Democracy. IN FOCUS	To highlight the impact of populism on the global democracies	Populism does not challenge any democratic system or anti-establishment sentiments. When a government fails to serve the public rights and wellbeing through the democratic means such as election, voters prefer to turn towards populists' beliefs as they hope their stance will be preferred and taken forward by the populists.

Figure 9 Summary of Literature Concerning Populists' Rhetoric

Source	Method	Journal/ Book	Aim	Summary
(Moehler et al., 2005)	Research Perspective	Foreign Affairs	To analyse the governments' interest in political behavior	A desire to engage in life-effecting decision is common among all, but the political institutions mold the way people desire to involve in the political process, with what they want and what should be required the outcome
(Dalton & Klingemann, 2011)	Literature Review method	The Oxford Handbook of Political Science	To examine the existing approaches on political behavior	Socio-political; modernization is now introducing new trends in the developing world as third wave of political democratization has greatly reformed the political systems worldwide particularly in Asia, Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa.
(Settle, 2014)	Research Perspective	College of William & Mary's Research Repository	To analyze the foundations and theories of political behavior	Despite knowing the fact that their vote will not influence the results of election, millions of Americans dominate the rational calculation to "free ride" by actively participating in the voting process in every four years.
(Ley, 2014)	Mixed-method Study	Duke University's Research Repository	To examine the political behavior by using fear as a force to improve voters' participation	Understanding the decision regarding using violence is not understandable phenomenon, yet focusing on people's political behavior was an important decision by the local government as our current understanding of political behavior is mostly in the peaceful democratic contexts
(Nur et al., 2020)	Case study method	International Journal of Innovation, Creativity and Change	To examine the patterns of Indonesian government in improving political	Some studies suggest the reason of low political participation during the election is that the Indonesian government do not much acknowledge the political participation of public and also, prefer to keep people

			behavior during election	uninformed about the political issues in the country.
--	--	--	--------------------------	---

Figure 10 Summary of Literature Concerning Political Behaviour